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Preface
Many countries are moving towards greater reliance on market insti
tutions, and as part of this process they are developing and strengthen
ing their private pension systems. At the same time, the aging of
populations is straining social security systems. As a result of these
trends, future retirees will rely increasingly on private pensions to pro
vide retirement income.
This book identifies important issues involved in developing and
managing private pension systems and examines how selected coun
tries have dealt with these issues. It discusses a wide range of experi
ence that may be useful for policymakers to consider in developing
pension policies.
This book grew out of discussions between the authors in Japan in
October 1993. John Turner gratefully acknowledges the financial sup
port of the Franco-American Commission for Educational Exchange
and the Commission for the International Exchange of Scholars. He
expresses his appreciation to the Institut de Recherches Economiques
et Sociales for providing a productive working environment, and in
particular, he expresses appreciation to Lucy apRoberts and Emmanuel
Reynaud. The authors acknowledge the following people who have
collaborated on related work: Stuart Dorsey, Sophie Korczyk, David
Rajnes, and especially Lorna Dailey.
John Turner acknowledges with great appreciation his parents
Henry and Mary, and the support of his wife Kathy Peery and his
daughter Sarah; they bore the primary burden of his absence, which
allowed him to write this book. Noriyasu Watanabe expresses his
appreciation to his mother Miyako (82 years old), his daughters Maki
and Akemi, and to his wife, Harumi.
Lucy apRoberts, Joanne Brodsky, Lorna Dailey, Judy Gentry, David
Rajnes, and two anonymous reviewers read the entire manuscript and
made many useful comments. In addition, pension scholars from Ger
many, the United Kingdom, and other countries contributed to the book
by explaining aspects of their countries' pension systems.
The material in the book is the responsibility of the authors and does
not represent the position of any institution with which they are associ
ated.

The Authors
This book was written while John A. Turner was a Senior Fulbright
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1
The Trend Toward
Private Pensions
Economic insecurity among the elderly is a universal problem.
Many industrialized countries have dealt with this problem by develop
ing retirement income systems likened to a "three-legged stool." 1 This
image refers to the three primary sources of income for the nonworking elderly: government-provided social security, employer-provided
pensions, and household-provided savings. 2 The three-legged stool,
however, is more an ideal than a reality. In most countries that use this
approach, only households with higher income—fewer than half of
retirees—actually receive income from all three sources.
Pension systems are the result of cultural and economic forces and
reflect different political philosophies concerning the relative roles of
government, employers, and individuals in providing retirement
income. In some countries, the ideas of national solidarity and commu
nal responsibility are important, and government plays a major role in
providing retirement income. In other countries, a high value is placed
on individual responsibility and freedom of choice, and employers and
workers play a larger role in determining retirement income. Historical
experiences concerning inflation and the development of capital mar
kets also influence the development of pension systems. The result is a
diversity of systems among countries.
Regardless of the institutional arrangements of pension systems,
population aging is a fundamental force that affects the way retirement
income is provided. As populations age, the political power of the older
generation increases, but so also does the cost of providing retirement
benefits. The net effect is manifested in increasing payroll tax rates and
cutbacks in benefit generosity. These changes reduce the rate of return
on social security benefit programs, favoring the development of
funded private pensions.
In addition to demographic changes, the shift towards private
pensions may also be due to a move in many countries towards greater
reliance on market institutions. This move has resulted in some
countries from the fall of Communism. The trend has been more

2 The Trend Toward Private Pensions

widespread, however, with many countries seeking to reduce the role
of government in economic life.
Pension retirement benefits provided by private-sector employers
are an increasingly important source of retirement income in the
United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Western Europe. 3 Spain
in 1987 (Ruano 1995) and Italy in 1993, for example, countries that
have not had well-developed pension systems, have adopted compre
hensive legislation to encourage and regulate private pension plans.
Countries in Central and Eastern Europe are studying Western models
to develop reforms of their retirement income systems. Countries in
Latin America, following the lead of Chile, are moving towards pri
vate-sector pension systems. In 1993, Peru adopted a version of Chile's
pension system, followed by Argentina in 1994 (Campbell 1994).
Colombia has passed legislation calling for similar reforms. In the
United States, there has been a long-run trend of employer-provided
pensions providing a growing share of U.S. retirement income (Chen
1992).4 In short, these developments suggest that over the next decade,
the growing importance of private pensions—the privatization of
retirement income—will be worldwide.5
The primary purpose of private pensions traditionally has been to
provide retirement income, a purpose sometimes called "welfare capi
talism." Private pension systems, however, are increasingly being
called on to serve other functions. For example, the 1993 private pen
sion legislation in Italy was a response to the government's declared
aim of increasing savings and capital accumulation, supporting and
enlarging the domestic financial market, and creating the capacity to
absorb the large amount of assets to be sold during the process of
privatizing public enterprises.

Pension Terminology
Pension terminology varies among English-speaking pension
experts. While in many countries social security programs include a
wide range of benefits, social security refers, in this book, to a govern
ment-provided retirement income program. Employer-provided pen
sions include those provided by private-sector employers and those
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provided by public-sector employers for their employees. This book
focuses on private pensions. A private pension plan is an employer-pro
vided plan or an employee group-sponsored plan that provides retire
ment benefits for private-sector employees.
In an international comparison of pension plans, the variety of bene
fit arrangements blurs the distinctions among different types. Plans
providing cash benefits to older workers differ as to who sponsors
them, who is covered by them, and what purposes they are used for.
Pension plans for government-owned enterprises are plans in the pri
vate sector for enterprises that are owned by the government. Savings
plans are employer-sponsored plans that may be used for retirement or
for other purposes. Disability plans for older workers may allow a
worker to retire with a pension, but require the worker to have a medi
cal condition that affects the ability to work. Unemployment compen
sation plans for older workers may provide benefits that function as
retirement benefits, but they require that the worker qualify as unem
ployed. Severance pay plans may provide retirement benefits for older
workers, but they generally pay benefits regardless of the age at job
separation. When discussing private pension plans, it is worth keeping
in mind that other plans serve similar purposes.
A private pension plan may be voluntary or mandatory. This book
considers the mandatory pension plans in France and Switzerland to be
private pension plans because the assets of these plans remain under
private-sector control. While some plans serve multiple purposes, plans
used primarily for providing retirement income are considered in this
book to be retirement plans.

Overview
Social security powerfully influences private pensions. Social secu
rity benefit expenditures have been growing in the developed countries
of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).6 Social security expenditures as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) are a measure of the public burden of provid
ing old-age benefits. Table 1.1 shows that measure for the G7 coun
tries—the major democratic, developed economies. Between 1960 and
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1985, social security expenditures as a percentage of Gross Domestic
Product doubled in France, nearly tripled in Italy, and quadrupled in
Japan. In 1985, this percentage covered a fairly broad range, from a
low of 5.3 percent in Japan, to a high of 15.6 percent in Italy. Expendi
tures as a percentage of GDP will continue to grow, due to the large
increases in old-age dependency that will begin to occur early in the
twenty-first century (table 1.2). Population aging will be a particularly
serious problem in Japan. Because of long life expectancy, low fertility,
and low immigration in Japan, the projected old-age dependency ratio
(the ratio of the population aged 65 and older to the population aged 20
to 64) in the year 2025 will be nearly 50 percent higher than in the
United States at that time. Increasing expenditures on social security
have also been caused by a growth in the percentage of the aged who
are beneficiaries (the maturing of social security systems), and by
increases in benefit generosity in past years.
Social Security Expenditures as a Percentage of Gross
Domestic Product in Selected Countries, 1960-1985
1975
1960
Country
1980
1985
4.1
6.9
6.7
United States
7.2
4.4
3.7
2.8
Canada
5.4
11.5
10.1
6.0
France
12.7
12.1
12.6
9.7
Germany
11.8
12.0
10.4
5.5
15.6
Italy
4.4
2.6
1.3
5.3
Japan
4.0
6.3
6.0
United Kingdom
6.7
Table 1.1

SOURCE: Mitchell (1993).
NOTES: The percentage is the ratio of annual public expenditure on pensions to current-year
GDP. Public pensions in this table include both transfers through social programs and pension
payments to retired government employees. Privately sponsored pensions are not included, nor
are tax expenditures granted to private and/or public plan savings. Figures for Germany refer to
the former West Germany.

With social security growing relative to the economy, a number of
OECD countries are facing pressures to reduce their social security
benefits. Future social security benefits have been lowered by legisla
tion: in the United States in 1983, in Japan in 1985 and 1994, in the
United Kingdom in 1980 and 1986, in Germany in 1989, in France and
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Italy in 1993, and in Sweden in 1994. The United States, Germany, and
Japan have scheduled increases in the age for full benefits and a higher
reduction in benefits at early retirement. When the change is fully
implemented in the United States in 2022, benefits at early retirement
will be reduced by 12.5 percent below what they would have been had
no reduction occurred.7
Table 1.2 Old-Age Dependency Ratio in Selected Countries,
1990,2010, and 2025
2025
1990
2010
Country
22
34
21
United States
19
24
38
Canada
24
27
38
France
34
42
24
Germany
24
34
44
Italy
49
37
19
Japan
29
39
27
United Kingdom
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce (1993, p. 122)
NOTE' The old-age dependency ratio is measured here as the number of persons 65 years and
over per 100 persons 20 to 64 years.

In some countries, rather than directly lowering social security ben
efits, changes have been made that indirectly have that effect. France,
for example, has raised the qualifying period for full benefits from 37.5
years to 40 years, has raised the base earnings for computing benefits
from 10 to 25 years, and has changed the indexing of the earnings used
in computing the base from wage indexing to price indexing. These
changes will reduce social security benefits by 8 percent. Similar
changes have been made in Italy (Graham 1994). Thus, while social
security expenditures are growing relative to the economies of a num
ber of countries, legislative changes in place will cause the generosity
of social security benefits to decline.
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Effects of Shifting Towards Private Pension Systems
Government policy makers presumably base retirement income sys
tems on the relative merits of private pensions and social security.
There are important differences between the two: (1) private pensions
generally do not cover the entire private-sector workforce, while social
security generally does; (2) private pensions are at least partially
funded through investments in the private sector, while social security
generally is unfunded or has limited funding through holdings of gov
ernment bonds; (3) social security frequently provides complete index
ation for postretirement inflation, while private pensions provide
partial or no indexation; and (4) social security benefits are fully porta
ble between jobs, while private pension benefits in defined benefit
plans generally are not.8 (When a pension benefit is fully portable
between jobs, a job change causes no loss of future retirement bene
fits.)
Private pensions and social security may differ in how they affect
workers and retirees. A reduction in social security could have the most
serious consequences for low-income workers not covered by private
pensions, who depend primarily on social security for their retirement
income. Whether that effect occurs, with a consequent worsening of
the income distribution, depends on how social security benefits are
reduced. If social security is reduced across-the-board, as will happen
in the United States in the next century, then it appears the shift
towards private pensions would cause a worsening in the income distri
bution and an increase in poverty.9
Private pensions are at least partially funded in most OECD coun
tries, while social security is generally unfunded. Thus, a shift away
from social security toward private pension plans may increase
national savings. A survey of studies suggests that a one-dollar
increase in funding of a private pension plan increases aggregate sav
ings on average by 40 cents and decreases nonpension savings by 60
cents (Pesando 1992). Researchers do not agree on the size of this
effect, however, although most researchers have found at least a small
positive effect. In the countries of Eastern Europe, which have poorly
developed capital markets and thus fewer competing assets through
which to save, the effect of private pensions on net savings would prob-
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ably be greater than in countries with well-developed capital markets.
Studies of the effect of social security on savings generally find a nega
tive or insignificant effect (Feldstein 1974).
Because of differences in the degree and type of funding, social
security and private pensions are subject to different risks. Funded pri
vate pension systems face financial market risks. Inflation risk is
greater for private pension benefits than for social security benefits
because private pension plans lack full inflation protection after retire
ment. Also, funded private pension systems are more at risk due to
inflation than are unfunded public systems because of fixed rates of
return on some investments. Unfunded systems depend on wage pay
ments, which tend to keep pace with inflation better than do financial
rates of return. Because defined benefit private pensions are generally
not portable between jobs, they also have greater risk of benefit loss
due to job change than does social security. Workers face risks associ
ated with changeable political commitments to social security systems,
but also face risks concerning changeable laws affecting private pen
sions.
Private pensions are more expensive to administer than social secu
rity systems because of the economies of scale in administering social
security. On the other hand, private pensions offer greater flexibility
because they can be tailored to the needs of small groups of workers.

Private Pension Systems and Policies
In developing pension policy, it may be useful to understand the
experience of other countries with similar economies as they confront
problems concerning retirement income. For example, many countries
have legislated pension rules to protect workers against pension benefit
loss at job change. All countries face the problems of demographic
change and of inflation eroding the purchasing power of retirement
benefits. All countries must decide on the tax treatment of their pension
systems.
Private pension systems and policies can be analyzed by comparing
across pension systems, treating each country as an entire entity, or by
comparing across countries on individual issues without discussing
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entire pension systems. The first approach provides an understanding
of the major issues as to how different countries structure their pension
systems, but comparisons on individual policies are not as clearly
drawn. The second approach provides a clearer international compari
son on individual issues, but the major comparisons on system struc
ture are lost. This book adopts the second approach because that
approach is more useful for analyzing particular policy issues. It is
designed for readers wishing to learn about how different countries
address particular policy issues, rather than for those wishing an over
view of pension systems in different countries. This decision reflects
the availability of good country studies. 10

A Selective Summary of Pension Trends
This book discusses issues that arise as countries adopt and expand
private pension systems. In doing so, it identifies a number of interna
tional trends in various aspects of pension policy and systems. First,
there is a trend towards greater privatization of retirement income. This
is occurring through explicit privatization of social security and
through legislative cutbacks in the generosity of social security bene
fits. Chile has almost entirely privatized its system of retirement
income, and other countries have adopted partial versions of its system.
The United Kingdom and Japan both allow for partial privatization of
social security through "contracting out," which is known in the United
States (in the context of health care) as "pay or play." Germany has a
privatized system of pension benefit insurance.
Second, the aging of populations in developed countries is raising
the cost of providing social security benefits, but it is also making the
tax subsidies to support private pension systems more expensive. Pre
sumably in response to this, a number of countries have reduced the
generosity of the tax subsidies for private pension plans.
Third, in many countries there is a trend towards defined contribu
tion plans. This is at least partly the result of increasing regulation of
defined benefit plans. In some cases, it is the result of government pol
icy mandating the provision of defined contribution plans.
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Fourth, pension plans are investing increasingly in foreign securi
ties. Regulations inhibiting foreign pension investments have been
reduced or eliminated in some countries. In other countries, increased
foreign investment seems to be driven by a realization of the financial
benefits afforded by the greater diversification.
Fifth, many countries have reduced the loss of benefits suffered by
workers who change jobs. Pension portability has been enhanced by
reducing the years required for vesting and, in some countries, by
indexing (up to a ceiling inflation rate) the benefits of workers leaving
a job before retirement age.
Sixth, in most countries with pension systems the coverage rate of
workers has increased over the past twenty years. In more recent years,
this trend has stabilized or slightly reversed in some countries.

NOTES
1. Outside of the United States, the images of three pillars or three tiers are more commonly
used.
2. Earnings, disability programs, unemployment insurance, and poverty programs also pro
vide income for the elderly.
3. Reynaud (1994a) characterizes this analytical focus on the public/private division as an
Anglo-Saxon approach. In France, analysis is based on whether a pension is a basic pension or a
complementary pension. Reynaud also notes that when faced with the complexity of pension sys
tems, analysts tend to practice ethnocentnsm, applying a familiar analytical framework that does
not always correspond to the logic of the pension system being analyzed.
4. Because of the declining generosity of social security starting in the year 2000, it can be
expected that private pensions in the United States will provide a larger share of retirement
income in the future.
5. These trends suggest that there will be a convergence of retirement income policies as many
countries react to the changing demographic and political environment.
6. These countries include Japan, Canada, Australia, the United States, and the countries of
Western Europe.
7. Generally, when referring to an aspect of social security or pension law where the primary
source of the information is the law itself, secondary references are not given.
8. Multiemployer denned benefit plans are an exception. They allow unionized workers to
change jobs within a single union and geographic area without losing benefits. For other excep
tions see Turner (1993a).
9. This is the conclusion of Pestieau (1992).
10. Readers wishing to learn about particular countries should refer to the listing of countries
in the index. In addition, readers wishing an overview of the pension systems in Canada, Japan,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom can refer to Turner and Dailey (1991). Readers wishing
an in-depth analysis of the U.S. pension system can refer to Turner and Beller (1992). Additional
country studies available include: Chile (Diamond and Valdes-Pneto 1994); Japan (Clark 1991b);
Ireland (Hughes 1994); Germany (Bodie, Mitchell, and Turner 1995); France (Reynaud 1994b);
and Mexico (Cross 1994). The World Bank (1994) discusses the overall structure of retirement
income systems.

Basic Issues in Structuring
Pension Financing
An International Survey
Pension financing methods are important in the overall structure of
pension systems. A wide range of approaches have been adopted by
different countries in dealing with some of the basic financing issues.

Issues
The issues discussed below represent fundamental questions about
retirement income financing that must be addressed in designing new
pension systems or changing established ones. As a convenient reference
for comparing the structure of different pension plans, table 2.1 provides
an overview of the retirement income systems of the G7 countries.
1. To what extent should retirement income be privatized? Alterna
tively stated, What should be the relative roles of social security and
private pensions? The fundamental measure of the privatization of
retirement income is the percentage of retirement income provided
through the private sector.
Private pensions differ in their role as a source of retirement income
depending largely on how generous the social security program is. 1 In
Italy, for example, social security benefits are generous and there is lit
tle role for private pensions. In Germany, the social security system
provides generous benefits, even at relatively high incomes, and private
pensions are provided mainly to middle- and upper-income workers. In
Chile, most benefits are provided through the private sector, though
with extensive government regulation. In Japan and the United King
dom, social security benefits are moderate and private pension cover
age is more extensive. Japan and the United Kingdom have retirement
income systems that allow firms and workers to partially privatize their
retirement income by voluntarily withdrawing from part of social secu
rity. Those programs are described in the next chapter.
11

Table 2.1 Overview of Social Security and Private Pension Systems in Selected Countries, 1994
Private Pensions
Social Security
Financing

Country

Coverage

Payroll tax rate Type of system
Type of benefit
(including
Coverage-% of
disability
Average gross
working
Type of benefit insurance tax)
replacement rate
population
shared equally
including social
Average gross by employer and
security
Type of plan
employee
replacement rate

Financing
Benefit
insurance

Voluntary
Pensions linked
to average
earnings
U.S.

All workers

Canada

All residents for
flat-rate
pension; all
workers for
earnings-related
pension

(41%)
Flat-rate pension
and pension
linked to
average earnings
during working
life
(35%)

(50%)
Partially funded
12.4% payroll
tax
Pay-as-you-go
5.2% payroll tax
for earningsrelated pension;
flat-rate pension
from general
revenue

Defined benefit
and defined
contribution

Lump-sum
pensions or
annuities
(68%)

Funded
Yes, covering
most defined
benefit plans

Voluntary
(29%)
Predominantly
defined benefit

Lump-sum
pensions or
annuities
(70%)

Funded
Province of
Ontario only

Taxation
Employer
contributions
deductible
Employee
contributions
taxed (except
401(k))
Benefits liable
for income tax.
Employer and
employee
contributions
deductible up to
a ceiling.
Benefits liable
for income tax.

Pay-as-you-go
Pensions linked
to average
earnings of best
10 years
France

All workers

(50%)

Pensions linked
to average
earnings during
working life
Germany

All workers

Italy

Pensions linked
Employees, self- to average
employed,
earnings of last
certain
5 years
professional
categories
(80%)

(50%)

16.45% payroll
tax (not
including
disability,
6.65% employee
and 9.8%
employer)

Compulsory
(100%)

Annuities

Pay-as-you-go

Defined benefit

(67%)

No

Lump-sum
pensions or
annuities

Mainly book
reserve (no
funds set aside)

(60%)

Voluntary
Pay-as-you-go
17.5% payroll
tax

(42%, West
Germany
Defined benefit
Voluntary
(5%), mainly
only for
executives

Annuities

Yes
Pensions often
collectively
bargained.
Insured, pay-asyou-go, or book
reserve

Defined benefit

(60%)

No

Pay-as-you-go
27.07% payroll
tax (7.54%
employee,
19.53%
employer)

Employer and
employee
contributions
deductible.
Benefits liable
for income tax
Employer
contributions
deductible,
benefits partially
taxed
depending on
financing
method.

Benefits liable
for income tax

Table 2.1 (continued)
Private Pensions

Social Security
Financing

Country

Japan

Coverage
All residents for
flat-rate
pension; all
workers for
earnings-related
pension;
contracting out
of earningsrelated pension
permitted

Payroll tax rate Type of system
Type of benefit
(including
Coverage- % of
disability
working
Average gross
Type of benefit insurance tax)
replacement rate
population
shared equally
including social
Average gross by employer and
security
Type of plan
replacement rate
employee
Flat-rate pension
linked to years
worked and
Partially funded
pensions linked
14.5% payroll
to average
tax, lump-sum
earnings over
working life
tax and general
revenue for flatrate benefit
(47%)

Voluntary
39% in funded
plans, others
covered by
unfunded plans)

Lump-sum
pensions or
annuities

Defined benefit

(60%)

Financing
Benefit
insurance

Funded, book
reserve, and
unfunded
Yes, covering
about half the
plans

Taxation

Contributions
deductible.
Pension assets
taxed. Benefits
liable for
income tax.

Pay-as-you-go
All workers for
Flat-rate pension
flat-rate and
19.4% payroll
earnings-related (higher for
tax (employee's
married than
pension;
share is 9%,
single) and
contracting out
of the earnings- pensions linked employer's
share is 10 4%,
to average
related pension
earnings during lower rates for
permitted by
low earnings,
working life
company plans
zero for very
and by
low earners
(40%)
individuals
U.K.
SOURCE. OECD 1992, pp. 34-38; Dailey and Turner 1992

Voluntary
(29%)
Predominantly
defined benefit

Lump-sum
pensions or
annuities

Funded

(68%)

No

Employer and
employee
contributions
deductible.
Benefits liable
for income tax,
except lumpsum payments
up to a ceiling.
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2. Should the private pension system be voluntary or mandatory? In
France, Finland, Chile, Mexico, Switzerland, Sweden and Australia,
most employees are required to be covered by a pension plan.
Even in countries where private pensions are mandatory, however,
small employers, workers younger than a minimum age, and those
working fewer than a minimum number of hours may be excluded.
Switzerland uses such a system. In France, however, all workers
(excluding the self-employed) are covered from the first hour of work.
In Canada, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United
States, employers voluntarily decide whether to provide a pension
plan. In countries where pension plans are voluntary, the government
requires that plans meet minimum standards concerning which work
ers are included and by how much the plan is funded in advance of
benefit payments.
In the Netherlands, providing a plan is voluntary for some employ
ers. In other industries, however, employers are required to participate
in an industrywide plan. Some groups of self-employed workers are
also required to belong to such a plan. There are eighty-one industry
wide pension plans, of which sixty-six are compulsory for all employ
ers and employees in the industry (Lutjens 1995). Issues concerning
pension coverage are discussed in chapter 7.
3. If private pension plans are voluntary, should the government
encourage them or simply permit them? Most countries with welldeveloped pension systems encourage pension plan provision by grant
ing tax preferences and occasionally direct subsidies. Since April 1993,
the government in the United Kingdom has provided a subsidy of 1
percent of covered earnings to workers over age 30 who leave the earn
ings-related social security system and participate instead in an indi
vidual pension plan. In Canada, Japan, and the United States, pension
plans receive tax preferences that allow money to accumulate tax free,
but no direct subsidies are offered. In New Zealand, no special tax
preference or subsidy is provided to pensions. For tax purposes, pen
sions are treated exactly like other forms of savings. The tax treatment
of pensions is considered in greater detail in chapter 4.
4. Who is best able to bear the inherent financial risks in pension
plans? The primary decision as to who bears the pension financial risks
is made when policy makers or employers determine whether pension
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plans should be defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans, or a
mixture of both types. Countries where defined benefit plans predomi
nate include Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands. Countries where
defined contribution plans predominate include Australia, Chile, and
Singapore. In Canada and the United States, a mix of both defined ben
efit and defined contribution plans is provided. In the United States,
and to a lesser extent Canada, as well as in other countries, there has
been a trend towards defined contribution plans. Risk-bearing in pen
sion plans is considered in more detail in chapter 5.
5. Should there be mandatory insurance for pension benefits? In
Chile, Finland, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland, the
province of Ontario in Canada, and the United States, the government
requires that benefits in some plans be guaranteed. In Japan, Germany,
and Sweden, mandatory pension benefit insurance is provided through
private-sector institutions. This insurance covers the risk that the spon
soring firm will declare bankruptcy without having fully funded its
pension plans. It also covers the risk of financial malfeasance by the
plan sponsor. In Australia, there is no government insurance for pen
sion benefits. Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and Switzerland insure or
guarantee defined contribution plans. Pension insurance programs are
considered in chapter 5.
6. Who should pay for pension plans? Should the funding for pen
sion plans come from employers, employees, or both? In Japan and the
United States, the money provided for pension plans comes predomi
nantly from employers. In Argentina and Chile, it comes entirely from
employees. In the United Kingdom and Canada, both employers and
employees provide money for pension plans. From an economic point
of view, however, employees indirectly pay for pension benefits
through reduced wages (Montgomery, Shaw, and Benedict 1992).
Thus, the source of funding may be unimportant in determining who
ultimately pays for benefits. In practical terms, however, the source of
funding is an important design consideration in developing a pension
system. The question of who should pay for pensions is considered in
chapter 6.
7. Should benefits be funded in advance? Most countries, with the
exception of France, require at least some advance funding for pension
benefits. The French, argue that requiring no advance funding avoids
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financial market risk and the expense of asset management in financial
markets, and that a social benefit of a pay-as-you-go national private
pension system is an increase in social cohesion as the retired and
working generations share in the economic downturns or economic
success of a country.
In Germany and Japan, some plans are fully funded in advance,
some are partially funded, and some have no advance funding. In Can
ada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plans
receiving preferential tax treatment are required to be funded in
advance. However, the advance funding is generally less than the pen
sion liabilities of ongoing plans. These issues and the remaining four
are discussed in chapter 6.
8. To what extent should pension portfolios be regulated? In Ger
many, the government does not regulate the investments of some types
of pension plans. In the United Kingdom, pension portfolios are gov
erned by the general requirement that all investments be prudently con
sidered. In addition, no more than 5 percent of a plan's funds can be
invested in assets of the sponsoring employer. In Chile, allowable pen
sion portfolios are regulated in greater detail. In Canada and other
countries, excluding the United States, the percentage of a portfolio
that can be invested in foreign securities is restricted.
9. What types of organizations should be allowed to sponsor pension
plans? In most countries, employers are allowed or encouraged to pro
vide pension plans. In many countries, large multiemployer, industry,
or union organizations are also allowed to sponsor pension plans.
These countries include the Netherlands, Japan, Canada, Germany, and
the United States.
10. Should individual plans be allowed? In some countries, workers
can receive pensions through individual plans that are not tied to a par
ticular employer. These countries include Argentina, Chile, the United
Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. In other countries, pensions
are provided exclusively through plans that are tied to a particular
employer. These countries include Germany, the Netherlands, and
Japan.
11. What types of institutions should be allowed to manage pension
funds? In Chile, only special institutions established specifically to
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manage pension funds are allowed to do so. In most countries, includ
ing Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, insur
ance companies and banks are allowed to manage pension funds. In
France, insurance companies are allowed to manage funded pension
plans, but banks are not allowed to do so. In some countries, such as
Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, investment
managers are allowed to manage pension funds. In many countries,
such as the United States and the United Kingdom, but not Japan,
employers are allowed to manage pension funds internally.

Conclusion
These eleven issues of pension finance are basic questions to con
sider when designing or modifying pension policy. The following
chapters address each issue in greater detail.
NOTE
1. To a lesser extent, the relative size of pnvate pensions is affected by government disability
and unemployment insurance programs. In some countries, such as the Netherlands, disability and
unemployment insurance programs provide early retirement benefits for some workers.

3
Privatizing Retirement Income
What should be the roles of social security and private pensions? For
both ideological and economic reasons, a minority of pension experts
have advocated the complete privatization of pensions, with retirement
income financed by the employer or the individual rather than by gov
ernment under the social security system (Nusberg 1988). This
approach has appealed to conservatives for ideological reasons because
it greatly reduces the role of the government by substituting privatesector institutions. Conservatives have also argued that a program that
allows workers and employers to voluntarily privatize part of social
security would be desirable because it would increase their range of
choices. Privatization has also had appeal for economic reasons; it is
argued that the substitution of a funded private-sector system for an
unfunded public one would increase national savings.
For most pension experts, it has traditionally been inconceivable
that social security could be abolished (O'Higgins 1987). They take the
position that coexistence rather than dominance or replacement should
be the key feature of the relationship between social security and pri
vate pensions.
The optimal mix of public and private provision, defined benefit and
defined contribution, funded and pay-as-you-go can presumably be
determined within an optimal portfolio framework, considering each
alternative as a possible asset in the retirement income portfolio. Each
type of pension plan has different characteristics concerning its risk,
expected rate of return, and covariance with other retirement income
sources. In actuality, the determination of the retirement income mix is
more complex because it also has elements of public choice affecting
the level of benefits provided by social security. With a declining inter
nal rate of return to social security in many countries, there is political
support for reducing the role of social security.
This chapter discusses three countries that have pension programs
for privatizing social security. They can serve as important models for
any other countries considering whether to partially or completely
privatize their social security systems.
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Mandatory Individual Accounts: Chile
In 1924, Chile was the first country in the Western Hemisphere to
initiate a defined benefit social security system. Because of the high
cost of that system, the government ended it in 1981. In its place, the
Chilean government introduced a new system of funded individual
accounts managed through the private sector. With this arrangement,
Chile has succeeded in largely privatizing its social security system,
and in the process has revolutionized thinking about retirement income
systems.
Because of its financial success and because of the philosophy of
retirement income provision that it represents, the Chilean pension
reform has attracted worldwide attention, particularly among countries
lacking a well-developed pension system (World Bank 1994). The
Chilean pension system has been proposed as a model for Poland and
other Central and Eastern European countries, and it has been adopted
in modified form in Mexico, Argentina, and other Latin American
countries.
Chile has a compulsory system of individual retirement accounts
that covers nearly all workers. The system includes civil servants, but
excludes the armed forces. 1 The self-employed have the option of par
ticipating, but most do not.
Contributions and Benefits
Employee contributions for old-age benefits are 10 percent of earn
ings in Chile. In addition, employees must pay for disability and survi
vor's insurance, and they also pay a commission. The average cost of
these additional features was 3.2 percent of covered wages in 1990. All
employee pension contributions are tax deductible. Employers do not
contribute.
Employees are allowed to make additional voluntary, tax-deductible
contributions. Until 1990, those contributions were limited to an addi
tional 10 percent of earnings, but since 1990 there has been no limit on
those contributions. Withdrawals from voluntary contributions are lim
ited to annuities. This restriction, which limits the ability of workers to
use their savings, may explain why few individuals make voluntary
contributions.
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There is a ceiling on earnings subject to the mandatory contribu
tions. The ceiling is about 5.25 times the average salary of all covered
workers. The nominal amount of the ceiling is indexed, rising each
year at the rate of inflation. In 1994, the annual ceiling was roughly
equal to $17,000. Only about 4 percent of contributors earned more
than the ceiling (Diamond and Valdes-Prieto 1994).
Individual retirement accounts are managed by large privately oper
ated fund management companies.2 These specialized companies only
manage pension fund accounts, and each company may only manage
one fund. In 1992, there were thirteen such companies. Retirement
annuities are provided separately by life insurance companies; by the
end of 1992 there were nineteen such companies.
Employees are allowed only one tax-deductible account. Contribu
tions are withheld from pay by employers and transferred monthly to
the pension fund chosen by the employee. Employees may select
which fund they wish to use and may transfer their account balances to
another after four months.
Employee contributions to individual pension accounts are taxdeductible, and the interest earned is tax-free. Pensions benefits are
treated as taxable income. In contrast to this favorable tax treatment of
individual accounts, employer-provided pension funds are given no tax
advantages. This is in sharp contrast to the tax advantages given to
employer-provided plans in most OECD countries.
Retirement benefits are available at age 65 for men and at age 60 for
women. Pension benefits may be taken at those ages whether or not an
individual continues to work. They are available earlier if the pension
payable is either (1) at least 50 percent of the average indexed earnings
of the individual in the last ten years, or (2) at least 110 percent of the
legal minimum wage.
Workers must take their retirement benefits either as an indexed
annuity, a phased withdrawal, or a combination of the two. Benefits
cannot be taken as a lump-sum payment. Pension fund management
firms do not provide annuities. At retirement, the individuals must con
tract with an insurance company to convert their account balance to an
annuity or contract with the pension fund management company to
receive benefits over their lifetime.
If an individual purchases an annuity from an insurance company,
that annuity must be fully price-indexed. The government guarantees
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the annuity payments of insurance companies in case an insurance
company fails. For low-wage workers, the government guarantees a
minimum pension. For all workers, the government guarantees 100
percent of the minimum pension and 75 percent of their pension above
that level. An individual who contracts with the pension fund manage
ment company continues to bear the risk of fluctuations in the invest
ment rate of return. With phased withdrawals, the individual's annual
benefit is recomputed each year, taking into account the investment
performance of the fund and whether the worker's spouse or other ben
eficiaries have died.
In converting the account balance at retirement to an annuity, life
insurance companies consider the difference in life expectancy
between men and women, along with any other relevant factors. With
equal account balances, single men receive higher benefits than do sin
gle women. This practice differs from the treatment of men and women
in pension plans in the United States and Western European countries.
For married workers in Chile, a survivor's benefit must be provided for
the spouse and for minor children.
There are two ways in which the Chilean system is not completely
privatized. First, the government provides a lump-sum benefit at retire
ment for all persons who had at least twelve months of coverage under
the old system during the sixty-month period ending October 1980.
The lump-sum benefit is derived from special government bonds,
called recognition bonds, transferred to workers switching into the new
system. The amount of the bond is based on the age, salary, and sex of
the individual. These bonds pay a 4 percent real rate of return, gener
ally considered to be a high real rate of return for a long-term invest
ment instrument. In fact, however, this rate was about a third of that
earned in Chilean financial markets during the 1980s. The bonds are
financed out of general government revenues.
A second quasi-governmental feature of the Chilean pension system
is that if the benefit provided by the lump sum and the individual's
accumulated account balance is below a certain level, a guaranteed
minimum benefit is paid. The minimum benefit is payable to individu
als who have contributed to the old and new pension systems for at
least twenty years. The minimum benefit is financed out of general tax
revenue on a pay-as-you-go basis.
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The minimum pension benefit discourages some workers from com
plying with pension contribution regulations. Low-income workers
may conceal income and avoid fully paying into a fund in some years
since they would receive little more than the minimum amount if they
contributed. The minimum pension is set at a relatively high level—85
percent of the legal minimum wage. The legal minimum wage is about
half of the average wage for the country. Thus, a worker with average
wages is guaranteed a pension of about 40 percent of earnings. This
may explain why many low-wage Chilean workers do not contribute to
the system.
Participants in poor health may prefer to receive benefits as sched
uled withdrawals because, in the event of early death, remaining
account balances are inherited by dependents. This arrangement is
more generous than the survivor's benefit paid by an annuity. An
advantage of scheduled withdrawals to low-wage workers is that if the
retiree lives a long time and his or her benefit falls below the guaran
teed minimum, the government will make up the difference.
Both the lump-sum benefit to workers who participated in the previ
ous system and the guaranteed minimum benefit are costs for the Chil
ean government. Each year there is an additional interest cost on the
bonds given to workers who had been in the old system. This cost will
eventually diminish as that generation of workers dies. The guaranteed
minimum benefit will remain, however, as a permanent ongoing cost to
the Chilean government.

Pension Fund Investments
When the Chilean funded pension system began in 1981, allowable
investments were strictly controlled to limit financial risks. The major
ity of assets were invested in government bonds, with the next largest
amount invested in bank deposits, both indexed against inflation. The
large share of pension assets invested in government bonds was partly
because the poorly developed capital markets in Chile offered few
other financial assets in which to invest. No funds were invested in
stocks until 1986.
The portfolio mix of Chilean pension funds continues to be
restricted by law. The rules are primarily designed to assure that pen
sion funds are conservatively invested with at least some diversifica-
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tion, and to assure that the investments are made primarily within
Chile. The rules generally specify maximum limits on investments.
The complete set of limits is detailed, but table 3.1 shows some of the
more important. The government has changed these limits several
times, gradually making them more flexible
Pension Portfolio Restrictions in Chile, 1994__________
Maximum percentage
of pension portfolio
Asset type
80
Mortgages
Bonds of private and publicly owned
50
businesses
45
Government bonds
30
Common stocks
12
Foreign securities
7
Securities of a single company
SOURCE: Chilean pension regulations.

Table 3.1

The Chilean government permits pension funds to invest outside the
country. In 1994, a minimum of 6 percent and a maximum of 12 per
cent of a plan's assets could be invested internationally. The govern
ment restricts the types of foreign investments allowed, again to
control risk.
For domestic stock investments, only government-approved stocks
can be purchased. This restriction limits the participation of the larger
pension funds in the Chilean stock market. Government approval is
determined through a system that classifies stocks according to risk.
Government-approved stocks consist of a small group of state-owned
firms in the process of privatizing. In 1992, there were only 38 publicly
traded firms in which the pension funds could invest. By comparison,
large U.S. pension plans often have portfolios of more than 1,000
stocks.
Government pension investment regulations also protect Chilean
financial markets. Regulations limit a pension fund management com
pany to no more than 30 percent of a bond issue. In addition, a fund
can hold no more than 7 percent of the stock of a particular company in
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which no investor owns more than 50 percent of the shares, and no
more than 1 percent in firms with more concentrated ownership.
Another restriction on investments is that Chilean pension funds are
prohibited from investing in pension fund management companies or
in insurance companies. This prevents conflicts of interest involving
pension fund management and pension fund investments.
Chilean pension funds have been far more active in domestic debt
markets than in domestic capital markets. In June 1992, the funds held
52 percent of the corporate bonds of both public and private enter
prises. The large supply of funds available to finance corporate debt
has lowered financing costs and reduced dependence on foreign financ
ing.
When a privately managed pension system invests in government
bonds rather than in private sector assets, it can be considered a mixed
or government-sector system rather than a privatized system. Social
security system funds for most countries are invested exclusively in
government bonds. The Chilean system has gradually become more
privatized as it has increasingly invested in the private sector.
Chile, like many other countries, has privatized a number of for
merly nationalized industries. Its experience exemplifies the role that
pension plans can play in privatization. Pension funds played a crucial
role in Chile's program to privatize nationalized industries between
1985 and 1989. Through pension fund purchases, stock was sold indi
rectly to workers via what was called "institutional capitalism." Pen
sion funds were heavy investors in public utilities and other stateowned companies. The total equity positions of the Chilean pension
funds in previously state-owned companies privatized during that
period varied in 1990 between 10 and 35 percent of each firm's equity,
with an average of about 25 percent. Investments in privatized firms
account for about 5 percent of pension fund portfolios, but that is
nearly 90 percent of their equity investments (Vittas and Iglesias 1992).
This large percentage in part reflects the importance of privatized com
panies in the Santiago Stock Exchange. In 1989, stock in privatized
enterprises accounted for 60 percent of the stock trading on the Santi
ago Stock Exchange (Luders 1993).
In privatizing companies during the mid 1980s, the government first
offered shares to the pension funds through competitive bidding at the
Santiago Stock Exchange because the funds had trained financial ana-
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lysts who could analyze the value of the shares. Sales to the pension
funds became the way of establishing a market price for shares not
traded before, or when their market had been very thin (Luders 1993).
Thus, pension funds played an important role in the development of
private-sector financial institutions in Chile.

Regulation of Pension Fund Management Companies
The market of pension fund management companies is highly con
centrated, the four largest having 75 percent of the participants. In
1994, pension fund management companies employed more than
8,000 people out of a population of about 12 million (Adrian 1994).
The government does not restrict the ownership of the management
companies. They generally are operated by private Chilean financial
groups or banks, or by foreign banks or insurance companies with
minority Chilean ownership. Some of the fund management companies
were owned by the government during the 1980s, but they have since
been privatized.
Commissions charged by pension fund management companies are
competitively set. Commissions measured relative to the size of
account balances have been falling, and in 1990 they averaged 2.3 per
cent of account balances (Vittas and Iglesias 1992).
Besides regulating the type of fees charged, the government super
vises management companies to minimize mismanagement or fraud.
Management companies are required to report their operating expenses
and investments to the government, which publishes the reports.
To protect pension participants, the government regulates the allow
able minimum annual rates of return received by pension funds. It
requires a minimum rate of return of the lesser of: (1) the average
return on all funds less 2 percentage points, and (2) half the average
return on all funds. If plans do not achieve the minimum return, they
must make up the difference from their reserves. This restriction on
rates of return further limits the portfolios Chilean pension funds are
willing to hold because of the disincentive to have portfolios that differ
greatly from the typical portfolio of other pension management compa
nies.
Other countries have followed Chile's lead. In 1993, the Peruvian
government launched a voluntary system of individual privatization for
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retirement pensions. The Peruvian system follows closely the Chilean
model. Contributions to the system are financed at the rate of 1 percent
of the worker's earnings paid by the employer and 8 percent paid by
the employee. Argentina also started a system in 1994 in which indi
viduals may continue in the social security system or may contribute
11 percent of earnings to individual accounts, but new workers must
establish individual accounts (Campbell 1994).

Conclusions
The Chilean pension system has encouraged the development of
Chilean financial markets. In addition to providing a market for finan
cial assets, it has created a demand for financial intermediaries. It has
done this is by encouraging the growth of life insurance companies
through the sale of annuities to retirees. A second way human capital
has increased in Chilean financial markets is that pension fund man
agement companies have developed competent professional portfolio
management departments to assess investment opportunities in Chile.
Pension funds do not have a long history in Chile, but they have
withstood the test of a major recession. In 1982, the Chilean Gross
Domestic Product fell 14.3 percent. Unemployment reached nearly 30
percent, and the economy stagnated until 1985. Some of the pension
fund management companies became insolvent due to the drop in com
mission income. However, none of the pension funds, which are finan
cially separate from the pension fund management companies,
experienced financial problems.
Because of the very high real rates of return earned on Chilean pen
sion plan investments, the pension system has been a financial success.
Those rates of return are partly due to the success of the Chilean econ
omy and partly due to the government policy of providing high real
rates of return on government debt.
The Chilean pension funds had assets in 1992 equaling 40 percent
of the Gross Domestic Product. The pension system is the principal
source of savings in Chile, providing 72 percent of all domestic invest
ment in 1991 (Cohen 1994b).
Some analysts have questioned whether a 10 percent contribution
rate will provide adequate retirement benefits when rates of return
decline to more normal levels. Roughly in 2020, the first group of
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workers who have spent their entire career contributing to the new
Chilean pension system will retire. At that point and in future years, it
will be much clearer whether the contribution rate was adequate, given
the rates of return experienced in the system over a worker's career.
Workers believing that the 10 percent contribution rate is too low to
provide an adequate retirement have the option of voluntarily contrib
uting a higher percentage. An argument could be made, based on pater
nalism by the government and myopia or lack of discipline by workers,
that the mandatory contribution rate should be increased slightly to
assure an adequate retirement benefit.
The Chilean pension system has had high administrative costs,
partly because of competition between pension fund management
companies for clients. While it might appear that competition would
result in low fees, the expenses for advertising and sales force neces
sary for a private market system are not present in a government-run
system. In Argentina's pension system, most advertising has been
banned.
Workers in Chile bear more financial market risk than workers in the
United States, because U.S. workers have a defined benefit social secu
rity system that is not directly affected by financial market risk. This
aspect of risk bearing may ultimately be viewed as an important weak
ness of the Chilean system. With the Chilean economy growing at a
steady pace, that weakness has not been evident. However, one aspect
of risk is lower in Chile. By privatizing management of its social secu
rity system, Chile has succeeded in greatly insulating old-age benefits
from the risk of change due to political forces (Diamond and ValdesPrieto 1994).

"Pay-or-Play" Pensions: Japan and the United Kingdom
"Pay-or-play" refers to a government benefits policy for workers
that has two options. Under "pay" the firm contributes to a mandatory
government-sponsored program. Under "play" the firm provides a ben
efit plan that substitutes for the government program and in exchange
pays a reduced mandatory contribution.
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Pay-or-play permits firms to voluntarily privatize government bene
fit programs. Such a policy differs from the pension system in Chile
where privatization is mandatory for all new workers. The extent to
which privatization occurs under pay-or-play depends on the voluntary
choices made by firms, and in some variants by workers. Firms and
workers presumably pick the private-sector option if it minimizes their
long-run costs for providing a desired level of benefits.
"Pay-or-play" has been used to refer to policy options for health
care reform. The term has not been used to refer to similar pension pol
icy options, but it applies equally well to them.
To understand how a pay-or-play policy could privatize social secu
rity, and how, once started, such a policy might evolve, we can look to
the experience of the United Kingdom and Japan. The pay-or-play
option for pensions originated in the United Kingdom in 1961, but was
discontinued for a period. It has continuously operated there since
1978. Such a system has operated in Japan since 1966. 3 Firms that
meet certain criteria can withdraw, or "contract out," from part of the
Japanese and British social security systems.
Contracting out allows firms to voluntarily privatize part of the
social security system by paying a reduced contribution to social secu
rity when they provide a replacement private pension plan of sufficient
generosity.4 This option expands the range of choice open to the private
sector while assuring adequate retirement income.5
The current forms of contracting out in Japan and the United King
dom have evolved from simpler programs. The initial programs may
provide insight into how such a program could be started, while the
historical development in those countries suggests possible refinements
to a system after the initial framework has been established.
The Japanese and British defined benefit pay-or-play systems com
pete with the Chilean mandatory defined contribution system as a
model for pension reform. The patterns of risk-bearing in the Chilean
defined contribution option are much different from the Japanese and
British defined benefit systems. Although pension experts have debated
the relative merits of defined benefit and defined contribution plans,
defined benefit plans have traditionally been preferred by most workers
and employers.6

32 Privatizing Retirement Income

Japan
Pay-or-play pensions in Japan can only be understood in relation
ship to the Japanese social security system. The Japanese social secu
rity system has a program called the National Pension, where benefits
are based on the number of years for which the individual has made
monthly contributions. Monthly contributions are equal for all contrib
utors, not based on earnings. In 1991, the flat rate benefit plan was 29
percent of total social security benefits and 10 percent of social secu
rity tax payments (Turner and Rajnes 1995). Japanese social security
also has an earnings-related segment called Employees' Pension Insur
ance. Benefits from Employees' Pension Insurance are based on a flat
rate times average earnings times years of service. Employers can con
tract out of part of the earnings-related segment of the program and
establish plans called Employees' Pension Funds.
Unlike the U.S. social security system, the earnings-related benefit
formula of the Japanese social security system is not progressive in that
it does not provide higher benefits relative to covered earnings for lowwage workers. The lack of income transfers within the earnings-related
part of the Japanese social security program facilitates contracting out
because there are no systematic incentives for high-income workers to
contract out at the expense of low-income workers.
A Japanese employer can qualify three ways to contract out of the
social security Employees' Pension Insurance. First, large employers
can contract out. When this option was first available, the size require
ment for a firm to be eligible was 1,000 full-time employees, but it has
been reduced so that a firm with 500 full-time employees can contract
out.7 Second, a controlled group of employers can contract out. A con
trolled group is a group of allied employers having substantially the
same ownership. Initially, 5,000 employees were required, but this has
been reduced to 800. Third, a group of smaller employers in the same
industry can form a multiemployer group in order to contract out. Ini
tially, 5,000 employees were required in such a group, but that number
has been reduced to 3,000. A liberalization of the rules allows firms to
form groups composed of employers in different industries within the
same region. The minimum size for such a regional group is also 3,000
employees.
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In 1992, data on contracted-out plans indicated that there were 547
single-company plans, 612 allied company plans, and 566 multiemployer plans (Pension Fund Association 1993).
The Japanese government requires a minimum number of employ
ees in a contracted-out pension plan because of concern for the finan
cial stability of the plan. The volatility of plan finances is greater for
plans composed of smaller employers because smaller employers have
a greater risk of bankruptcy than larger employers. For that reason,
contracted-out plans composed of small employers have a higher mini
mum number of employees than plans where only large employers par
ticipate.
Besides the minimum size requirement, four other requirements
must be met for establishing a contracted-out plan. First, the firm must
have made a profit for each of the preceding three years. Second, at
least half of the full-time employees of the firm must vote in favor of
establishing a plan. Third, if a union represents at least a third of the
employees, it must approve the plan by a majority vote. Fourth, the
firm must have had a stable or growing labor force for the preceding
three years. Once a firm has established a contracted-out plan, it can
continue such a plan even if it later fails to meet the initial size and
profitability requirements.
As a result of contracting out, the payroll tax rate for Employees'
Pension Insurance was reduced in 1994 by 3.2 percentage points, from
14.5 percent to 11.3 percent (table 3.2). The payment of contributions
and the reduction in rates is shared equally by the employer and the
employee. As the payroll tax rate has risen over time, the percentage by
which contracting out reduces the total has fallen considerably. In
1994, contracting out reduced the payroll tax rate by 22 percent, in
comparison to 44 percent or more in 1966.
These contracted-out plans must participate in a national Pension
Fund Association, a nonprofit, private-sector organization heavily
influenced by the government through the Ministry of Health and Wel
fare. The Association provides several services. First, it insures the
benefits in the plans. If an employer were to go bankrupt, the Pension
Fund Association guarantees the benefits provided by the plan and
pays beneficiaries. 8 Second, the Association assures that there is no
loss of benefits for employees changing jobs. The amount that has been
accumulated for a job-changing employee is transferred to the Pension
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Fund Association. Third, for a fee, the Association provides adminis
trative and record keeping services for smaller employers. In this way,
smaller employers can gain economies of scale in plan administration.
The Association also consults with plans at no charge concerning
administrative problems. Fourth, the Association researches issues
concerning the administration and structure of plans.
Table 3.2 Reduction in the Social Security Tax Rate Due to
Contracting Out in Japan, 1966-1994
Year in
which
Percent reduction
Total payroll
rate
is of total
Reduction
tax rate
began
Male
Male
Female
Female
Male
Female
1966
1971
1980
1988
1994

2.4
2.6
3.2
3.2
3.2

2.0
2.2
2.9
3.0
3.2

5.5
6.4
10.6
12.4
14.5

3.9
4.8
9.0
11.6
14.5

44
41
30
26
22

51
46
33
26
22

The government's goal is to have 50 percent of the full-time labor
force (private and public) participating in a contracted-out pension
plan. The percentage has been growing over time, reaching 36 percent
in 1993. Growth has been due to the reduction of the minimum size
requirement and to regional groups of small employers being allowed
to participate.
While many U.S. pension experts oppose contracting out for pen
sions, the system has operated successfully in Japan for many years.
An alternative and considerably more complex system of contracting
out has also existed in the United Kingdom.

United Kingdom
While virtually every developed country has a social security sys
tem, the United Kingdom is virtually unique in giving every employer
and employee the option of contracting out of part of social security.
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Contracting out in the United Kingdom has developed into a highly
complex system.
Like Japan, the United Kingdom has a two-tier social security sys
tem supplemented by a voluntary private pension system. The main
part of social security benefit expenditures is a flat rate benefit, called
the National Insurance benefit. Unlike in Japan, where the flat rate ben
efit is relatively unimportant, in the United Kingdom it is more than
two-thirds of social security benefits. This benefit is financed primarily
by employer and employee contributions, but is also partly financed by
government payments. In 1993, government contributions were set at a
level not to exceed 20 percent of benefit payments. The program is
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.
As in the Japanese system, it is not possible to contract out of the
British flat rate benefit, although such a policy has been discussed. The
National Insurance program provides a uniform benefit to all recipi
ents, varying as in Japan by years of work but not by previous earnings.
It does, however, vary by marital status, being about 60 percent higher
for married workers. The Chilean system, in contrast, does not provide
higher benefits based on marital or family status, but does provide
higher benefits based on gender and other indicators of life expectancy.
The British social security system also provides an earnings-related
benefit, called the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERFS),
where benefits are financed by a payroll tax levied within an earnings
band.
The flat rate pension has been frozen in real terms, keeping pace
with inflation but not with growth in real wages. Over time, it will
gradually become a less important aspect of the British retirement
income system. The earnings-related part will gradually grow in rela
tive importance, reaching about a third of the total cost of social secu
rity pensions by the year 2030.
The British system differs considerably from the Japanese in the
conditions under which contracting out can occur. While the Japanese
restrict contracting out to certain firms or groups of firms, the British
allow all firms to contract out of the earnings-related part of social
security so long as they provide a benefit at least as generous. Most
contracted-out defined benefit plans provide benefits considerably
greater than the minimum required. Contracted-out defined benefit
plans must base benefits on years of service and final earnings.
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While the British have no restrictions as to the types of firms con
tracting out, or to their likely financial stability, the government
attempts to assure that firms fully fund their contracted-out plans. The
Occupational Pensions Board, an agency of the national government,
has the statutory responsibility to ensure that employers fully fund the
accrued liabilities for Guaranteed Minimum Pension (GMP) benefits at
least equal to benefits that would have been provided by the social
security system. The plan's actuary must provide a regular certificate to
this effect, and the Occupational Pensions Board relies heavily on this
oversight provided by actuaries.
In addition, the British social security system insures that the GMP
be paid. If a firm goes bankrupt, the state assumes responsibility for
paying the benefit by reinstating the worker in the State EarningsRelated Pension Scheme. Contracted-out salary-related defined benefit
plans must pay at least the GMP, which in 1994 was approximately 18
percent of the worker's average indexed salary up to the ceiling salary.
That percentage will rise to 25 percent as the system matures, but then
will gradually fall to 20 percent in the early part of the twenty-first cen
tury as a result of legislative changes.
In the United Kingdom, firms may unilaterally contract out. They
are required to consult with the relevant unions if their workforce is
unionized, but the decision is the employer's. About 50 percent of
workers in the private and public sectors combined are covered by an
employer-provided pension. Virtually 100 percent of public-sector
pensions are contracted out. In the private sector, 78 percent of mem
bers of pension plans are contracted out (Daykin 1995).
When an employee joins a pension plan that is contracted out, the
administration is simple. All that is required is for the employer's pay
roll department to deduct contributions for social security at the lower
contribution rate that applies for contracted out plans. When year-end
filings are made to the Department of Social Security, the worker's
change from contracted-in to contracted-out status will be recorded.
However, when an employee ends a job with a pension plan that is con
tracted out and moves to one that is not contracted out, the administra
tion is more complicated. Whenever an employee leaves a contractedout plan, the government needs to know: (1) if contracted-out benefits
are being preserved in the plan; (2) if contracted-out benefits are being
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transferred to another plan, and who will be liable for paying them; and
(3) if the worker will be contracted out in the new job.
A job leaver with less than two years of service in a contracted-out
defined benefit plan may pay a premium to the government to restore
the social security earnings-related benefits as if they had not been con
tracted out.
Contracting Out with Defined Contribution Plans
As in Japan, the contracting-out option in the United Kingdom has
been expanded over time to make it available to more people. Before
the Social Security Act of 1986, the only way a firm or worker could
contract out was by the firm providing a replacement defined benefit
plan. Since 1988, firms can also contract out using a money purchase
defined contribution plan. Unlike a salary-related defined benefit plan,
there is no Guaranteed Minimum Pension in a contracted-out money
purchase plan. The employer and employee simply contribute to the
contracted-out plan at least the amount they would have contributed to
the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme. An employer may offer
both a contracted-out money purchase plan and a contracted-out
defined benefit plan and allow workers to choose.
The participant in a contracted-out money purchase plan has "pro
tected rights." These are the benefits secured by the value of the assets
based on the social security contributions that would have been made
had the worker not contracted out. Benefits based on protected rights
can only be taken as an annuity at retirement age, and then no earlier
than age 60. The conversion to an annuity must be at a unisex rate, and
the pension must provide survivor's benefits to a widow or widower
who has dependent children or is age 45 or older.
In addition to allowing firms to contract out, British law has allowed
workers to contract out individually since 1988. Workers can opt out of
the employer's contracted-out plan and subscribe instead to a personal
defined contribution plan called an Appropriate Personal Pension. For
personal pension plans, contracting out means authorizing the govern
ment to pay a rebate of social security contributions into a personal
plan. This option represents a fundamental change in the British pen
sion system from compulsory to voluntary membership in employerprovided pension plans.

38 Privatizing Retirement Income

Appropriate Personal Pensions purchased with contracting-out
rebates must be taken as an annuity, with 3 percent a year increases and
a benefit to a surviving spouse of half the member's pension. Addi
tional contributions can be used for other benefits.
Appropriate Personal Pensions can be chosen by all employees—
including those whose employer does not offer a pension plan, those
whose employer offers a contracted-out plan, and those whose
employer offers a contracted-in plan. However, Appropriate Personal
Pensions are not financially advantageous for low-income workers.
Because the contributions of low-income workers into these plans are
necessarily small, the fixed costs of establishing and maintaining such
plans are too high a percentage of the contributions to make them prof
itable.
Like any personal pension, an Appropriate Personal Pension can be
arranged directly with the provider with no involvement of the
employer. Providers include insurance companies, banks, building
societies, unit trusts, and friendly societies.9 Since the employer will
often be unaware that the worker has an Appropriate Personal Pension,
the existence of such a pension plan has no effect on the worker's
social security contributions, which continue to be paid in full. A
rebate from the Department of Health and Social Security to the pro
vider of the Appropriate Personal Pension Plan is paid after the end of
each tax year. Personal income tax paid on the employee's share of the
social security contribution is also rebated. The rebate does not include
interest on the social security contributions or income tax payments,
which could have been paid in part more than 12 months earlier. 10 By
this method, contracting out can be back-dated to the beginning of the
tax year as late as the end of the tax year.
An employee may opt out of a company's contributory pension plan
where he or she may be contributing as much as 5 or 6 percent of earn
ings in favor of a contracted-out personal pension plan requiring only a
2 percent contribution. The ultimate retirement benefit in that case
would be reduced.
The policy of allowing nonparticipation in an employer-provided
pension plan complicates the financial calculus for the employer decid
ing whether to contract out. If all young employees opt out of the
employer's contracted-out plan and the older, high-cost employees
remain in, it may not be financially beneficial for the employer to pro-
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vide such a plan. Any financial advantage to a firm of contracting out
will depend on the age-sex composition of the employees covered by
the plan.
Between 1988 and 1992, it has been estimated that the British gov
ernment paid 10.5 billion pounds in the form of rebates on social secu
rity contributions to people taking out personal pensions. However, not
all of the money spent on personal pensions has gone directly to
increasing pension benefits. Insurance industry experts estimate that
companies selling personal pensions typically take between 4 percent
and 13 percent of contributions in commissions and charges for sales
agents and management fees (Cohen 1994c).
In contracted-out defined contribution plans, the worker bears the
investment risk. If the actual benefit based on the assets in the defined
contribution plan is lower than what the worker would have received
from a contracted-out defined benefit plan, the government does not
make up the difference. Similarly, if the actual benefit is higher, the
government does not reduce the social security benefit it provides.
Thus, while contracting out through a defined benefit plan does not
affect a worker's entitlement or risk, contracting out through a defined
contribution plan does: it alters the worker's risk because the govern
ment defined benefit plan is replaced by a private-sector defined contri
bution plan.
As of 1992, more than 300,000 men and women who contracted out
of the social security State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme through
a personal pension probably were going to receive lower benefits on
retirement than if they had remained contracted in. That is because the
rebate system gives more than a young person would need to buy pen
sion benefits equivalent to the social security State Earnings-Related
Pension Scheme benefits, but far less than an older person would need
(Cohen 1994c).
Contracting out through use of a personal pension plan is a revers
ible decision. Workers can later change their minds and rejoin the gov
ernment program, but that option is available only once. For workers
who opt out of their employer's contracted-out pension plan, the
employer need not give the option to rejoin. Employers who allow
workers to rejoin may require evidence of good health so that the
employer's death benefits are not exploited.
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For early job leavers, the contracted-out plan is required to provide
cost-of-living adjustments to the value of accrued benefits between the
date of job leaving and retirement. 11
Both the Japanese and British governments have been reluctant to
impose the full cost of postretirement inflation indexing on firms with
contracted-out plans. In the United Kingdom, the government pays
much of the cost of indexation equal to the increase in the Retail Price
Index for the Guaranteed Minimum Pension after the worker retires.
For benefits accruing after 1988, the firm is obligated to pay the cost of
indexation up to 3 percent a year. For workers covered by a contractedout defined contribution plan, the annuity benefits must be indexed for
inflation up to 3 percent a year. For inflation higher than 3 percent, the
government provides full indexing on the Guaranteed Minimum Pen
sion.
Contracting-Out Rebate
The reduction in the social security contribution when contracted
out is based on the estimated cost to plans of providing the Guaranteed
Minimum Pension. However, the government has generally included
an additional margin in the rebate partly as an incentive for contracting
out, especially for plans with nontypical age distributions.
With these three methods of contracting out—defined benefit plans,
employer-provided money purchase plans, and personal pension
plans—social security benefits are reduced by an amount based on the
worker's earnings while contracted out. This reduction is the same for
each method. The reduction is intended to be at least sufficient so that
the contribution of that amount to the contracted-out plan would pro
vide the worker the same level of benefits as would have been provided
through social security alone.
The contracted-out rebate has been independent of both the age and
sex of the worker. The cost of an employee's contracted-out benefit,
however, rises with age. At age 25 it is between 2 percent and 3 percent
of earnings. At age 55, it may be 9 percent or more. Because of the
constancy of the rebate across ages, the likelihood of having a better
financial deal through a personal pension than through the government
program declines as workers age. Different investment advisers sug
gest different ages for contracting back into the government program.
For example, Prudential advises men aged 49 and women aged 42 to
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rejoin. Because women can retire at a younger age than men, it is more
expensive to provide women a given level of benefits. For that reason,
the age for optimally rejoining social security is lower for women than
men. The calculations underlying these figures depend on assumptions
about annuity rates at retirement and investment returns before then.
Between April 6, 1988 and April 5, 1993, incentive payments of 2
percent of covered earnings in addition to the regular rebate were made
to workers in newly contracted-out plans. Incentive payments of 2 per
cent were also made to workers in Appropriate Personal Pensions. In
this way, the British government has subsidized contracting out
through personal plans. Also, workers who had been in contracted-out
employer-provided plans for less than two years could receive the 2
percent incentive payment if they started an Appropriate Personal Pen
sion. Because of this subsidy to workers leaving the earnings-related
part of social security, the British government decided to raise by 1
percent the base rate that workers pay into social security. About twothirds of contracted-out workers are in employer-sponsored plans and
one-third are in personal pension plans.
The contracting-out incentives continue to change over time in the
United Kingdom. A 1 percent incentive for Appropriate Pension Plan
holders over the age of 30 began in April 1993. The British government
has announced its intention to consider a more finely tuned age-related
rebate structure starting in 1996.
Other incentives encourage contracting out. First, pension contribu
tions of workers are tax deductible, while their social security contribu
tions are not. Second, social security benefits are only payable at age
65 for men (60 for women), while contracted-out benefits can be pro
vided earlier.
Over time, the contracting out rebate has fallen in the United King
dom (table 3.3), while it has risen in Japan. This decline has occurred
in part due to the decline in the generosity of the earnings-related pen
sion. In contracted-out plans, the percentage of the social security lia
bility that is contracted out has varied around one-third without a trend.
The rebates are periodically reviewed and have been reduced after
considering the underlying economic and demographic assumptions.
Calculation of the rebate is based on assumptions about the age/sex/
earnings profile of the population contracted-out and on assumptions
about future investment returns and earnings growth, as well as other
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actuarial assumptions. The economic assumptions used in calculating
the 1988/89 rebate were an 8.5 percent investment return and a 7 per
cent annual growth in earnings. The assumptions provide a generous
rebate. The rebate reduction in 1988 was due in part to the reduction
that year in the accrual rate for future social security State EarningsRelated Pension Scheme benefits. The terms for contracting out
became less favorable in 1993 and could result in many workers in
contracted-out plans rejoining the State Earnings-Related Pension
Scheme program. The 1 percent incentive for workers over age 30 is
designed to counteract that.
Table 3.3

Contracting-Out Rebate in the United Kingdom, 1978-1994
(percent of covered earnings)
Tax rate before rebate
Rebate
Starting
in tax
(a)
(b)
EE
ER Total (b-a) (a/b)
year Employer Employee Total
1978-79
1983-84
1988-89
1993-94

4.50
4.10
3.8-4.0
3.00

2.50
2.15
2.00
1.80

7.00
13.5
6.25
11.45
5.8-6.0 5-10.45
4.8 4.6-10.4

6.5
9.0
9.0
9.0

20.0
20.45
14-20
14-19

13.0 35.0
14.2 30.6
8-13 41-54
9-15 35-25

NOTE: The tax year runs from April 6 through April 5 of the following year. A 1986 law
increased the number of wage classifications on which employers are to pay payroll taxes,
accounting for the range of tax rates shown. EE stands for employee and ER stands for employer.

Contracting out can be thought of as a means of borrowing from the
state. The firm or worker receives contribution rebates now, but will
have to meet future pension obligations. Moreover, in the United King
dom it is a form of indexed borrowing because of the requirements for
indexation of benefits. It follows that the attractiveness of contracting
out will depend on the rate of return that can be earned on pension plan
assets versus the implicit rate of return earned on contributions to
social security. As population aging reduces the internal rate of return
to social security, contracting out will be more attractive.

Critique of Contracting Out
Attractive features of contracting out include reduced reliance on
the government and greater reliance on the private sector, greater
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incentives for private savings and investment, and more flexibility in
shaping pension plans.
With contracting out, a largely underfunded public pension program
is replaced by a private pension program designed to be fully funded
and invested in the private sector. Thus, an advantage of contracting out
is that it may increase savings and the national capital stock.
Contracting out expands the options open to firms and workers for
providing for retirement income. The expanded choice provides greater
flexibility and may allow individuals to better provide for their retire
ment in the manner they choose.
In both Japan and the United Kingdom, there were already welldeveloped private pension plans when the social security earningsrelated benefit program was started. Contracting out was a way to pro
tect the interests of the middle class who had substantial pension
rights. 12 Thus, contracting out can be thought of as a way of providing
the option for higher-income workers who are covered by a private
pension to decline full participation in social security.
A redistributive social security system where it was possible to con
tract out fully from the redistributive portion would not be viable
because all the high earners would contract out, leaving nothing to be
redistributed to the low earners. In the United Kingdom, the higherearnings employees in contracted-out plans pay considerably more in
social security taxes than do the lower-earnings employees, but both
receive the same flat benefit. In 1994, individuals earning less than a
minimum amount, the Lower Earnings Limit of 56 pounds per week,
paid nothing. Those earning 56 pounds per week or more paid a 2 per
cent rate on the first 56 pounds, and 10 percent on earnings between 56
pounds and the Upper Earnings Limit of 420 pounds. The rate the
employer paid varied from 4.6 percent to 10.4 percent, increasing with
the employee's earnings with no ceiling. Thus, the redistributive aspect
of the system is maintained both on the tax and on the benefits side.
The replacement rate from British social security falls from 76 percent
for workers earning 25 percent of the national average earnings to 14
percent for workers earning 300 percent of the national average earn
ings (table 3.4).
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Table 3.4 British Social Security Earnings Replacement Rates at
Different Earnings Levels, 1994
Earnings as a percentage of national
Replacement rate
average earnings
2576
48
50
33
100
20
200

___________300___________________14____
SOURCE: European Commission (1994).

Financing the Transition
A difficult problem in privatizing social security is how to pay for
existing social security liabilities during the transition period from a
fully state-run program to a privatized program. This is known as the
"paying twice problem." The problem arises because the first working
generation in a privatized social security system must pay for the social
security benefits of the current generation of retirees, and it must pay
for its own retirement benefits under the new system. The transition to
the new system must make that generation worse off, since that genera
tion would only need to pay for the benefits of current retirees under
the old system.
This critique of the transition to a privatized social security system
ignores private intergenerational transfers. So long as other intergenerational transfers are being made, those transfers can be increased or
reduced to offset the intergenerational transfers caused by the transi
tion to a privatized system. When generations care about each other,
transfers will be made to restore the original intergenerational distribu
tion of income.
When Japanese employers establish Employees' Pension Funds, the
size of the government social security program is reduced. The size of
contributions is reduced immediately, and the level of benefit payments
is reduced in the future. If the Japanese social security system had
operated on a pay-as-you-go basis, it would have been necessary to
raise the social security payroll tax rate when contracting out was
started in order to make up the lost revenue needed for current benefit
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payments. The Japanese social security program is not operated on a
pay-as-you-go basis, however, but rather is partially funded. For that
reason, an increase in tax rates was not required when the Japanese
contracting-out option was begun.
Financing the transition in Chile was easier than it would be in many
countries because Chile had a relatively young population, and the lia
bilities to be financed were relatively small in comparison to the total
population.
In the United Kingdom, contracted-out defined benefit plans only
need to replace the level of benefits that would have been provided by
social security, while in Japan the contracted-out benefits must be at
least 30 percent higher than social security benefits. Many employerprovided contracted-out plans in the United Kingdom provide higher
benefits than the minimum required, but that is not the case for the per
sonal contracted-out plans (Appropriate Personal Pensions). There is
concern that people relying on those plans will end up with low retire
ment income.
State-run social security systems presumably have a cost advantage
over private systems. Because participation is mandatory, state-run sys
tems incur no advertising costs. They also may enjoy economies of
scale. However, their incentives for efficiency are fewer, since they
have no profit motive.
When contracting out is an individual decision, greater responsibil
ity is placed on the individual for becoming informed and making pru
dent decisions concerning retirement financing. There is also the
possibility pension service providers will exploit the lack of knowledge
of workers. There is considerable concern in Britain that more than two
million people who have contracted out may have been wrongly
advised by insurance companies to leave the social security earningsrelated program or employer-provided plans and take out personal pen
sions.
A criticism of the British contracting-out system is that it is too
complicated. While complexity has the advantage that it may create a
range of choices, it also increases costs because it creates a demand for
the services of actuaries and other highly paid benefits consultants.
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Adverse Selection
Critics of contracting out cite adverse selection as a problem for the
financing of such plans. With adverse selection, firms with employees
for whom benefits can be provided less expensively leave the govern
mental program. This exodus of low-cost firms raises the average cost
for firms remaining in the governmental program, which causes a fur
ther exodus of firms with relatively low cost.
A requirement that only large firms can contract out limits adverse
selection to the extent that large firms have workforces with age distri
butions similar to that of the national workforce. The Government
Actuary's office in the United Kingdom has argued that the age struc
ture of the British workforce does not differ greatly across firms. How
ever, in Japan, as in the United States, some large computer software
companies have young workforces, for example, while some steel-pro
ducing companies have older workforces. Benefits are generally less
expensive to provide for younger workforces through contracting out
than through the government program.
Adverse selection is also limited by not allowing firms to freely
withdraw from contracting out. In Japan, a firm must have the approval
of its employees to end an Employees' Pension Fund plan.
Adverse selection is also limited in Japan because the earningsrelated part of the Japanese social security system is not redistributive
from high- to low-income workers. The redistributive aspect of the
U.S. social security system makes contracting out more difficult to
establish, since high-income workers and firms would tend to favor
contracting out while low-income workers and firms would tend to
favor remaining fully in the system. That problem has been solved in
the United Kingdom, however, where redistribution occurs through
higher social security tax rates paid by higher-income employees in
contracted-out plans.
In spite of the incentive for adverse selection in the Japanese system,
and the possibility of adverse selection by small firms joining regional
or industry groups, the average age in contracted-out plans is similar to
the average age in the Japanese workforce, according to government
actuaries.
Nonetheless, to limit adverse selection in Japan, one proposal being
considered would vary the terms of contracting out based on the aver
age age of the employees in the firm. Firms with an older average age
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would be allowed more favorable terms for contracting out because it
is more expensive for those firms to provide the required benefits. A
similar proposal on an individual basis is being considered in the
United Kingdom.

Conclusions
The British and Japanese systems provide a program for voluntarily
privatizing government benefits. Together they have had more than 50
years of experience with their programs. Both programs have been
modified several times, consistent with the desire to encourage firms
and workers to contract out.
Compared to the Chilean approach of privatizing social security
through a mandatory defined contribution plan, the British and Japa
nese approaches have more options and allow firms to select the form
in which retirement income is provided. They also provide risk diversi
fication in that pay-as-you-go and funded systems are subject to differ
ent risks. Pay-as-you-go systems are subject to the risk of demographic
changes, while funded systems are subject to financial market risks.
British and Japanese workers in defined benefit plans do not bear the
risks of pension asset value fluctuations, while those risks are borne by
Chilean workers and by British workers in contracted-out defined con
tribution plans. Both defined benefit and defined contribution
approaches, however, offer funded alternatives to unfunded social
security systems.
NOTES
1. Participants in the previous social security system had the option of remaining in that sys
tem. Because participation in the new system was offered on generous terms, few did.
2. The companies are known as Admmistradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs).
3. See Clark (1991b) for a description of the Japanese pension system and Turner and Dailey
(1991) for a description of the British and Japanese systems.
4. The term "contract out" is synonymous with "pay-or-play," and is the term that has been
used in describing such an option for pensions
5. In the United States, state governments that have historically not participated in social
security are allowed to opt out, but there are no requirements concerning alternative retirement
plans they might provide.
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6. In addition, pay-or-play pensions in Japan provide a possible model for privatizing U.S.
unemployment insurance, where large firms could privately contract out for such insurance.
7. Part-time employees are not counted in determining whether an employer is large enough to
meet the minimum size requirement.
8. The insurance program has operated since 1989. As of 1993, no plans had terminated with
insufficient assets.
9. A unit trust is a mutual fund where the price of units is determined by the managers based
on the net asset value of the fund Investors can buy into the trust or redeem an earlier investment
based on the value of units. A friendly society is a type of small financial institution in the United
Kingdom, owned by its members, that offers sickness, retirement, unemployment, and death ben
efits, as well as savings plans, to its members.
10. An advantage of a contracted-out money purchase plan is that the rebate is paid directly in
the plan with no delay.
11. The contracted-out plan can choose between three methods for revaluing benefits: (1)
complete indexation, (2) a fixed 7 percent per year, and (3) 5 percent per year or full indexation if
lower
12. The situation was similar to that in the United States, where workers in the railroad indus
try and workers in state, local, and federal government were not required to participate in social
security when it was started.

4
Tax Policy Towards
Private Pensions
Tax policy is both the engine and the brakes of the private pension
system. It both encourages firms to offer pension plans and discourages
or regulates particular features. It encourages the formation and growth
of pension plans by providing them favorable treatment compared to
that of other assets. All countries with well-developed pension systems
provide preferential tax treatment for saving through pensions. The tax
system regulates private pensions by setting conditions under which
favorable tax treatment can be received. In the United Kingdom, for
example, these requirements are the primary legal constraints on pri
vate pension plans (Daykin 1995). At times the regulatory aspects of
tax policy may discourage firms from offering plans, counteracting the
policy aspects designed to encourage their formation.
The tax treatment of pensions is the result of compromises made
within the political arena. While the broad goals of pension tax policy
are similar across developed countries, specific policies and practices
vary significantly. This chapter examines tax policy differences across
countries. 1 By focusing on differences, insights can be gained into the
tax treatment of pensions in individual countries. Differing policies
and practices also demonstrate the range of options available to policy
makers.

Overview
The most common approach to taxing pensions is to allow a tax
deduction for contributions, allow investment earnings to accumulate
tax free, and tax benefits when paid to workers. New Zealand is the
most notable current exception to this approach: pensions funds there
are taxed on the same basis as a fully taxable savings account.2
Favorable tax treatment for pensions is justified by the argument that
it encourages retirement savings and that without a tax subsidy families
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would save too little (Ippolito 1990a). Possible explanations for insuffi
cient savings are that some families may be myopic, not fully anticipat
ing future needs, or that they may lack the discipline to save adequately
for future needs.
By encouraging pensions through preferential tax treatment, govern
ments incur a cost in lost tax revenue. This is the revenue that would
have been received if the savings had otherwise occurred in taxable
form. As populations age and the cost of tax preferences for pensions
rises, it is not surprising to find governments seeking to reduce the loss
in tax revenue.
Some of the tax provisions concerning pensions are not designed to
raise or reduce tax revenue, but rather are designed to regulate plans by
influencing the behavior of pension fund managers or pension partici
pants.
Pension plans in the United States must meet requirements of the
Internal Revenue Code in order to qualify for favorable tax treatment.
To be tax-qualified, a plan must meet minimum standards regarding
participation, vesting, nondiscrimination against lower paid workers,
and other criteria. When plans do not meet these standards, the
employer's contribution must be included in the employee's taxable
income in order to be tax deductible for the employer.
In the United Kingdom, some actions by pension plans or employ
ees are not forbidden or required, but instead are encourage or discour
aged by the use of taxes. For example, tax penalties are levied on plans
that are overfunded and fail to withdraw the surpluses from the plan.
This policy encourages plans to withdraw their excess assets and return
them to the employer. The opposite policy is followed in the United
States. No tax is levied on excess assets if they remain within the pen
sion plan. However, a minimum tax of 20 percent is levied on excess
assets of overfunded plans when those plans terminate and the assets
are returned to the employer. The tax rate is increased to 50 percent if
the employer does not also transfer a portion of the excess assets to a
replacement plan or increase the benefits in under the terminating plan.
Tax systems can be compared in terms of whether they distort
choices made by workers and employers. These choices include: wages
versus pensions, deferred wages versus pensions, other fringe benefits
(such as health insurance) versus pensions, social security versus pen
sions, current consumption versus future consumption, defined benefit
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versus defined contribution plans, individual plans versus employerprovided plans, self-employment versus corporate employment, lumpsum benefits versus annuities, and pension investments in some types
of assets versus others. The analysis of each of these issues will be
demonstrated by using a particular country or countries as an example.
Private pensions are composed of three transactions: pension contri
butions, investment earnings, and disbursements. These three transac
tions plus pension assets are the primary points at which pensions have
the potential to be taxed.

Contributions
Employer Contributions
The United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and most other coun
tries with well-developed private pension systems allow employer con
tributions to be tax deductible. In this way, employer costs for wages
and contributions to pension plans receive equal treatment with respect
to corporate income taxes. Thus, the tax system does not distort the
choice of employers between paying current wages and paying future
pension benefits. There is still a tax distortion between paying deferred
wages and paying pensions, however, since there is no equivalent man
ner for a firm to set aside money to pay for deferred wages.
Employer contributions to a pension plan are not taxed as income to
the employee, which avoids both personal income and social security
payroll taxation at the time the contributions are made. Because
employees pay tax on pension benefits when received in retirement,
they entirely avoid social security taxation. This reduces the tax burden
for workers, but it also reduces their future social security benefits in
countries, such as the United States, where benefits are related to tax
able earnings (Burkhauser and Turner 1985).
In Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom, employers
may deduct 100 percent of contributions for retirement annuity bene
fits. Contributions for past service liability are also tax deductible.
In Australia, by contrast, employer contributions are taxed at a rate
of 15 percent to the employee. However, the difference between the 15
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percent rate and the employee's marginal personal income tax rate can
still be considerable (Asinta 1994).

Employee Contributions
In the United Kingdom, Canada and most other countries, employee
contributions also are tax deductible. In Belgium, however, only 30 to
40 percent of employee contributions are tax deductible. In New
Zealand, neither employee nor employer pension contributions are tax
deductible. In the United States, employee contributions for most types
of pension plans are taxable under both the personal income tax and
social security payroll tax. Thus, the U.S. tax code treats employer and
employee contributions differently.
Employee contributions to salary reduction plans, however, are an
exception to the rule that employee contributions are taxed in the
United States. The most common type of salary reduction plans are
401(k) plans. In salary reduction plans, employee contributions are
deductible from before-tax earnings under the federal income tax but
still are liable for the social security payroll tax so as not to erode the
social security tax base.3
The primary effect of not allowing employee contributions to be tax
deductible for most types of U.S. pension plans is that most plans are
funded entirely by employer contributions. Since employees probably
bear the cost of employer contributions through reduced wages (Mont
gomery, Shaw, and Benedict 1992), the lack of deductibility of
employee contributions appears to have little effect on the cost of pen
sion plans to employers or employees. According to this argument, the
tax deductibility of employee contributions to 401(k) plans would not
be a particularly advantageous feature of those plans, and the fact that
this feature is not available to defined benefit plans would not particu
larly disadvantage them.
In the United States, if an individual does not use his or her allow
able tax deduction for pension contributions to a defined contribution
plan within the tax year, it is generally lost. The tax treatment of contri
butions to defined contribution plans in Canada allows individuals
greater flexibility in the timing of their contributions. An individual's
unused contribution allowance in each year is carried forward indefi
nitely for use in subsequent years, subject to certain dollar limits. Sim-
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ilarly, contributions not deductible in the year in which they are paid
may be deducted in subsequent years.
This flexibility for contributions to defined contribution plans was
introduced to achieve equal footing with the flexibility available to
employers for contributions to defined benefit plans. Employers in
most countries have flexibility in their contributions to defined benefit
plans, so long as their plans are not overfunded to the extent that fur
ther contributions are not allowed.
Registered Retirement Savings Plans are the Canadian equivalent of
Individual Retirement Accounts in the United States. Contributions to
the Canadian plans must be made within 60 days of the end of the year
in order to be deductible for the year. A similar provision in the United
States is available for contributions to Individual Retirement Accounts.
However, in Canada failure to contribute by the deadline does not
cause the deduction to be lost. Unused contribution amounts, subject to
a prescribed seven-year limit, may be carried forward and deducted
when made (Hewitt Associates 1990).
Contribution Limits
Countries generally set a maximum on allowable tax deductible
contributions. The maximum is often expressed as both a maximum
percentage of earnings and a maximum amount. Maximums are set to
limit the government's loss of tax revenues and to limit the tax prefer
ences received by high-income workers.
In the United States, maximum contributions to a pension plan on
behalf of an employee are lower when the employee is covered by
more than one plan, and when the plan is top heavy, which refers to
plans (mainly found in small firms) where a disproportionate amount
of the benefits accrue to the owners and higher-paid employees of the
firm. Limits are placed on the maximum employee earnings that can be
used to determine benefits or contributions. There are also contribution
limits based on the extent to which defined benefit pension assets
exceed or fall short of liabilities.
In the United States, there are maximum limits for both defined ben
efit and defined contribution plans. The limits set the amount that can
be contributed to a defined contribution plan and the maximum benefit
that can be received from a defined benefit plan. For a defined contribu-
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tion plan, the annual limit is the lesser of 25 percent of compensation
or $30,000. The $30,000 limit will be adjusted to equal one-fourth of
the dollar limit on which benefits can be calculated for defined benefit
plans, after that limit, which is price indexed, exceeds $120,000.
Defined benefit plans are limited in the actuarial assumptions they can
make, which prevents plans from claiming unreasonably large tax
deductions.
The tax treatment of pensions in Canada is based on the principle
that all workers should have equal access to a tax-preferenced pension
plan, whether or not their employer provides a pension plan. This is
viewed as an important principle of interpersonal equity. To achieve it,
each worker's maximum contributions to a Registered Retirement Sav
ings Plan is reduced by a Pension Adjustment to reflect the assessed
accrual of benefit value under employer-provided defined benefit and
defined contribution plans. This integration of employer-provided
plans with individual plans assures that all workers are able to set aside
roughly an equivalent amount in a tax-preferred retirement plan.
This is a major difference between the tax treatment of pensions in
Canada and in the United States. No attempt has been made in the
United States to equalize the treatment between employer-provided
plans and individual plans. U.S. pension tax policy greatly favors
employer-provided plans over individual plans. Since 1981, maximum
deductible contributions to an Individual Retirement Account have
been frozen at $2,000. For middle- and upper-income workers, maxi
mum tax deductible contributions are roughly ten times higher in
employer-provided plans than in Individual Retirement Accounts.
In Canada, tax deductible contributions to retirement arrangements
by or on behalf of individuals are limited to the lesser of 18 percent of
the prior year's earnings and dollar limits that will be wage indexed
starting in 1995 from a base of $15,500 in 1994. The figure of 18 per
cent for the maximum allowable contribution was chosen because it is
roughly consistent with the existing limit on benefit formulas of 2 per
cent of earnings per year of service that applies to pension benefits pro
vided by defined benefit plans (Wyatt 1990).
In Japan, employee contributions to an Employees' Pension Fund,
which is the contracted-out type of plan, receive a tax deduction
because such plans are similar to social insurance. For a Tax-Qualified
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Pension plan, employees may receive a tax deduction for contributions
up to a low maximum of 100,000 yen a year (about $950).4
In the United Kingdom, the maximum allowable tax deductible con
tributions for personal pension plans increase with age, rising from
17.5 percent of earnings for those under age 36, to 40 percent for those
ages 61 to 74 (table 4.1). The idea behind this policy is that older work
ers are more aware of their retirement income needs and may be more
motivated to save for their retirement. In the United States and other
countries, the amount does not vary by age.
The 25 percent limit for employer plans in the United States is con
siderably higher than the 18 percent limit in Canada, but considerably
lower than the 40 percent limit for older workers in the United King
dom. These differences, however, may be of little economic signifi
cance if few workers wish to contribute more than the 18 percent limit.
The difference is most likely to be constraining for older workers and
higher income workers, who would more likely wish to contribute a
high percentage of their salary to a pension plan.
Perhaps because the aging of populations has raised the level of total
tax deductions for pensions in many countries, there has been a trend in
countries with developed pension systems toward reducing the maxi
mum amount that can be deducted. This has occurred in the United
States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada.
Table 4.1 Maximum Allowable Percentage of Salary Contributions to a
______Personal Pension Plan in the United Kingdom, 1994_____
Maximum percentage
Age
of salary
Up to 35
17.5
20.0
36 to 45
25.0
46 to 50
51 to 55
30.0
56 to 60
35.0
40.0
61 to 73
SOURCE: British Tax Law.
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Tax Treatment of High-Income Workers
Because most countries have progressive income tax systems, with
higher-income workers paying higher marginal tax rates, the tax
deductibility of contributions is relatively more beneficial for higher
income taxpayers. In the mid 1990s, higher-income taxpayers in the
United Kingdom effectively received a tax rebate of 40 percent on pen
sion contributions, while basic rate taxpayers, who were the large
majority, received a 25 percent rebate. While pension tax policy can be
criticized as favoring middle- and upper-income taxpayers, a broader
analysis of tax policy that includes redistribution through social secu
rity would provide a better measure of the transfers made by the gov
ernment to different income groups to provide retirement income.
The tax treatment of pension plans is more generous for highincome workers in the United States than it is in Canada. The maxi
mum dollar amount of contributions to defined contribution plans is
considerably higher in the United States, and the maximum percentage
of earnings that may be contributed is also higher. Both of these fea
tures benefit high-income workers.

Book Reserve Plans
For book reserve plans in Germany, Austria, Luxembourg and
Japan, firms may take a tax deduction even though they make no con
tribution to the plan. A book reserve plan is one where the firm indi
cates the pension liabilities in its financial accounts but does not set
aside money in a separate fund. The tax deductible amount is deter
mined by calculating the contribution that would be necessary to fully
fund the accrued liability.
In Germany, book reserve liabilities are not deductible for employ
ees younger than age 30, and limitations are placed on the actuarial
assumptions to prevent employers from deducting unreasonably large
amounts. In Japan, only 40 percent of the accrual of book reserve is tax
deductible. In the United States, firms receive no tax deduction for
their unfunded pension liabilities.
In Japan, it is cheaper for employers to accumulate the money nec
essary to pay benefits through an Employees' Pension Fund plan or a
Tax-Qualified Pension plan than it is to accumulate money to pay ben-
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efits through a book reserve plan. The present tax laws are not favor
able for book reserve plans. However, many large companies have
book reserve plans because they can use the money that would have
been put into a pension plan as working capital in the firm. The popu
larity of book reserve plans in Japan in spite of their relatively unfavor
able tax treatment indicates the high value that firms appear to place on
the availability of this form of corporate financing.

Investment Earnings
In Canada, the United States, and the majority of countries with
well-developed private pension systems, investment earnings on pen
sion assets accumulate tax free. Pension plans receive dividends, capi
tal gains, and interest payments and pay no tax on those earnings.
However, taxation of pension investment earnings is becoming increas
ingly common. In Australia, they are taxed at 15 percent, while capital
gains are taxable at 15 percent after adjustment for inflation. This dis
parate treatment of capital gains and investment earnings distorts the
pension portfolios of Australian pension funds towards investing in
stocks providing capital gains rather than dividends.
In Belgium, pension funds face a tax rate of 10 percent on interest
income, and 20 or 25 percent on dividends and income from property.
In Ireland, a tax was placed on pension fund investment income in
1988, including realized capital gains, on a one-time-only basis (Stewart 1995). In the Netherlands, pension investment income is taxed to
the extent that it exceeds a real rate of return of 3.5 percent. Both real
ized and unrealized capital gains are included in the calculation of the
real rate of return. The tax rate is 40.5 percent. In Sweden, pension
investment income is taxed at 10 or 15 percent, compared to a general
income tax rate of 30 percent.
In the United Kingdom, pension plans received a full rebate from
the government for many years on the pro rata share of the corporate
income tax paid by companies in which they owned stock. It was rea
soned that because pension plans are tax-exempt investors, they should
not be forced to pay the corporate income tax indirectly before receiv
ing income from their investments on corporate stock. A change in tax
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law in 1993 modestly reduced the rebate. In the United States, corpora
tions pay corporate income tax and then pay dividends out of after-tax
corporate income. Pension plans are not taxed on those dividends, but
they do not receive a rebate for the corporate income tax that was paid.
In this respect pensions receive more favorable tax treatment in the
United Kingdom than in the United States.
Defined benefit plans in Canada and the United Kingdom offer
employers the possibility of a windfall tax shelter for surplus funds.
Since an employer able to withdraw those funds will have received the
benefit of tax deductions, employers have an incentive to contribute
more to their pension plans than is required to assure adequate funding.
Employers in Canada and the United Kingdom are allowed to with
draw surplus funds without terminating a plan, whereas in the United
States the only way to withdraw surplus funds is to terminate. To dis
courage overfunding, Revenue Canada (the federal tax collecting
authority) has set contribution limits. By denying tax deductibility to
contributions when funding reaches a certain level, Revenue Canada
and Inland Revenue in the United Kingdom have limited contributions
to plans with surpluses.

Assets
Pension assets are not taxed in most countries. Because of the large
size of pension assets in several countries, however, taxation has
become an appealing possible source of government revenue. Such a
tax offsets the loss in government revenue from other aspects of prefer
ential tax treatment that pensions receive. It also, however, offsets the
incentive effect that encourages firms and employees to establish plans.
In Belgium, there is a 0.17 percent tax on pension fund assets. In
Japan, a tax of 1.17 percent per year is levied on the assets of TaxQualified Pension Plans. This tax is considered to be the recovery by
the government of interest on income tax not paid during the period of
tax deferral. It generally does not apply to the assets in contracted-out
plans (Employees' Pension Fund plans).
Special corporate tax payments on pension assets have grown in
Japan, as private pension plans have developed (table 4.2). The
amounts in 1991 were 950 million yen for Employees' Pension Fund
plans (paid by 30 plans) and 12.7 billion yen for Tax-Qualified Pension
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Plans. Many groups, including the Japan Employers' Association, have
proposed abolishing the taxation of pension assets.
In Japan, as in other countries that allow book reserve plans, the
funds that would have been set aside had those plans been funded are
invested in the working capital of the company. Company earnings are
subject to the corporate tax, which is roughly 50 percent (including a
regional tax).
Table 4.2 Asset Tax Payments by Private Pension Plans in Japan,
1982-1990 (million yen)
Employees' Pension
Tax-Qualified
Year
Fund Plans
Pension Plans
40
1982
44,901
1984
119
59,219
1986
186
81,911
512
1988
101,515
1990
950
127,030
SOURCE Japanese Advisory Council on Social Security.

Disbursements

Lump-Sum Distributions
Some countries provide preferential income tax treatment for bene
fits received as a lump-sum payment, rather than as an annuity. The
economic justification for this policy is unclear. Annuities provide a
form of insurance—they assure that the retiree will not outlive his or
her income. Lump-sum payments do not provide this insurance, and
thus appear to be a less desirable form in which to receive retirement
benefits. However, social security benefits, which are paid as annuities,
provide this type of insurance. In some cases, workers appear to indi
cate by their choice of a lump-sum benefit that the social security pro
gram provides them adequate insurance against outliving their
resources. Employees often do not have much information as to how to

60 Tax Policy Towards Private Pensions

invest their lump-sum benefits, however, and may be overly conserva
tive in managing such investments.
In Japan, an Employees' Pension Fund plan must pay a life annuity
for benefits contracted out from the Employees' Pension Insurance
social security program. However, 93 percent of all Tax-Qualified Pen
sion Plans have a lump-sum benefits option, and more employees
choose that option than annuity benefits. The popularity of lump-sum
benefits arises in part because of the more favorable tax treatment of
lump-sum benefits than of annuities.
Japanese retirees can deduct lump-sum payments up to a certain
amount from their retirement income. The deductible amount increases
with an employee's years of work. The amount that it increases by is
greater for years of work exceeding twenty (table 4.3).
Table 4.3 Taxation of Lump-Sum Benefits in Japan, 1994
Years of service
Deduction amount
Less than 3
0.8 million yen
3 to 19
0.4 million yen x (years of service)
20 or more
0.7 million yen x (years of service -20) + 8.0 million yen
Taxable amount = (lump-sum benefit - deduction amount) x 1/2.
SOURCE: Japanese Income Tax Law, Section 30.

In the United Kingdom, part of a pension may be received at retire
ment as a tax free lump sum. This is limited to 1.5 times final annual
pay, with a smaller multiple for retirement with less than twenty years
in the pension plan. Ireland and Australia also provide preferential tax
treatment for retirement benefits received as a lump sum rather than as
an annuity.
In the United States, lump-sum distributions at retirement have been
granted special income averaging provisions for tax purposes, but
lump-sum distributions from Canadian pension plans have been pro
hibited.
Annuity Benefits
The taxation of benefits is the most common way for pensions to be
taxed. Any payment from a Canadian or U.S. pension plan, whether on
death, retirement, or termination of service, is taxable income. In Ger-
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many, pensions financed through the book reserve method are taxed as
normal income when received as benefits, except that 40 percent is tax
free up to an annual ceiling. If benefits are funded through direct insur
ance with an insurance company, company contributions are consid
ered taxable income. Accordingly, the retirement benefits are tax free if
paid as a lump sum, or taxable only to a certain extent if paid as an
annuity. The taxable percentage of the benefit depends on the age of
the worker at retirement. This percentage is 29 percent at age 60, 26
percent at age 63, and 24 percent at age 65. Thus, the tax treatment of
pension benefits in Germany is used to encourage delayed retirement.
In Japan, pension and social security annuities are subject to special
income tax treatment and are tax free up to a certain amount per year.
The deduction is composed of a flat amount, plus a deduction that var
ies with the size of the annuity. The percentage deducted declines in
increments for benefits exceeding certain levels.5
Annuity benefits paid by an Employees' Pension Fund plan are sub
ject to the same tax as social security benefits. The tax is applied after
certain deductions are made (table 4.4). For a married annuitant under
age 65, the maximum annuity on which no tax would be paid is 1.75
million yen per year (about $16,500). For the annuitant who is age 65
or older with a spouse who is age 70 or older, the maximum annuity on
which no tax would be levied is 3.05 million yen (about $29,000).
Table 4.4 Maximum Level of Tax-Free Pension Annuities in Japan, 1994
Annuitant
Maximum tax-free annuity
Under age 65
Single
1.05 million yen
$ 9,900
Married
1.75
16,500
Age 65 and older
Single
2.25
21,200
Married
2.95
27,800
Spouse age 70 or older____3.05_______________29,000
SOURCE: Japanese Income Tax Code, Section 35.

In a Tax-Qualified Pension Plan, annuity benefits after excluding the
amount equal to employee contributions are subject to the same tax as
on an Employees' Pension Fund plan.6
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In the United States, pension benefits received at retirement are
taxed under federal and state personal income taxes, but not the social
security payroll tax. A participant generally recovers tax free the
amounts that were previously included in taxable income, which would
be non-tax deductible contributions made by the participant. Due to the
progressivity of the income tax system, workers frequently have lower
marginal income tax rates in retirement than while working.

Implicit Taxes
Even when an explicit tax is not levied on pension benefits, an
implicit tax may cause the net increase in retirement income to be less
than the amount paid by the pension fund. In the United States, social
security benefits are taxable for retirees whose income exceeds a cer
tain level.7 For some U.S. workers, there is double taxation of pension
benefits at retirement. This occurs if pension benefits raise income to a
level where social security benefits are taxable. Each extra dollar of
pension benefits raises the recipient's tax payments by the tax on the
pension benefit and by the increased tax on the social security benefit.
In Canada, the income-tested component of the social security sys
tem discourages participation in employer-sponsored pension plans for
workers with low lifetime earnings. For each dollar of retirement
income exceeding a certain amount, social security Guaranteed Income
Supplement benefits are reduced by 50 cents. The net result is that
Canadians with low lifetime earnings face a 50 percent tax rate on pri
vate pension income in retirement.
Increases in private pension benefits in Sweden will reduce the min
imum benefit provided by the Swedish social security system by the
rate of 50 percent (a reduction of one kroner for every two kroners
increase in pension benefits) starting in 1996, until the minimum bene
fit is reduced to zero. This private pension benefit reduction is an
implicit tax of 50 percent on those benefits.

Consumption Taxes
The tax treatment of pensions moves the United States, the United
Kingdom, Japan, and other countries toward a consumption tax sys
tem. Under a consumption tax, retirees generally pay higher taxes than
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under an income tax raising equal revenue. Under such a system, con
sumption expenditures are taxed but savings (including investment
earnings) are not. Earnings saved through a pension are not taxed until
received in retirement when they are presumably consumed, which is
the way they would be taxed under a consumption tax system. For
other types of savings, a worker's earnings are taxed and then if the
worker saves and receives investment earnings on the savings, the earn
ings are taxed again. A consumption tax avoids the double taxation of
savings and thus does not distort the decision between current con
sumption and future consumption. This is a desirable aspect of a tax
system, given the concern in many countries over inadequate savings,
but its effect on total savings is diminished by the reduction in other
savings.
In Japan, investment earnings for nonpension savings are taxable at
a rate of 20 percent (a 15 percent national income tax and a 5 percent
regional tax). For people age 65 and older, however, the investment
earnings on savings are not taxable. Employer contributions to
employee savings are deemed to be wage income to the employee and
are immediately taxable.
In the United Kingdom, tax treatment is more favorable for pensions
than for social security contributions and benefits. Employee pension
contributions are deductible, while employee social security payments
are not. Pension benefits can be taken, at least in part, as a tax free
lump sum, while social security benefits cannot.

Conclusions
While a number of comparisons across countries have been made,
contrasts between the United Kingdom and the United States illustrate
the insights that can be gained. The United Kingdom provides more
favorable tax treatment for private pensions than does the United
States. It allows employee contributions to be tax deductible, and it
allows lump-sum benefits at retirement to be received tax free (both
subject to restrictions). The United States allows neither. The United
Kingdom gives pensions a partial rebate on corporate income tax paid
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the companies in which pensions hold stock. Pension plans in the
United States receive no such rebate.
Countries have developed a wide variety of tax rules for pension
plans. However, all countries with well-developed pension systems
provide some form of tax preference for pensions. The most common
form is to allow contributions and investment earnings to be made and
received tax free, but to tax pension benefits at receipt. Pension partici
pants are taxed once, when they receive benefits. This taxation com
pares to the double taxation of other savings, where wage income is
taxed and the subsequent investment earnings are also taxed.
NOTES
1. Sections of this chapter are based in part on Dilnot (1995).
2. This tax treatment has greatly reduced the amount of savings through pensions. To some
extent, lost pension savings have been channeled into other forms of savings; for example, greater
investment in owner-occupied housing.
3. They are not deductible under the state income tax in some states.
4. There are no employee contributions to such plans because they are not funded.
5. The tax treatment of Japanese pensions is explained in Clark (1991b).
6. Book reserve plans do not pay annuity benefits, so this tax question does not arise for them.
7. Fifty percent of social security benefits are taxable at the personal income tax marginal rate
for income exceeding a certain level and 85 percent of benefits are taxable for higher incomes.

5
Pension Risk and Insurance
Risk-bearing is a fundamental aspect of pension systems. An impor
tant aspect of risk-bearing is the distinction between defined benefit
and defined contribution plans. In some countries, specific programs
have been established to insure or guarantee benefits against risk.

Pension Risk in Defined Benefit and Defined
Contribution Plans1
Financial risk is inherent in pension plans. It must be borne by some
party—workers, employers, an insurance company, the stockholders
and bondholders of the company, taxpayers, or other employers. Risks
may differ between categories of workers, such as between long-tenure
and short-tenure workers, or between men and women.
To the extent that the entity who bears the risk controls the invest
ment of pension portfolios, the allocation of risk-bearing may affect
financial markets. For example, individuals tend to be more conserva
tive when investing their defined contribution plan portfolios than the
professional money managers who generally are responsible for invest
ing the defined benefit plan portfolios.
The rules that specify the conditions of benefit payment effectively
determine who bears pension risk. An employer's first decision when
considering the amount of pension risk to bear is whether to provide a
defined benefit or defined contribution plan.2
It is traditionally argued that in defined benefit plans the employer
bears the entire risk. The employer promises the worker a fixed benefit
independent of the rate of return on pension assets. In financial terms,
the defined benefit pension liabilities of the firm are independent of the
investment performance of the pension plan. The firm acts in effect as
an insurance company; it insures pension participants against financial
risk. In publicly held firms, defined benefit plan risk is ultimately borne
by corporate stockholders. Workers have no financial interest in the
pension fund, since their benefits are independent of the performance
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of the fund, according to the traditional argument. The conclusion that
workers bear no risks in defined benefit plans, however, assumes that
the plans are fully funded, or that there is no risk of the firm defaulting
on its pension liabilities, or that the pension liabilities are fully insured.
In defined contribution plans, the worker is said to bear the entire
risk. After contributing to the worker's account, the employer has no
further liability.
In actuality, workers and employers in both types of plans shift risk
to each other and to other parties. They do so through collective bar
gaining when a union is involved, they seek alternative risk-bearing
arrangements through competition for workers and jobs in the labor
market, and they influence government to enact laws regulating riskbearing or to insure benefits.
The government, responding to political interests, influences the
pension risk-bearing of employers and workers. For example, govern
ment may affect the choice between defined benefit and defined contri
bution plans. Sometimes it mandates a particular type of plan, such as
the mandatory defined contribution plans in Chile. It may provide
options, such as allowing workers to opt out of defined benefit plans
and participate in personal pension (defined contribution) plans in the
United Kingdom. It may affect the relative costs of the two types of
plans, such as in the United States where government regulations have
added to the costs of defined benefit plans.
Coverage by a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan
are not mutually exclusive—a worker can be covered by both types of
plans offered by the same employer. In the United States, 40 percent of
workers covered by an employer-provided pension plan are covered by
both a defined benefit and a defined contribution plan (Turner and
Beller 1992). A study in Bavaria, Germany indicated that a large per
centage of employers who offered a defined benefit plan offered volun
tary participation in a defined contribution plan as an option (Ahrend,
Forster, and Walkiewicz 1990).

The Trend Toward Defined Contribution Plans
In a number of countries, there has been a movement towards
defined contribution plans. Defined contribution plans are increasingly
popular in the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada,
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Germany, and Ireland. Defined contribution systems have been man
dated in Australia, Chile, and Switzerland. While in Japan and the
Netherlands defined benefit plans dominate, in Denmark and Sin
gapore defined contribution plans are the primary or sole type of plan. 3
The United States and Australia both have a sizable percentage of
participants in defined contribution plans. Australia has slightly more
participants in insured defined contribution than defined benefit plans
(52 percent), but it should be noted that data for noninsured plans are
not available (table 5.1). In Canada and the United Kingdom, by far the
largest number of participants are in defined benefit plans. Defined
benefit plans have been dominant worldwide.
For many years, defined benefit plans were more popular than
defined contribution plans in the United States, but that has changed.
Since 1984, more workers have participated in defined contribution
than defined benefit plans, and the disparity is growing. There are more
assets in defined benefit plans than in defined contribution plans, but
that is partly because defined benefit plans generally pay annuities out
of the plan, while defined contribution plans generally pay lump sums,
and thus disburse their money to retirees much more quickly.4 It is also
partly because when an employee participates in both a defined contri
bution and defined benefit plan, which is the case for about 40 percent
of pension participants, the defined contribution plan is typically a sec
ondary plan that is less generous.
Two explanations for the trend away from primary defined benefit
plans in the United States have been advanced.5 First, some researchers
have attributed it to increasing regulation, beginning with the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and con
tinuing through tax and pension regulations passed during the 1980s.
Many of these regulations have increased the cost of defined benefit
plans relative to defined contribution plans. Other regulations, such as
the top-heavy regulations for vesting, have reduced the advantages of
defined benefit plans to small businesses. Plans for state and local gov
ernment employees are not affected by the regulations, and there has
been no trend towards defined contribution plans among those employ
ees. They are predominantly defined benefit plans. Second, some stud
ies have indicated that the changing composition of industry and the
workforce has had an important role in the trend. Defined benefit plans
are more likely to be found in union firms and in manufacturing indus-

Table 5.1 Defined Benefit Versus Defined Contribution Pension Plans, 1988
(percent)
Participants, assets, plans
By number of participants
Defined benefit
Defined contribution
By size of assets
Defined benefit
Defined contribution
By number of plans
Defined benefit
Defined contribution

Australia3

Canada15

Germany
(FRG)

Japan

United
Kingdom

United
States

48
52

86
12

--

100
0

92
8

53
47

62
38

87
13

---

100
0

-

66
34

19
81

40
59

90
10

100
0

---

28
72

SOURCE: Dailey and Turner (1992).
a. Relates to insured plans only.
b. Plans and participants do not total 100 percent as there are composite plans in addition.
— Data not available.
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tries. These key correlates of plan type have declined. Unionism has
declined and there has been a trend away from employment in manu
facturing and toward services. The remaining policy issue is the degree
to which the drop in defined benefit pensions is attributable to regula
tory changes. While all studies examining this issue attribute some role
to regulatory changes, they disagree on the importance of that role. 6
The 1980s witnessed tremendous growth in 401(k) plans in the
United States, a type of defined contribution plan named after the sec
tion of the Internal Revenue Code that enabled it. Between 1984 and
1990, participants in 401(k) plans grew by 12 million, while partici
pants in defined benefit plans declined by 3.8 million. The number of
workers participating in defined contribution plans other than 401(k)
plans declined, so that the total growth of workers in defined contribu
tion plans was 4.8 million (table 5.2). These aggregate statistics sug
gest that 401(k) plans have to some extent replaced previously existing
plans.
Table 5.2 Active Worker Participants in Defined Benefit, Defined
Contribution, and 401(k) Plans in the United States,
_______1984-1990 (thousands of workers)_______________
Defined contribution
Defined
Non-401(k)
401(k)
Year
Total
benefit
23,063
7,540
30,172
30,603
1984
33,244
29,024
22,885
10,359
1985
23,061
11,559
34,620
28,670
1986
21,828
13,131
28,432
34,959
1987
19,537
15,203
34,740
27,864
1988
17,673
17,337
35,010
27,295
1989
19,548
15,940
35,488
26,344
1990
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor (1993) and author's calculations.

When workers are given greater choice, they are forced to rely more
on themselves. With the trend toward defined contribution plans, where
workers bear the investment risk and where they can generally cash out
their pension when they change jobs, the U.S. pension system is shift-
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ing away from employer responsibility and toward individual responsi
bility for retirement income.

Mixed Uses for Plans
While defined benefit plans are designed for retirement savings,
some defined contribution plans have elements of both a general sav
ings plan and a retirement pension plan. For example, 91 percent of
firms listed on Japan's eight stock exchanges provide Employee Stock
Ownership Plans (ESOPs), which are a form of defined contribution
plan that invests primarily or entirely in stock of the employer. These
plans are not considered to be retirement plans, however (Jones and
Kato 1993). Workers cannot withdraw shares while employed until
they have been in the plan for twenty years, and then can withdraw
some.
Workers in the United States often cash out their pension plans, pri
marily their defined contribution plans, when changing jobs and some
times do not consider them to be retirement plans. In the United
Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands, by contrast, after several years
in the plan a worker cannot cash out a pension plan until retirement.
Not all plans are readily categorized as defined contribution or
defined benefit plans. In many types of plans the investment risk is
shared between the employer and the worker. The mandatory,
employer-provided, pay-as-you-go pension plans in France are an
example of plans where risk is shared, and thus they are neither a pure
defined benefit nor pure defined contribution. In these plans, there is
little financial market risk because they have little funding. There is
risk as to the adequacy of the contributions being paid into the system,
however. They must be considered defined benefit plans because the
ultimate benefits are not based on the investment of contributions to an
account. However, the generosity of the plans is adjusted according to
the financial status of the pay-as-you-go funds, and thus the risk in the
plans is shared between the workers and employers.7
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Determination of Risk-Bearing
How firms and workers divide pension risk-bearing can be analyzed
as being specified through a contract. Some aspects of this contract are
explicit—determined by law or written into the pension benefit for
mula or collective bargaining agreement. Other aspects are implicit
agreements as to conditions under which the firm will provide cost-ofliving adjustments to retirement benefits, reduce the worker's real pay,
lay off the worker, or terminate the pension plan.
An implicit contract could take the following form: The firm prom
ises the worker an ongoing pension plan and long-term employment,
so long as the worker maintains a given level of productivity and the
firm's financial status maintains a minimum level. If the firm's finan
cial status deteriorates, the worker may bear some risk through reduced
pay, including reduced pension accruals or plan termination.
Pension risks can be analyzed according to their source. Risks arise
from uncertainties of labor supply and demand, from uncertainty as to
life expectancy, from financial market variables, and from political
change. The following sections examine who bears these risks in dif
ferent pension systems.
1. Job Tenure and Wage Risk
Workers. In defined benefit plans, the benefit at retirement—and
thus the annual accrual of benefits while working—usually depends on
the worker's final salary. Defined benefit plans are generally backloaded, meaning that the accrual of pension benefits increases relative
to salary the longer the worker has been in the plan and the nearer the
worker is to retirement. In some defined contribution plans the percent
age of pay the employer contributes to the plan increases with
employee age or tenure.
While many workers in Japan, primarily men, have lifetime job
security, workers elsewhere generally have uncertain job tenure with
their firm and uncertain future wages. Backloading features make plans
riskier for workers uncertain whether they will have long tenure with
the firm than for workers who expect no job changes. Firms presum
ably impose this risk on workers to insure against hiring and training
losses related to workers who quit before retirement.
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Basing benefits in defined benefit plans on final average wages
would appear to provide workers with retirement income maintenance
insurance not available in defined contribution plans or in career-aver
age defined benefit plans.8 However, because wage paths are uncertain
early in worklife, individuals bear risk when their retirement benefits
depend so heavily on final salary. While backloading does hedge
against inflation (because wages tend to keep pace with inflation), final
earnings can sometimes be low due to poor health or changes in market
conditions. This risk frequently is reduced by basing pension benefits
on the highest rather than the final salary, by averaging over several
years, and by providing special disability benefits for early retirement
due to poor health.
Defined contribution plans provide "wage diversification" because
they are based on career wages. Career-average defined benefit plans
also have wage diversification, since they are based on wages earned
over many years.9
Firms. The protection offered to workers is risk borne by the firm.
To the extent that this risk is largely diversifiable to employers
(because they can diversify it across a number of workers) and nondiversifiable to individual workers, the replacement rate stability would
be an advantage of defined benefit plans to workers.
2. Early Retirement Risk
Defined benefit plans in the United States often provide early retire
ment benefits greater than what would result from an actuarially fair
reduction in benefits. This feature of defined benefit plans insures an
initial benefit level to employees who are unable to work past early
retirement. Defined contribution plans cannot protect against this risk,
since their level of benefits is determined by the individual's account
balance.
3. Implicit Contract Risk
Workers bear the risk that firms break their implicit contracts. Sup
pose, for example, that a firm with a defined benefit plan that tradition
ally granted cost-of-living adjustments to its retirees is sold. The new
owners discontinue providing cost-of-living adjustments or terminate
the plan without providing a successor plan. If the workers had
accepted lower wages anticipating a pension that was partially indexed
after retirement, they would suffer a loss. 10
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4. Longevity Risk
Workers who do not annuitize their benefits risk outliving their
assets. Because defined benefit plans generally provide annuities and
defined contribution plans generally provide lump-sum benefits, the
longevity risk is greater in defined contribution plans. However, this
difference is not inherent. In Japan, some types of defined benefit plans
provide benefits as a lump sum, while in Chile, the mandatory defined
contribution plans require workers to annuitize their benefits or take
them in installments over time.
5. Demographic Risk
Both unfunded and funded pension plans face demographic risk due
to an increasing old-age dependency ratio raising the cost of providing
retirement benefits. Changes in the percentage of the population that
are elderly can be predicted years in advance, and thus would be con
sidered cost factors rather than risk factors. When pension systems are
set up, however, not all demographic changes are predictable years into
the future, and thus pension systems face an element of demographic
risk.
In unfunded pension plans, such as in France, the ratio of beneficia
ries to covered workers acts like a price measuring the cost to workers
of providing benefits to beneficiaries (Doescher and Turner 1988).
When there are five workers for every retiree, it costs workers $.20 to
provide an extra dollar of benefits to beneficiaries. When there are two
workers for every retiree, the cost is $.50.
Funded systems are affected by demographic risk through the effect
of population aging on the tax subsidy to pensions. The generosity of
such subsidies is likely to be reduced during periods when a large age
group is receiving them. Funded systems are also negatively affected
by reduced market rates of return caused by aggregate dissavings.
Because defined benefit plans are generally backloaded, the expense
of such plans depends on plan demographics. Thus, as population ages,
the annual expense of defined benefit plans will increase.
6. Financial Market Risk
Workers. The generosity of some defined benefit plans may depend
on the financial market performance of the plan's portfolio. Multiemployer plans in the United States are an example. They are collectively
bargained between a union and a group of employers. The level of ben-
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efits in multiemployer defined benefit plans usually is set as a fixed
amount per year of service and does not depend on worker earnings. In
addition, the level of employer contributions is also fixed through the
collective bargaining agreement.
Every few years when the collective bargaining agreement is rene
gotiated, the fixed amount is increased. The size of these increases may
depend on the financial performance of the plan's assets. Retirees ben
efit from favorable investment performance because if the plan reaches
its maximum allowable funding, the required contributions of employ
ers frequently are used to give retirees a one-time bonus.
Workers also may bear some of the risk of poor financial perfor
mance by defined benefit plans through reduced wages. When required
to make additional cash contributions to the pension plan because of
poor plan performance, employers may offer smaller wage increases or
less generous increases in pension benefits. Data from a small survey
of Canadian plan administrators suggest that some workers received
benefit increases in response to favorable investment performance of a
defined benefit plan, while workers were less likely to suffer from poor
financial performance of a plan (Pesando and Hyatt 1992).
Top managers of firms are often major beneficiaries of the pension
fund. While managers often also hold common stock or stock options
in the firm, their pension benefits may be a substantial part of their
expected retirement wealth. Because of the limit on the level of bene
fits insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation in the United
States, the benefits of top managers are at greater risk than are those of
rank-and-file workers. Thus, managers will presumably consider the
impact of their pension decisions on their own economic interests as
beneficiaries, rather than single-mindedly promoting the interests of
shareholders. 11
Although in many situations defined benefit plans hold less financial
risk for workers than do defined contribution plans, the reverse can also
be true. Consider a career-average defined benefit plan with no postretirement indexing. Accrued benefits at retirement are thus purely nomi
nal and have the investment characteristics of a long-term bond. Since
inflation and investment risk are virtually synonymous for fixed
income securities, retirees in such plans bear substantial investment
risk. In contrast, workers in a money-purchase defined contribution
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plan that invests in Treasury bills would be exposed to less inflation/
investment risk.
Because workers bear the investment risk in defined contribution
plans, firms often allow or require them to determine their pension
investments by choosing among several investment funds. In contrast,
defined benefit plans do not provide workers with a risk-return
choice. 12
Firms. Funded pension plans have financial market risk arising from
the assets in their portfolios. Defined benefit plans can reduce the
financial market risk to retirement benefits by risk-sharing between
retirement cohorts. When a retirement cohort experiences a large
decline in the value of pension assets due to a fall in financial markets,
the firm can efficiently absorb such risk by spreading it over the
cohorts for which it insures benefits.
Because pension plan liabilities have a long time horizon, the typi
cal pension fund can absorb more investment risk during intermediate
periods than can the average market investor. This gives defined benefit
plans an advantage over defined contribution plans for bearing finan
cial market risk. It allows defined benefit plans to hold riskier portfo
lios and to expect higher return than defined contribution plans.
Insurance Companies. Employers providing defined benefit plans
and employees in defined contribution plans can shift risk to an insur
ance company by buying allocated annuity contracts. With these con
tracts, the plan pays premiums on a per participant basis toward
immediate or deferred annuity payments.
Government. In defined benefit plans where the employer contribu
tion is tax deductible (as in most plans in most countries, but not in
New Zealand), some of the financial market risk is borne by the gov
ernment. If the assets the plan invests in suffer a capital loss, the
employer's contributions to the plan are increased. These increased
contributions reduce the employer's taxable profit and tax payments.
Similarly, if plan investments receive a high rate of return, the firm's
contributions to the plan are reduced and its taxable income increases.
Thus, the government shares both the upside and downside investment
risk in defined benefit plans. The Canadian data, however, suggest that
firms may modify this outcome by sharing upside returns with employ
ees.
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Through the tax system, the government also bears some financial
risk for defined contribution plans. If a defined contribution plan suf
fers a financial loss, workers' retirement benefits are reduced. If those
benefits are taxable, worker tax payments in retirement will be lower,
making after-tax benefits fall less than before-tax benefits. If the bene
fits are not taxed in retirement, there would be no risk-sharing by the
government. 13
7. Risk Due to Wrongdoing
Workers and Firms. Funded plans risk wrongdoing by employers
and fund managers. Both defined benefit and defined contribution
plans face malfeasance risk. Malfeasance can be misappropriation of
plan assets or it can result from placing plan assets in overly risky
investments. The Maxwell pension scandal in the United Kingdom
exemplifies both types of malfeasance. Before his death in 1991, Rob
ert Maxwell stole more than 440 million pounds ($730 million) from
pension funds of firms he controlled. He invested some of the funds in
his own companies, which were having financial problems.
Some countries have sought to reduce the risk of malfeasance by
requiring that employer representatives be on the board of trustees of
pension funds. For example, starting July 1, 1995, all pension funds in
Australia with five or more members must be administered by a trustee
group comprising 50 percent member and 50 percent employer repre
sentatives. A similar arrangement was proposed by the Goode Com
mission in the United Kingdom in its report following the Maxwell
affair (Pension Law Review Committee, 1994). In the Netherlands,
plans have equal employee and employer representation (Lutjens
1995), as do multiemployer plans in the United States, as well as plans
in France (Reynaud 1994b). In Spain, the majority of trustees must
represent employees (Ruano 1995). In these plans, employers cannot
determine the investment of plan assets. Rather, investment is deter
mined by the employer and employee groups that manage the plans.
Government and Insurance Companies. In the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Japan, Finland, and the province
of Ontario, Canada a mandatory program insures against the risk of
malfeasance for some defined benefit plans. Through this insurance,
the risk is borne by other employers, by an insurance company, or
directly by the government, meaning taxpayers. In contracted-out
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defined benefit plans in the United Kingdom, the government guaran
tees a minimum level of benefits through the social security system.
Some countries without formal insurance programs partially insure
defined benefit plans on an ad hoc basis. For example, a governmental
fund was established in the United Kingdom to partially compensate
members of the Maxwell pension plans for their losses. Malfeasance
risk may also be borne by pension service providers, who in most
countries have at least an implicit responsibility to protect pension par
ticipants from such risk.
Chile, Mexico, Switzerland, and Argentina provide government
guarantees for defined contribution plans if their rate of return falls
below specified levels (Campbell 1994). Plans in these countries are
not subject to risk due to underfunding because of the requirements of
their pension system, but they are subject to malfeasance and financial
market risk.
For both defined benefit and defined contribution plans, govern
ments reduce malfeasance risk by writing and enforcing regulations,
by judicial remedies, and by requiring plans to report information to
the government or make it available to plan participants. Regulations
and the filing of reports impose costs on firms, and the reduction in risk
should be balanced against the increased costs.
8. Risk Due to the Financial Performance of the Plan Sponsor
Workers. All pension plans to which employers contribute are
affected by the financial risks facing the sponsoring employer or
employers. This type of risk varies across plan type. 14 In profit sharing
plans, a type of defined contribution plan in the United States, the
employers' annual contributions can vary at their own discretion.
These plans give employers flexibility, reducing their risk by lowering
their fixed financial obligation. Workers bear some of the risk by
receiving lower pension contributions when the firm performs poorly.
While this arrangement increases the variability in employee compen
sation, it reduces their risk of being laid off.
In money-purchase defined contribution plans, the contribution is
fixed, such as a fixed percentage of the worker's earnings. Because the
required payment is fixed, the firm and not the worker bears risk in
these plans. If the firm has financial problems, it may terminate the
pension plan. If a money-purchase plan is terminated, plan accruals to
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date of termination are unaffected, and workers receive the amount in
their accounts. In a defined benefit plan, however, workers receive ben
efits based on their earnings at the time the plan is terminated. These
benefits generally are lower than the benefits the workers would have
accrued to date had the plan continued until the their retirement age.
Funding a pension plan collateralizes the interests of workers in
their retirement benefits, reducing the risk to workers, but increasing it
for shareholders and debtholders in the event of financial distress or
bankruptcy. Without funding, or with underfunding, and without insur
ance of benefits, the risk of bankruptcy to benefit levels in defined ben
efit plans is borne entirely by workers. 15 This is the case in the United
Kingdom for benefits that are not contracted out and in Japan for Tax
Qualified Pension Plans.
The risk to a firm's stockholders depends in part on whether the risk
of the defined benefit plan investments are positively correlated with
the risk of the firm. If a firm fully funds its defined benefit plan in a
diversified portfolio, the correlation between the financial performance
of the plan and the firm would presumably be small. However, if a firm
were to completely fund the plan by investing in firm assets, the corre
lation would be maximized. To the extent that firms underfund or use
book reserve funding, they have implicitly invested plan assets in
assets of the sponsoring employer. Such plans, unless otherwise
insured, pose greater risks for workers.
Stockholders. Rules regarding the priority of pension participants in
the bankruptcy of the sponsoring firm can affect which parties bear this
risk. If pension participants are given top priority in bankruptcy, then
some of the risk of defined benefit plans is shifted to stockholders,
bondholders, and creditors of the firm.
9. Interest Rate Risk
Workers wishing to convert a defined contribution account balance
into annuitized benefits face interest rate risk. The higher the interest
rate, the higher the worker's annuitized benefit at retirement, given the
level of assets in the plan. 16
Because defined benefit plan benefits are paid as an annuity at retire
ment, workers do not face interest rate risk. Defined benefit plans in
effect guarantee the interest rate for computing retirement annuities.
Thus, the interest rate risk is shifted to the firm.
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10. Inflation Risk
Inflation risk affects initial real benefits of job changers and real
benefit levels during retirement for all pension recipients. Job changers
in defined benefit plans face inflation risk from the point they leave the
firm. 17 The real value of their nominal final salary is eroded due to
inflation between that point and the time they receive benefits. While
few if any plans anywhere voluntarily index benefits for early leavers,
they are required to do so in the United Kingdom up to an inflation rate
of 5 percent per year.
Annuitized pension benefits have the financial characteristics of a
long-term bond. Thus, they face inflation rate risk. Once an initial level
of retirement benefits is set, benefits will erode in real value due to
inflation if that level is not periodically increased. Workers, however, in
participant-directed defined contribution plans who do not annuitize
their account balance can choose the asset composition of their pension
wealth and thus their preferred risk-return tradeoff.
In the United Kingdom, for contracted-out guaranteed minimum
benefits accruing since April 1988, the pension plan must provide costof-living adjustments after retirement of up to 3 percent annually. For
inflation rates higher than 3 percent, the government social security
program provides cost-of-living adjustments for the difference.
When inflation adjustments to pension benefits depend on the finan
cial performance of the underlying assets in the pension plan or of the
sponsoring firm, workers in defined benefit plans bear some of the
risks. 18 They bear the risks in part because the risks affect the level of
their benefits. Because women live longer than men, the postretirement
inflation risk has a greater effect on women's lifetime retirement bene
fits than on men's.
Because workers presumably must pay through reduced wages for
"inflation insurance" for a defined benefit plan, they may prefer partial
rather than full indexing of their pension plan, especially since social
security in most countries provides at least partial indexing. Private
pensions would be more likely to index for inflation after retirement in
such countries as the United Kingdom, where the social security bene
fits are relatively low. However, more complete inflation indexation of
pension benefits is provided in Germany, where social security benefits
are relatively generous.
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11. Risk of Political Change
Firms face the risk that laws and regulations will be changed, mak
ing it more costly for them to provide a pension plan. For example, the
law regulating vesting may be changed so that firms are required to
vest workers after a shorter period of time, the extent that pensions are
subsidized through the tax code could be reduced, 19 or court rulings
could make firms liable for benefits in circumstances where they had
not been liable before.

Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans Combined
The risk-return mix may be optimized for workers participating at
the same time in both defined benefit and defined contribution plans.
When offering both types of plans, firms effectively provide a defined
contribution plan with a guaranteed minimum benefit. Employers and
workers can trade off the level of the minimum benefit against the size
of the expected defined contribution benefit. Combining the two offers
the downside protection of defined benefit plans, yet allows workers to
invest in high expected return assets. By offering a voluntary, supple
mental defined contribution plan—such as a 401(k) plan in the United
States or Additional Voluntary Contributions in the United Kingdom—
firms allow workers greater flexibility. Workers who desire high sav
ings can participate in such plans, while coworkers who wish for rela
tively high current consumption are not forced to save by participating
in them.
A mixed public-private pension system in which many workers have
both defined benefit and defined contribution plans offers the most
diversification against risks. Risks are reduced in a mixed system
because social security and private pensions are subject to different
risks that are not perfectly correlated. A pay-as-you-go social security
system is subject to risks to the level of its contribution base, usually
national wage earnings, but is not directly subject to financial market
risk. The United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States exemplify
such a system.
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Conclusions
Risk-bearing depends on the institutional features of the pension
plan and on the actions taken by workers and employers. It is com
monly thought that employers bear all the risks in defined benefit plans
and workers bear the risks in defined contribution plans. For both types
of plans, however, that is frequently not true. In defined contribution
plans, workers can shift some of the risk to insurance companies. In
Chile, some of the defined contribution plan risk is borne by the gov
ernment. In the United States, some of the defined contribution plan
risk can be shifted back to employers, who can be sued for mismanage
ment of the plan. Workers bear risks in defined benefit plans that arise
from risks to the employer and, for funded plans, from risks associated
with the assets in which the plan invests.
The relative riskiness to workers of defined benefit and defined con
tribution plans depends on the particular circumstances being com
pared. For workers in financially weak firms with underfunded plans
that do not provide postretirement cost-of-living adjustments, defined
benefit plans may be fairly risky. For workers in financially secure
firms with money-purchase defined contribution plans that are invested
in products guaranteed by insurance companies, there may be little
risk.

Insolvency Insurance
A growing number of countries have mandated some form of benefit
insurance or guarantee. Finland, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the
United States all have pension insolvency insurance programs for
defined benefit plans, as does the province of Ontario, Canada. The
United Kingdom guarantees a minimum benefit in contracted-out
defined benefit plans. In Australia, the government has the power to
impose a tax of 0.05 percent per year on fund assets of pension plans to
pay for the financial loss suffered by a fund as a result of fraud or theft.
These insolvency insurance programs may affect capital markets by
influencing the types of investments that pension plans make. In some
cases, the ability of pension plans to hold equities is limited by regula-
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tion. In other cases where such regulations do not exist, plans may be
induced to increase their holdings of risky assets because the downside
risk of losses is partially insured by the insolvency insurance program.
The rationale for insolvency insurance differs greatly across coun
tries. In several countries, insolvency insurance has been instituted to
allow firms to use pensions for self-financing. In Germany and Swe
den, pension insurance is solely for this purpose, and firms that use
pension assets to finance their activities are required to insure their
pension liabilities.
In the United States, insolvency insurance protects workers against
firm bankruptcy and insufficient pension funding in plans that are set
up to be fully funded. In the Netherlands, there is no need for such
insurance because pension regulation assures that funded pension
plans do not become significantly underfunded.20 Japan provides insol
vency insurance for funded plans, but because it has strict regulations it
has never had an insurance claim. The United States is the only country
with an insolvency insurance program for funded plans in which a con
siderable amount of underfunding is permitted.
Germany

The German pension insolvency system was established in 1974, the
same year as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) in the
United States. The German Employers' Association joined with the
Federation of German Industries and the Federation of German Life
Insurance Companies to form a mutual insurance association known as
the Pensions-sicherungs-Verein (PSVaG). Shortly thereafter, Ger
many's parliament designated the PSVaG as the sole carrier of manda
tory pension insolvency insurance.
The PSVaG insurance premium is not risk-related, but is payable at
a uniform rate based on the company's total pension liabilities and the
total claims against the insurance system for a given year. Each com
pany's share of total payments equals its share of total insured liabili
ties. Thus, the system uses pay-as-you-go financing of the liabilities as
terminations occur. The PSVaG insures plans that are financed through
the book reserve method. PSVaG insurance premiums have averaged
less than 2 percent of the annually accruing liabilities.
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The insured event is the insolvency of the employer since under
book reserve financing an employer's insolvency also means that the
pension plan is insolvent. When an employer goes into receivership or
liquidates, the PSVaG purchases single premium annuity contracts
from a consortium of the major German insurance companies to cover
the benefits owed to present and former workers and their survivors.
The benefit insurance has a high ceiling, it is limited to 300 percent of
the ceiling on benefits under social security.
Between its inception and the end of 1989 the German system had
3,930 cases of insolvency (Windel 1991) and spent more than 5 billion
DM ($3.3 billion) in protecting the benefits of more than 347,000
employees. It had 185 insolvency claims in 1992.

Japan
In 1989, Japan established a pension insolvency insurance program
that covers about half of the pension-covered labor force. The Pension
Guarantee Program is managed by the Pension Fund Association, a
private-sector organization which is heavily regulated by the Japanese
Ministry of Health and Welfare.
In spite of a major economic downturn in Japan in the early 1990s in
which the Nikkei-Dow Jones stock index lost half its value, the pro
gram has had no insolvency terminations. To initially qualify for cover
age, a firm must meet minimum size requirements, have earned a profit
for the preceding three years, and have a stable or growing workforce.
Thus, the insured firms have a low probability of bankruptcy, at least
during the early years following establishment of their contracted-out
pension funds.
An important issue in the development of the Japanese pension sys
tem has been how to protect the value of pension benefits. With the
decrease in asset prices in the early 1990s, the number of bankrupt
companies has grown. Furthermore, the financial situation of trust
banking companies, which manage pension funds, has grown weaker,
as has that of the life insurance industry.
When the Employees' Pension Fund plans were established in 1966,
all life insurance companies were required to guarantee a 5.5 percent
investment rate of return for Employees' Pension Fund plans. On April
1, 1994, the guaranteed rate was reduced to 4.5 percent. There is grow-
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ing support for deregulation, however, so that all companies could
decide on their own rate. The Ministry of Finance intends to establish a
Guarantee Fund for protecting insurance consumers. This would be the
first time such a fund has existed in Japan.
Lump-Sum Retirement Plan (Book Reserve Plan)
In the recession that followed the oil shock of 1973, company bank
ruptcies increased in Japan. Many employees lost their jobs, and firms
could not pay their wages and lump-sum retirement benefits. The regu
lations of bankruptcy law, labor law, and commercial law were insuffi
cient to protect workers.
To solve this problem, a law was enacted in 1976 that guarantees 80
percent of unpaid wages. It also requires the employer to guarantee
lump-sum retirement benefits through a contract with a financial insti
tution. The percentage of employers who guarantee their book reserve
plans through a financial institution increased from 12 percent in 1981
to 24 percent in 1989 (table 5.3). The law has not been strictly
enforced, however, and many employers have ignored it. Among firms
with 1,000 or more employees, only 16 percent guarantee their book
reserve plan.
Table 5.3 Percentage of Firms that Guarantee Their Book Reserve
______Plan With a Financial Institution in Japan, 1981 and 1989
Firm size
Year
Total
(number of employees)
Large
Small
(1,000+)
(30-99)
12.0
17.3
10.1
1981
16.3
24.3
23.7
1989
SOURCE: Japan Labor Department.

Tax-Qualified Pension Plan
Corporate tax law requires that the present value of a Tax-Qualified
Pension Plan be paid to the employee when an employer in Japan goes
bankrupt. However, Tax-Qualified Pension Plans do not have a pension
insurance system. This is perhaps the most serious unsolved problem
concerning Tax-Qualified Pension Plans.
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Employees' Pension Fund Plan
The Pension Guarantee Program established in 1989 only insures
Employees' Pension Fund plans, and those plans are required to partic
ipate in the insurance program. An Employees' Pension Fund plan can
be terminated with insufficient assets only if: (1) the sponsoring com
pany declares bankruptcy; (2) the business of the sponsoring company
or the industry deteriorates; or (3) other unavoidable circumstances
occur under which continuation of a fund is deemed to be extremely
difficult.
The level of contributions to the pension benefit insurance program
is computed for size groupings of employers, primarily on the basis of
the statistical likelihood of termination and the unfunded liability if ter
minated. The required contributions per participant decrease gradually
as the number of participants increases, because the risk of termination
with an unfunded liability is smaller for larger plans (table 5.4). The
amount of the required contribution is recalculated every year based on
the average number of participants in the plan in the previous year.

Table 5.4 Schedule of Contributions to the Pension Guarantee Program
in Japan, 1994
Number of
Ceiling on
participants in Contribution per
contributions
Number of
participant (yen) (thousands of yen)
plan
firms*
255
90
Less than 3,000
702
400
85
361
3,000 - 4,999
750
80
395
5,000 - 9,999
75
126
1,050
10,000 - 14,999
70
54
1,300
15,000 - 19,999
65
46
1,800
20,000 - 29,999
60
30,000 and more
51
3,000
SOURCE- Pension Fund Association.
*Number of firms is for the fiscal year 1992, other figures are for 1994 due to different informa
tion sources.
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Sweden
The Swedish pension insolvency insurance program was founded in
1961 to give companies an opportunity both to retain pension capital
within the firm and offer pension security for employees. It is a mutual
insurance company that is owned by the 2,500 policy-holding compa
nies that have purchased insurance. Nearly all of the liabilities of the
insurance program (95 percent) are for a single pension plan, the ITP.
The ITP is a plan for salaried employees based on a collective agree
ment between the Swedish Employers' Confederation and the Swedish
Federation of Salaried Employees in Industry and Services. It covers
more than 500,000 private-sector employees.
Firms participating in the ITP can either use the book reserve
method and retain the pension capital within the firm, or insure the
pensions by making contributions to the SPP Insurance Company. If
the book reserve method is used, the Swedish insolvency insurer (the
FPG) guarantees the benefits against the risk of the company becoming
insolvent. If the company becomes insolvent, the insolvency insurer
purchases insurance through the SPP.

The United States21
The United States has a mixed system of pension insurance in which
government and private guarantees compete. An employer can contract
with a private insurance company to assume, through the purchase of
annuities, all or part of its defined benefit pension obligations. Employ
ers most commonly do this when a worker reaches retirement. The
sponsor then pays a premium to the insurance company, and the insur
ance company becomes the guarantor of the retiree's pension bene
fits.22
Most defined benefit plan sponsors do not insure the pension liabili
ties for their workers through private insurance companies. They thus
must buy insurance through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC).23 The PBGC is an agency of the federal government funded
entirely through premium payments made by firms that sponsor
defined benefit plans.
The PBGC was created by the Employee Retirement Income Secu
rity Act of 1974 (ERISA). Before ERISA, when companies would not
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or could not pay, plan participants lost benefits to which they were enti
tled. ERISA shifted the burden of underfunded plans terminated by
employers from the plan participants to the PBGC and, through premi
ums, to sponsors of other pension plans.
Pension insurance protects against the risk that a defined benefit
plan will terminate without sufficient funding to pay guaranteed bene
fits and the sponsoring firm will be unable to cover the shortfall. The
federal government does not insure defined contribution plans.
Pension funding improved in the United States between the early
1980s and the early 1990s, but the PBGC is still concerned about its
exposure to a small group of highly underfunded plans. Though only
17 percent of the labor force belongs to unions, the plans that are
highly underfunded are all union plans.
PBGC has two pension guarantee programs—one for single
employer plans and another for multiemployer plans. This section
focuses on the insurance program for single employer plans, since
PBGC's financial problems are entirely due to that program. 24
PBGC guarantees basic retirement benefits. It does not guarantee
special benefit supplements, such as special early retirement benefits
which end when a worker reaches age 62 and becomes eligible for
social security. It also does not guarantee benefits above a fairly high
indexed ceiling ($2,353 per month in 1992). 25 There are one million
high-income workers in underfunded plans who have benefits exceed
ing PBGC's guarantee ceiling (Lockhart 1992).
Firms can only terminate an underfunded plan in a distress termina
tion. This means generally that a firm must be in bankruptcy proceed
ings in a federal bankruptcy court and receive a ruling from a federal
judge to terminate an underfunded plan.
A firm can enter bankruptcy proceedings without ending its business
and liquidating. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code allows firms to
reorganize and continue operations. Management is given four months
to propose a reorganization plan, but judges regularly extend that
period for years.
In Chapter 11 bankruptcy, a firm continues operating its business
with the goal of formulating a plan for paying back all or part of its
debt. Terminating its underfunded pension plans may be an important
part of the plan for reorganizing. In some cases, the main reason a firm
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enters Chapter 11 bankruptcy is to terminate its underfunded pension
plans.
A reorganizing company can terminate its underfunded plans only
when a bankruptcy court judge determines the alternative is to liqui
date the company. A firm that terminates an underfunded plan is liable
to PBGC for the underfunding. The liability also extends to all mem
bers of a controlled group of firms. A controlled group of firms is all
firms with 80 percent or more common ownership. Thus, if a firm
declares bankruptcy, affiliated companies are responsible for the pen
sion liabilities of the bankrupt firm. A firm with affiliated companies
can terminate an underfunded plan only if the firm and all other firms
with common ownership are in bankruptcy.
Employers who terminate underfunded pension plans and the
employers' controlled group are liable to PBGC for the plans' funding
up to 30 percent of the net worth of the controlled group. However,
PBGC recoveries in bankruptcy are typically small because of the low
value of firms in bankruptcy.
PBGC can initiate termination of an underfunded defined benefit
plan if the plan sponsor has not made the minimum required contribu
tions and PBGC believes that not terminating the plan would unreason
ably increase its unfunded liability.
A firm cannot terminate a collectively bargained pension plan if its
collective bargaining agreement does not permit it to do so. Frequently,
a collective bargaining agreement stipulates that a pension plan cannot
be ended without union approval. However, firms can circumvent this
restriction by forcing PBGC to initiate the termination. For example,
when LTV Corporation informed PBGC that it would not contribute
further to its collectively bargained plans, PBGC terminated them. 26
Because employees would continue to accrue benefits until the plans
were terminated, delaying termination would have substantially
increased PBGC's liability.
PBGC Exposure
Bankruptcy courts do not treat PBGC claims uniformly, making it
difficult to estimate PBGC's recoveries and potential net claims.
ERISA provides that the PBGC shall have a priority claim in bank
ruptcy court for missed premiums and contributions and for a portion
of the plan's underfunding. This provision is not, however, written into
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Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Some bankruptcy judges honor the
ERISA provision; others do not.
PBGC's deficit is the difference between its liabilities and assets. Its
liabilities are measured as the present value of benefits payable by
PBGC to beneficiaries of plans that have been terminated with insuffi
cient assets. Its assets include the assets of plans that have terminated
and been taken over by PBGC, as well as PBGC premiums and invest
ment earnings.27 This measure of the deficit has been criticized because
it does not allow for a reserve against greater-than-anticipated future
claims.
Most of the large claims against PBGC have come from collectively
bargained (union) plans. These plans are flat benefit plans, which pro
vide a retiree a specified monthly dollar benefit for each year of ser
vice. Federal tax laws do not permit these plans to be funded for future
benefit increases because the increases are not a legal requirement until
the labor contract is renegotiated. Because benefits are usually
increased at three- or five-year intervals, new liabilities are added
before old ones are completely funded, leaving the plans chronically
underfunded.
In contrast, final salary plans, which base benefits on salary in the
last few years before retirement, are almost always overfunded relative
to insured liabilities if they terminate. This is because their funding
methods anticipate increasing salaries and therefore benefit levels.
Consequently, typical final salary plans have funding ratios of 145 per
cent, while flat benefit plans have funding ratios of 75 percent. Because
they are generally well funded, final salary plans can absorb large
changes in interest rates, actuarial assumptions, and investment perfor
mance without becoming underfunded. Flat benefit plans cannot.
Premiums
Premium rates that plan sponsors must pay are not set by PBGC but
by Congress, through legislation that the President must sign. Because
of this cumbersome procedure, premiums are changed infrequently.
Since 1987, underfunded plans have had to pay higher premiums than
fully funded plans. In 1994, the premium for fully funded plans were
$19 per participant. The premiums for underfunded plans were $19 per
participant plus $9 per $1,000 of unfunded vested benefits per
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participant, up to a maximum premium of $72 per participant. 28
Starting in 1995, the maximum is being phased out over several years.
In the past, new defined benefit plans have typically granted credits
for past service, and have started with an initial unfunded liability and
low funding ratio. The PBGC premium structure may discourage the
formation of new defined benefit plans by charging relatively high pre
miums for plans that start with past service liabilities they do not
immediately fund.
PBGC does not guarantee insurance annuities purchased by pension
plans. Thus, though benefits are insured up to retirement, workers lose
federal benefit insurance at retirement if their company buys an annuity
for them. PBGC does not insure those annuities because insurance
companies have been considered secure providers of retirement bene
fits. Also, in most states insurance companies are insured by state
insurance company guarantee funds. If an insurance company fails,
pensioners holding annuities must rely on state insurance guarantee
laws.
Concluding Remarks
The United States and Japan are the only countries that have insti
tuted programs of insuring the benefits of funded pension plans. In
Japan, the plans that are insured are tightly regulated as to funding lev
els, and there has never been a claim against the insurance program.
Thus, the United States is the only country that has an insurance pro
gram for funded pension plans that are permitted to become under
funded.
The federal regulations of defined benefit plans have a number of
provisions that permit insured plans to become underfunded. The
severity of the effect of these provisions on the purposive underfunding
done by pension-sponsoring firms is unclear. There are costs associated
with exploiting these provisions, the primary one being damage to a
reputation as a good employer. A firm in financial distress, however,
can take actions that increase its potential claim on PBGC.
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Conclusions
Countries have developed different ways of controlling the risks
inherent in providing retirement income through private pension plans.
They regulate pension provisions directly as well as indirectly through
the tax system. They attempt to reduce the likelihood of financial
wrongdoing by requiring financial reporting, by maintaining pension
law enforcement programs, and by involving workers as trustees.
Firms and workers may shift the risks to insurance companies. Several
governments have mandated programs for insuring pension benefits,
but some of these insurance programs have had financial difficulties of
their own.
NOTES
1. This section is taken largely from Turner (1995).
2. In denned benefit plans, the pension benefit is determined by a formula that usually
involves the worker's earnings and tenure. For example, the worker's annual benefit could equal
the average of the worker's highest three annual earnings times years of work times a generosity
factor of 0.01. Thus, a worker having an average of highest three annual earnings of $50,000 and
having worked 30 years would have annual benefits of $15,000.
By contrast, in denned contribution plans, the eventual benefit the worker receives depends on
the amount contributed to the plan and the rate of return received on pension plan investments. For
example, the worker could have a plan where the employer contributes 5 percent of salary. This
amount would be deposited in an account for the employee, along with the investment earnings on
the assets in the account At retirement, the worker would have an account balance that he or she
could receive as a lump sum or convert to an annuity
3. This chapter does not provide a complete comparison of defined benefit and defined contri
bution plans, but focuses only on the issue of risk-bearing. This is an important issue in evaluating
pension plans, but issues such as the effect of pension plans on worker productivity, job turnover,
and retirement age are also important The chapter also does not consider how much risk should
be held in defined benefit and defined contribution plans, and who should bear that risk.
4. The number of total participants in defined benefit plans has continued to exceed that in
defined contribution plans because of the larger number of beneficiaries in defined benefit plans.
There are relatively few beneficiaries in defined contribution plans because generally those benefi
ciaries receive lump-sum benefits and then are no longer counted as participants
5 See Chang (1991), Clark and McDermed (1990), and Ippohto (1990b).
6. This disagreement is partly due to differences in methodology. Each of the studies that
examines this issue directly estimates the portion of the trend away from defined benefit plans due
to only one of the two factors: the changing propensity of firms of a given type to offer a plan or
the changing composition of types of firms. Each attributes the remaining portion of the trend to
the other factor, even though it was not directly estimated. This procedure may overestimate the
portion of the trend due to the factor that was not directly estimated (see Chang 1991).
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7. It might be better to classify these as hybrid plans in which both benefits and contributions
adjust. Some analysts note that the benefits adjust, and then by default call the plans defined con
tribution plans.
8. Career-average defined benefit plans are those in which the benefit is based on the worker's
annual earnings averaged over his or her career.
9. In both defined benefit and defined contribution plans in the United States, workers who
have declared bankruptcy have their pension assets protected against the claims of creditors.
10. A related example of implicit contract risk is the decision by some companies to change or
eliminate health insurance protection for retirees.
11. The points in this paragraph were made by Light and Perold (1985).
12. In some instances, participants in U.S. defined contribution plans can sue the plan sponsor
over poor investment performance. In defined contribution plans where the sponsor directs the
investments, the participant could sue if the sponsor did not act prudently in choosing invest
ments. In cases where the participant directs the investment, the participant can sue the sponsor if
the sponsor did not prudently consider the investment options offered to participants.
13. The extent of risk-sharing by the government may affect the relative amounts of risk that
are borne in defined benefit and defined contribution plans. The higher the personal income tax
rate relative to the corporate income tax rate, the greater the risk-sharing with the government in
defined contribution plans relative to defined benefit plans.
14. While workers may face risk as to their ability to participate in a pension plan, this analy
sis focuses only on workers covered by pension plans. It does not consider risks associated with
vesting rules, as well as those eliminated by disability and death benefits.
15. Defined contribution plans are always considered to be fully funded.
16. This risk is partially offset because higher interest rates may decrease the value of stocks,
bonds, and other assets held in the plan.
17. This argument does not apply to defined benefit multiemployer plans, where job changers
who remain within the plan do not suffer portability losses.
18. This point has been suggested by Pesando and Hyatt (1992).
19. Bodie (1990) has argued that integrated pension plans, where decreases in social security
benefits would cause increases in pension benefits, protect workers against the risk of adverse
changes in social security benefit levels. However, the demographic and economic factors causing
the government to reduce social security benefits may also cause firms to reduce their future pen
sion benefits.
20. Pension investments in the Netherlands are determined by a joint employer-employee
group rather than employers alone.
21 This section is largely based on Turner (1993).
22. Since almost all 50 states have state-sponsored insurance company guaranty funds, those
state funds then become the ultimate guarantor of the pension benefits.
23. A third of the assets in the private pension system are invested through insurance compa
nies. Data are not available on the percentage of defined benefit assets that are insured, but it is
probably between 35 and 45 percent. However, only assets that have been used to purchase an
insured annuity are exempt from PBGC insurance. The percentage of defined benefit assets in that
category is not known. Few plans purchase insured annuities for their workers, but more purchase
them for their retirees.
24. Multiemployer plans cover the unionized employees of two or more employers. They are
administered by an equal number of trustees representing the union and the employers They are
common in industries with a mobile labor force, such as trucking, mining, the building trades, and
entertainment.
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25 The ceiling is $2,353 per month for benefits payable as a single life annuity at age 65. The
maximum guarantee is adjusted if taken in any other form. The ceiling does not apply for benefi
ciaries who have been receiving benefits for three or more years.
26. If PBGC's decision to terminate a plan is contested, district court approval is required.
27. Assets are recorded at market value.
28. The interest rate used for valuing vested benefits is 80 percent of the thirty-year Treasury
bond rate.

Pension Financing
Private pension plans control an increasingly large share of world
capital markets. Thus, pension financing has become an important
aspect of the financial structure of a number of countries. This chapter
compares the different ways pension plans are financed and examines
statistics on several aspects of pension financing for major private pen
sion systems.
The comparison of institutions for financing private pensions
focuses on the risks in each system and the steps taken to reduce them.
The discussion extends the treatment of risk in the previous chapter by
examining how risks vary under different financing methods. 1

Unfunded Systems
Future pension benefits are inherently risky. Funding reduces this
risk, but funding levels and methods vary considerably across coun
tries, and some countries have pension plans where no money is set
aside in a separate fund.
France has an unfunded pay-as-you-go private pension system that
arose from the French experience following World War II. High post
war inflation decimated the value of French pension funds that existed
at the time. A national pay-as-you-go system was adopted in part
because it is not directly subject to financial market risk.2 Such a sys
tem is subject, however, to demographic risk. Reductions in the fertil
ity rate and increases in life expectancy raise the ratio of retirees to
workers.3
Book reserve funding is used by most plans in Germany4 and Aus
tria, by many plans in Japan and Sweden, and by some plans in Italy.
With book reserve funding, plan assets are like nontradeable, interestbearing notes issued by the sponsoring employer to the plan. Bookreserved pension assets are considered in these countries to be invested
in the sponsoring firm. These plans are subject to risks facing individ
ual firms, and for this reason countries often require that these plans
have some type of insurance protection.
95
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Germany
Germany differs from other countries in the ways that it finances
pension benefits. There are four ways that a German pension fund can
be financed: book reserve, support funds, pension funds, and direct
insurance. The choice among these financing options is made by
employers, based in part on their differing tax implications.
The most popular method of financing German pensions is the book
reserve method. Under this method, a company establishes a book
keeping pension liability account in its corporate accounts and claims a
tax deduction each year for the increase in pension liabilities. Thus, the
company takes an income tax deduction before it makes a cash transac
tion. Book reserves provide a source of internal financing for corpora
tions. This was particularly popular following World War II, when
companies needed to obtain financing and the devastation of the bank
ing industry and financial markets did not allow for external financing
for firms. The approach has had lasting popularity, however, and it is
currently used by 90 percent of firms with 1,000 or more employees
that offer pension plans (table 6.1).
Table 6.1 Percentage of Large Employers With Different Types of
______Funding and Benefit Arrangements in Germany, 1990____
Percentage of companies offering
Plan characteristic
benefit plans with the characteristic
Type of funding
Book reserve
9.0
Support funds
34.6
Pension funds
15.5
Direct insurance
12.7
Type of benefit
Integrated with social security
10.9
Final pay plan
47.3
Flat amount plan
36.4
Defined contribution
11.8
SOURCE: Ahrend, Forster, and Walkiewicz (1990).
NOTE: This table is for firms with 1,000 or more employees. The percentages do not sum to 100
percent because an employer can offer more than one type of plan and because other less impor
tant characteristics are not listed.
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In calculating book reserves, firms must use a discount rate of 6 per
cent. The government has proposed raising this to 7 percent to reduce
tax deductions and increase tax revenues, but thus far that has not been
done (Steinmeyer 1993). The value of book reserves account for 58
percent of the assets accumulated for pensions in Germany (table 6.2).
Table 6.2 Percentage Distribution of Assets in Different Types of Private
______Pension Plans in Germany, 1991_________________
Percentage of total pension assets
Type of plan
that are held by type of plan
Book reserves
58
Private fund
22
Direct insurance
11
Support fund
9
Total____________________________100_________
SOURCE. Ahrend (1995).

When a firm can take a tax deduction for unfunded pension liabili
ties, as it can in Japan, Germany, and Austria, it may prefer not to fund,
since the pension liabilities, in effect, become a cheap source of bor
rowing. Although this form of pension finance is widely popular in
Germany, it is most advantageous for financially distressed firms.
However, it is less advantageous for the workers in such firms because
of its riskiness.
The second way of financing German pensions is via a support fund,
which is a separate legal entity that may invest pension fund assets.
Support funds are financed by transfers from employers. No legal
restrictions limit the investment of fund assets. The funds are com
monly invested as an interest-bearing loan to the sponsoring company.
The third funding method is the pension fund or "pensionskasse."
Such funds are regulated in the same way as insurance companies, with
the same investment restrictions. In addition to employers, employees
also generally contribute to these funds. Support funds are permitted to
make loans to the sponsoring company, but only against collateral and
to a limited extent.
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A fourth funding method is direct insurance through an insurance
company. Since company contributions are taxable income to workers,
retirement benefits are tax free if paid as a lump suni, and taxable only
to a certain extent if paid as a pension. This approach is most popular
with small companies, and is used by 52 percent of small companies
that offer pension plans (Ahrend, Forster, and Walkiewicz 1990). They
prefer this approach because it is easy to administer and the required
payments are predictable. The risks arising from the benefit commit
ment are borne by the life insurance company.

Funded Systems
In the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and some other
countries, all plans receiving preferential tax treatment are required to
be funded. The goal of U.S. policy is for all private pension plans even
tually to be fully funded. Federal regulations control both the allowable
overfunding and underfunding of pension plans.
Statistics on the funding ratios of underfunded plans, however, indi
cate the ineffectiveness of U.S. funding regulations. 5 In 1988 there
were $1.9 billion in unfunded liabilities in plans with termination fund
ing ratios of 10 percent or less.6
There are several ways that U.S. plans can become highly under
funded. First, firms can receive a funding waiver from the Internal Rev
enue Service if they argue that they are temporarily unable to make
their required pension contributions. Second, firms with flat rate
defined benefit plans create unfunded past service liability every time
they raise benefits levels, since the law prohibits them from advance
funding for future increases. By contrast, advance funding is allowed
in Canada. Third, firms in serious financial trouble sometimes do not
make the legally required contributions to their plans.
In the United Kingdom, while contracted-out plans must be fully
funded, there are no minimum funding standards for other plans. In
1993, the Pension Law Reform Committee, chaired by Professor Roy
Goode, recommended that minimum funding standards be established
for all British private-sector pension plans. A governmental study
found that 86 percent would meet the proposed standard, but that the
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14 percent that did not meet the standard included a significant number
of large plans (Cohen 1994a).
In the United Kingdom and Japan, employers can fund private pen
sion plans with money saved by opting out of part of the social security
system.7 In the United States and the United Kingdom, the reverse is
also possible as social security payments can be used to reduce pension
payments. Through integration with social security, an employer can
reduce pension liabilities for low-wage workers.
The amount that can be contributed to overfunded pension plans in
the United States is restricted. If a plan's assets exceed 150 percent of
its termination liabilities, the firm can no longer make tax-deductible
contributions to the plan. Termination liabilities are calculated as if the
plan were to terminate immediately. Current wages are used to deter
mine liabilities rather than projected future wages, which more accu
rately reflect the actual wages of workers when they retire.
In Canada, employer contributions are not tax deductible if the plan
has assets 10 percent greater than its liabilities. However, the liabilities
are calculated assuming future increases in benefits, and for most plans
are less restrictive than under the U.S. funding regulations.

Diversification
In the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, most plans are
required to reduce portfolio risk by diversifying their asset holdings.
The diversification requirement in the United States does not apply to
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). ESOPs are similar to
plans funded by the book reserve method in that they are undiversified;
both types basically invest in a single asset. In the case of ESOPs, the
asset held by the plan is corporate equity of the sponsoring firm rather
than corporate debt. 8
The diversification requirement also does not apply to support funds
in Germany. A support fund is a legal entity separate from the plan
sponsor, but it may lend the entire amount of its assets back to the plan
sponsor.
Adequate diversification is not available within the asset markets of
some small countries. For example, in Ireland there are thirty stocks
that are suitable for pension funds to invest in. Diversification can be
achieved by international investments, however.
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International Investments
Foreign investments of pension plans increase portfolio diversifica
tion, which is especially important in smaller countries that do not have
a wide range of industries. Even in large countries, however, it is
impossible to diversify away macroeconomic risks. Those risks can be
reduced by international investments, since macroeconomic risks are
weakly correlated across some countries.
Many countries restrict the foreign asset holdings of their pension
plans, which limits the extent those can diversify. They are concerned
about pension plans exporting domestic capital through their foreign
investments. However, if pension plans reduce their demand for
domestic assets, the price of those assets will fall and other domestic
investors, as well as foreign investors, will increase their demand for
those assets.
In Canada, pensions funds are allowed to invest up to 20 percent of
the book value of their assets in foreign securities. In Japan, pension
plans can invest up to 30 percent of their assets in foreign denominated
securities (including Japanese securities denominated in dollars). The
Japanese regulation is in terms of foreign denomination in order to
limit the foreign exchange risk that plans can have. There is no fixed
percentage limit on the extent of pension investments in foreign securi
ties by U.S. pension plans, but the requirements of diversification and
prudence apply. The European Union is considering a directive that
would prohibit countries establishing limits on foreign investments by
pension funds within the European Union. Since the United Kingdom
abolished foreign exchange controls in 1979, British pension funds
have been increasing their foreign investments (Minns and Martin
1995).
Foreign investments of pension plans have grown considerably in
absolute terms and as a percentage of pension portfolios around the
world. In 1993, the world's 300 largest pension funds invested 7 per
cent of their $2 trillion assets in foreign securities. That percentage is
expected to grow to 12 percent by the mid-1990s (Group of Ten 1993).
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Portfolio Restrictions
Japan and some other countries limit the percentage of pension port
folios that can be held in corporate equities. In Japan, the limit is that at
most 50 percent of the pension portfolio can be invested in domestic
and foreign equities. This limit reduces risk in plans that would other
wise have invested more in equities, but also reduces the rate of return
on pension portfolios. Such restrictions raise the cost of financing pen
sions, because higher employer contributions are required to provide a
given level of benefits.
The United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and others limit for
some plans the portfolio share held in securities of the sponsoring
employer. This is based on concern over conflicts of interest between
the employer and plan participants and in an attempt to assure adequate
diversification. In the United States and in Spain, no more than 10 per
cent of the assets of a pension plan can be invested in the sponsoring
employer (Ruano 1995). In the United Kingdom, the limit is 5 percent.
In most countries, employers can eliminate financial risk from their
pension plans by purchasing insurance company products. Insurance
companies frequently are insured by other insurance companies or
governmental entities.9

Paying for Pensions
This section analyzes trends in pension financing in nine countries: 10
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom and the United States. Reflecting both its large
economy and the general requirement that its pensions be fully funded,
the United States had nearly 70 percent of world private pension assets
in the late 1980s (table 6.3). The countries with the next largest pension
assets were Japan and the United Kingdom, both with about 8 percent
of world pension assets.
During the 1980s, U.S. private pension assets grew at an average
real annual rate of 8 percent. 11 Canada and the Netherlands had similar
average real growth rates of their pension assets. Japan's pension assets
grew fastest among the nine countries considered at 16 percent. These

Table 6.3

Total Assets of Private Pension Plans in Selected Countries, 1970-1989
(millions of U.S. dollars)
Germany
United
Year Australia Canada
France
(FRG)
Japan Netherlands Switzerland Kingdom
-~
1970
1,244
5,032a
4,617
10,704
-1975
3,782
14,681b
6,739C
18,070a
14,478
21,422
1980
42,066
8,866
31,468
28,563
44,738
34,288
78,000
1981
44,286
7,948
29,646
36,168
40,225
31,935
79,635
1982
51,761
7,443
30,248
39,639
42,842
33,530
90,695
1983
63,371
7,252
31,528
50,278
45,114
35,728
102,071
-1984
65,816
7,411
60,059
44,684
33,857
108,223
1985
15,362
74,173
8,238
70,805
47,548
130,980
-1986
17,158
81,927
11,859
117,412
70,038
178,954
1987
89,741
14,022
55,636
159,219
89,183
78,222
218,579
1988
106,246
14,755
207,434
98,529
245,844
-1989
124,432
14,486
218,681
99,710
216,973

s
United
States
149,500
289,600
621,800
659,200
781,600
923,200
994,100
1,186,000
1,339,600
1,436,000
1,745,600
1,926,900

SOURCES: Dailey and Turner (1992) and U.S. Department of Labor (1993).
NOTES: Assets for the Netherlands and for the United Kingdom include only nonmsured private pension plans. Assets for Germany include support
funds, pensionskassen and direct insurance. Book reserves are not included for Germany and Japan.
a. Data-are partially estimated by the author.
b Interpolated by the author from data for 1973 and 1978.
c. Data are partially estimated by the author for this year from data available for 1976.
— Data not available.
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growth rate comparisons use assets valued in national currencies and
are adjusted for changes in the consumer price level in each country.
They are thus unaffected by exchange rate fluctuations or inflation.
Average pension assets per participant indicate the level of pension
funding. The figure is low when pension benefits are low, when a pen
sion system is new, or when the pension system is underfunded or
unfunded. It is lower in countries with high coverage rates because
low-income workers with low benefits are covered in those countries.
The United States had pension assets per participant of $28,800 in
1988 (table 6.4). 12 France, with its pay-as-you-go system, had assets of
$700 per participant.
The Netherlands had the highest pension assets per participant at
$33,100. Canada and the United Kingdom had assets per participant of
$29,100 and $27,000. The asset figures for the United Kingdom and
the Netherlands, however, are understated because they exclude
insured private pension assets. The Government Actuary's Department
in the United Kingdom estimates that insured pension assets at the end
of 1987 equaled 66 billion pounds, a figure that increases total British
pension assets by 50 percent.
Australia and Japan have roughly half the U.S. level of pension
assets per participant. Australia's low level reflects its relatively new
pension system. Japan's reflects its use of book reserve assets, not
included in the figures reported here.
Changes in aggregate private pension assets can be divided into
changes in assets per participant and changes in the number of partici
pants. Rapid growth in pension assets in Japan in the 1980s resulted
from a large increase in pension assets per participant, up more than
400 percent between 1980-89. While this large increase was due in part
to the strong Japanese stock market during that period, the effect of the
stock market increase and subsequent decline on the value of pension
portfolios was lessened by the limits on pension plan holdings of equi
ties. The large increase in pension assets per participant was also due in
part to a move towards funded pensions. In comparison, U.S. pension
assets per participant grew 87 percent during the same period.
The percentage of private pension assets held in corporate equities
varies considerably across countries. The United States has 26 percent
of its pension assets in corporate equities (table 6.5). 13 Switzerland has
the lowest level, at 7 percent. The United Kingdom, by comparison,

Table 6.4 Average Assets of Private Pension Plans per Participant in Selected Countries, 1970-1989
(thousands of U.S. dollars)
United
Germany
Japan Netherlands Switzerland Kingdom
(FRG)
France
Year Australia Canada
-1.3
3.8
2.7
1970
~
10.5
3.0
8.6
0.2
1975
-22.6
10.6
2.4
17.5
0.4
1980
~
—
20.2
2.9
15.6
0.4
1981
~
20.2
16.8
0.4
3.0
1982
15.6
-13.4
20.4
17.7
3.7
0.4
1983
-18.9
17.2
4.2
0.4
1984
20.3
-~
~
4.7
17.8
0.4
14.8
1985
--7.5
25.3
0.6
24.0
14.5
1986
~
27.0
30.0
31.7
9.8
6.0
0.7
1987
-~
34.3
12.1
0.7
29.1
1988
~
33.1
12.1
0.7
1989
SOURCES: Dailey and Turner (1992) and U.S. Department of Labor (1993).
NOTE: Participant is the total of active participants (workers) and beneficiaries.
~ Data not available.

£
United
States
5.1
8.2
14.8
15.2
17.5
19.7
20.6
24.3
26.9
24.9
28.8
28.3

Table 6.5 Asset Mix of Private Pension Plans (Noninsured Assets Only) in Selected Countries, 1986-1989
(percent)
United
United
Germany
States
Kingdom
Type of asset Australia Canada France (FRG) Japan Netherlands Switzerland
Stocks
Domestic
Foreign
Bonds
Domestic
Foreign
Real estate
Mortgages
Loans/private
placements
Pooled funds6
Cash and short
term assets
Other assets
Total

26

15

17
8

8
0
11
0

17
7

0
3

_

0

37
0

19

0
4
100

1
8
100

10
4
100

6
2
100

14
26
100

26
16a

8
10

37

38
a

6
9

0
0

15
5
11
4

30

c

0
10

0
0

16d

11
2
100

2
1
100

31
6

19
6
0

34
0
3
3

2
18
12
2
100

a

56
14

7

b

30
ll a

45

80

20
100

b

c

b

c

-

Type of asset Australia Canada France
Size of assets included
in asset mix (in millions)
91,847
Local currency 16,322
77,573
10,950
U.S. dollars
1989
1986
Date

United
States

United
Germany
(FRG) Japan Netherlands Switzerland Kingdom

77,289
41,111
1989

1988

199,136
93,901
1989

167,683
112,448
1987

132,332
216,973
1989

1,339,600
1,339,600
1986

SOURCE: Dailey and Turner (1992).
a. Foreign stocks and foreign bonds are combined.
b. Domestic and foreign stocks are combined.
c. Domestic and foreign bonds are combined.
d. Includes loans and contributions to government investment.
e. Pooled funds includes mutual funds, investment funds, insurance company managed funds and similar vehicles for pooled pension assets.
- Data not available.
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has 70 percent of its private pension assets invested in corporate equi
ties.
Reasons for the variation across countries in the percentage of pen
sion portfolios held in equities have not been studied. Nonetheless,
some factors can be identified as probable causes. In the United States,
larger pension plans and defined benefit plans have higher proportions
of equities in their portfolios than do smaller plans and defined contri
bution plans. Thus, the mix of plan type across country may have some
effect, with the United States having a higher percentage of pension
assets in defined contribution plans than some other countries.
The high percentage of pension portfolios held in equities in the
United Kingdom is likely due in part to that country having very few
domestic corporate bonds in which to invest. It also may be affected by
the relatively favorable tax treatment British pensions receive for the
corporate equities they hold.
Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have all
invested 10 percent or more of their pension assets in foreign corporate
equities. Pension plans also may diversify their portfolio risk interna
tionally by investing in domestic companies that export or that have
facilities in foreign markets.
All of the countries considered here had more assets in defined ben
efit plans over this period than in defined contribution plans (Dailey
and Turner 1992). Despite rapid growth in U.S. defined contribution
plans for more than a decade, 66 percent of pension assets were still in
defined benefit plans. In Canada, which experienced slower growth in
defined contribution plans, 87 percent of pension assets were in defined
benefit plans. In Germany and Japan, nearly all private pension assets
were in defined benefit plans.

Conclusions
Countries have developed different methods for financing private
pensions. The underlying financial risks can best be minimized by
diversifying the underlying financial base of a plan. This can be done
by purchasing insurance products, by holding a diversified portfolio, or
by having multiemployer plans. In most countries, employers have a
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variety of options for providing pensions. Expanding the range of pen
sion options allows firms and workers more flexibility to meet diverse
individual needs.
NOTES
1. This section is taken largely from Dailey and Turner (1992).
2. All pension systems are subject to the economywide risks facing firms that sponsor pen
sions.
3. Doescher and Turner (1988) show that this raises the "price" of providing pension benefits.
4. All references to Germany are to West Germany before German reunification, or to that part
of Germany following reunification.
5. A funding ratio is the ratio of a pension's assets to its liabilities. Assets are generally valued
at market value, but there are different possible measures of liabilities. A commonly used measure
is the liabilities that a plan would have if it were to terminate immediately.
6. Figures on unfunded liabilities refer to single employer plans with 100 or more participants.
7. Before the passage of the U.S. Social Security Act in 1935, the Clark amendment would
have allowed employers with plans meeting certain criteria to opt out of social security.
8. ESOPs must invest primarily in the stock of the sponsoring employer.
9. In the United States and elsewhere, insurance companies are insured by government agen
cies or by consortiums of insurance companies.
10. This section is based largely on Dailey and Turner (1992).
11. The averages are geometric means.
12. Participants here include both workers and beneficiaries.
13. This figure is for plans with 100 or more participants. See Papke (1992).

7
Labor Market Issues
To better understand the important role that private pensions play in
labor markets, this chapter examines the experience of selected coun
tries concerning pension coverage, portability of pension benefits, and
retirement. These three topics are the issues of who is in a pension
plan, what happens when they change jobs, and how does their pension
plan affect their decision to retire.

Pension Coverage
Most private pension participants in the world are found in nine
countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This section
discusses pension coverage in these countries over the period 197089. l While other countries provide private pensions, and other small
countries have high coverage rates, no other country with a voluntary
system has a sizable number of participants.
Countries differ in their pension coverage rates in part because of
the generosity of their social security systems. The finding that one
country has higher private pension coverage than another may simply
indicate differing roles for the public and private sectors. It may also
indicate differences in the roles of employer-provided and individual
plans in those countries. The adequacy of retirement income can only
be determined by examining all of its sources.
Private pension coverage rates are basically calculated as the ratio of
private pension-covered workers to the private-sector labor force, but
they vary depending on the definitions of a pension plan, covered
workers, and the relevant labor force. Private pension-covered workers
are defined as current employees who are members of a private pension
plan.2 The private-sector labor force includes wage earners and salaried
employees of private-sector employers, plus the unemployed. Part-time
employees are included to the extent they appear in labor force statis
tics. Employees of government and all government-owned agencies
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and corporations are excluded. Self-employed persons and unpaid fam
ily workers are also excluded.
Pension coverage rates differ depending on the categories of work
ers included. The pension coverage rates considered here for interna
tional comparisons include unemployed and part-time workers in the
definition of the labor force because excluding them would cause dis
tortions in coverage statistics over the business cycle. Unemployed and
part-time workers typically have low pension coverage rates unless
coverage is mandated for them. An increase in unemployment among
low coverage-rate groups would raise the coverage rate.3
A pattern of increasing pension coverage rates since the early 1970s
runs across most of the nine countries (table 7.1). In Canada, pension
coverage increased only slightly, from 26 percent in 1970 to 29 percent
in 1989. By comparison, France and Switzerland had increases in cov
erage of 20 percentage points or more. They historically have had high
coverage rates, and both now have mandatory private pension plans. In
France, virtually all workers are covered, including part-time and tem
porary workers. The Swiss coverage rate of 92 percent is less than 100
percent because employees under age 18, part-time employees with
low wages, temporary employees, and the unemployed are not cov
ered.
The Netherlands had the largest increase in coverage among coun
tries without mandatory plans; its coverage rate rose 16 percentage
points to 66 percent. The Netherlands is the only country with a volun
tary private pension system that covers more than half of the labor
force. Their pension system is not entirely voluntary, however. In some
industries, firms are required by industrywide agreements to provide
pension coverage.
The coverage rate for Japan is for participants in funded plans only;
most other full-time career employees are in unfunded severance pay
plans.4 There has been steady growth in the number of participants in
funded plans, but that growth includes a shift from unfunded to funded
plans.
The United Kingdom is the only country with a major decline in
coverage rates during the past 20 years. This decline occurred in the
early 1970s, with only a minor decline since then.
Changes in marginal tax rates may have affected coverage in some
countries. In the United States, marginal tax rates declined during the

Table 7.1

Year
1970
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Active Participants in Private Pension Plans as a Percentage of the Private Sector Labor Force in
Selected Countries, 1970-1989
(percent)
United
United
Germany
States
(FRG)
France
Japan Netherlands Switzerland Kingdom
Australia Canada
-42
38
46
50
20
80
26
-32
44
51
49
29
100
28
-45
31
59
56
31
100
29
-45
58
57
32
100
--45
61
56
100
33
30
--45
30
65
56
100
33
-46
44
57
66
34
100
28
---46
59
20
100
35
-~
-46
59
22
100
36
27
~
46
29
92
42
61
100
37
23
~
-~
45
62
28
100
28
38
-45
66
30
100
39
29

SOURCE: Dailey and Turner (1992).
NOTE: There are significant differences in the categories of participants included.
-- Data not available.

112 Labor Market Issues

1980s and appear to have been a negative factor on coverage rates
(Reagan and Turner 1995). Women have historically had lower cover
age rates than men, and the increasing percentage of the workforce that
is female may have had a depressing effect on pension coverage rates.
Coverage rates are higher in large firms than in small firms and are
higher in manufacturing than in services.
Even among countries with well-developed private pension systems,
few provide coverage for a majority of the private sector workforce.
Though the level of U.S. pension coverage is frequently a topic of pub
lic policy concern, that rate is higher than for the other English-speak
ing countries. The United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia had
coverage rates of 29, 29 and 30 percent in 1989. Starting in 1992, how
ever, all employers in Australia must contribute to a defined contribu
tion plan for their employees.

Pension Portability
Pension portability refers to arrangements for preserving the retire
ment benefits of workers who change jobs. An international perspec
tive on pension portability is particularly useful; several countries have
policies that greatly reduce pension portability losses, while other
countries have done relatively little.
This section focuses on four countries: Canada, Japan, the Nether
lands, and the United Kingdom.5 Each country has a well-developed
private pension system where employers voluntarily provide pension
benefits. Portability provisions in other countries are summarized.
Pensions in Canada are regulated by provincial governments, with
each province having separate standards for its pension plans. Ontario
has led in pension reform, with other provinces frequently copying it.
For this reason, and because it has 40 percent of the Canadian labor
force, Ontario's pension policy is discussed here.
The United Kingdom and Canada both provide tax advantages for
individual retirement accounts, which may substitute for an employersponsored pension. Those plans are called Personal Pension Plans in
the United Kingdom and Registered Retirement Savings Plans in Can
ada. Workers may use these plans for pension portability, because they
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can transfer preretirement distributions from employer-sponsored
plans to their individual plan. Also, workers may choose individual
plans as a portable alternative to participating in an employer-spon
sored plan.
In Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, defined bene
fit plans are often contributory—meaning employees as well as
employers contribute. This creates portability problems with regard to
employee contributions that are not confronted in the United States,
where contributory defined benefit plans are rare. In Japan and the
Netherlands, almost all plans are defined benefit plans. Canada and the
United Kingdom have some defined contribution plans, but they are
not as prevalent as in the United States. In defined contribution plans,
workers do not lose accrued vested benefits with job change because
account balances are unaffected.

Pension Vesting
Pension coverage rates mean little if covered workers do not have a
vested right to their benefits. Vesting occurs when a worker has been
employed long enough to have earned a legal right to a pension. The
countries considered, except Japan, all have mandated minimum vest
ing (table 7.2).
Table 7.2 Private Pension Vesting Requirements in Selected Countries,
_______1994_________________________________
Country
Vesting requirements*
Australia
None
Canada
2 years
France
Immediate
Germany
10 years
Japan
None
Netherlands
1 year
Switzerland
Immediate
United Kingdom
2 years
United States
5 years
*Except as indicated in the text.
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The length of time a worker must be employed to vest in the Nether
lands, the United Kingdom, and Canada is shorter than in the United
States. In the Netherlands, vesting must occur after participating one
year in the plan, although participation may be restricted until age 25
or later. The United Kingdom requires vesting after two years' partici
pation, but employees are usually eligible to participate at age 19 after
one year of service. The Canadian province of Ontario requires vesting
after two years' participation in the plan.
Japan is alone among the nine countries in having no legislated
vesting rules, but Japanese pension plans still provide quick vesting. 6
By comparison, plans in the United States frequently required fifteen
or more years of participation for vesting before ERISA mandated
minimum vesting requirements (Turner 1993a).
Employers in Japan generally require longer service for vesting for
employees who quit voluntarily than for employees whom they fire.
Fewer than 15 percent of employees are in plans that require more than
two years of participation if their separation is employer-initiated. By
contrast, over 60 percent of employees are in plans that require more
than two years if they quit. Even for long service, lurnp-sum payments
are typically higher if the firm rather than the worker terminates the
job.
The cause of separation (voluntary or involuntary) is generally con
sidered in computing pension benefits in Japan. This creates an incen
tive for employers to induce workers to quit rather than to lay workers
off, while employees have the incentive to induce employers to fire
them rather than to quit. However, both employers and employees
would suffer a loss of reputation by pursuing such strategies, and they
are thus constrained from doing so.
Employers in the United States may provide quicker vesting for
workers whom they layoff. This is done by providing extra years of
service to those workers in computing vesting. This practice is not as
prevalent in the United States as it is in Japan.
In Australia, workers must vest immediately for benefits earned
under collective bargaining agreements. Employee contributions also
must vest immediately. However, there is no mandated vesting require
ment for employer-provided benefits accrued outside of collective bar
gaining agreements.
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In Germany, vesting must occur after ten years of participation for
workers aged 35 and older, and after twelve years for younger workers.
Germany is the only country among the nine considered here that has
longer vesting requirements than the United States. Vesting require
ments in Germany are particularly unfavorable to workers wishing to
change jobs. Alternatively, those rules can be thought of as rewarding
to long-tenure workers.
In France, workers vest immediately. In Switzerland, vesting must
be immediate for mandatory pension benefits. However, most employ
ers provide additional pension benefits beyond those required and there
is no vesting requirement for these additional benefits. In the United
States, single-employer plans must provide full vesting after five years
or choose a graded vesting schedule that provides full vesting after
seven years. Multiemployer plans must provide full vesting after ten
years. Most single-employer defined benefit plans provide full vesting
after five years, while most single-employer defined contribution plans
provide full vesting after two or three years.
There is a trend among countries without vesting requirements to
add those requirements. For example, Ireland added vesting require
ments in the early 1990s (Hughes 1994). However, no legal vesting
provisions exist in Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, New Zealand,
or Belgium (for self-administered funds) (Jolliffe 1991).
Preretirement Indexation
Workers who change jobs generally suffer a portability loss if their
former job provided a defined benefit plan. This loss occurs because
the earnings used to calculate workers' retirement benefits usually are
frozen in nominal terms at the date of job change. Those earnings, and
the benefits they produce, erode in real value over time due to inflation.
When deferred benefits are inflation-indexed, the employer pays for
much of the portability loss that otherwise occurs with job change. In
the Netherlands, most plans voluntarily index deferred vested benefits.
If the pension plan increases benefits or gives cost-of-living adjust
ments to its retirees, it must grant the same increases to separated
workers with deferred pensions. Plans are not required to grant
increases to retirees in the Netherlands, but that practice is widespread
(Keizer 1991).
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In Ireland, for early leavers (workers changing jobs) benefits accru
ing since January 1, 1991 must be inflation-indexed up to an inflation
rate of 4 percent. Perhaps for reasons of simplicity, many firms have
voluntarily indexed all benefits of early leavers up to the 4 percent
maximum (Hughes 1994).
British law requires pension plans to inflation index deferred vested
benefits. Legislation requires indexation up to 5 percent annually,
based on increases in retail prices. Because of the caps, the Irish and
British systems only partially index benefits most years.7
Plans rarely index deferred vested benefits in Canada and the United
States. Many pension analysts in these countries believe that indexing
past vested benefits would be too costly for plan sponsors, although
that is not true in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.
Japanese Tax-Qualified Pension plans do not index deferred vested
benefits. Job changers receive their accrued benefits as a lump-sum
payment at job termination. Japan considers lifetime employment with
one company as the most desirable career pattern.

Portability Clearinghouses
Plans in the Netherlands transfer deferred vested benefits through
five portability clearinghouses called transfer circuits. Most large pen
sion plans choose to participate in a portability clearinghouse. The
clearinghouses were established in 1987 by a private-sector initiative
under pressure from the government. The Dutch government had indi
cated that if the private sector did not develop a solution to pension
benefit losses for job changers, it would mandate a solution.
Establishing industrywide portability clearinghouses in the Nether
lands was simplified by the fact that their pension plans have uniform
benefit formulas. Most Dutch defined benefit plans are based on final
average salary. It was also simplified by a law that requires all Dutch
pension plans to use a 4 percent interest rate for calculating pension
liabilities. The clearinghouses require all plans involved to have benefit
formulas based on final average salary and years of service. Both
insured and noninsured plans can participate. In 1988, 78 percent of
employees in a pension plan (including government employees) were
in a plan belonging to a portability clearinghouse (Keizer 1991). Work
ers have the option of leaving their vested rights with the former
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employer's pension plan or using a clearinghouse to transfer them to
the new employer's plan.
Small pension plans in the Netherlands provide portability differ
ently from large plans. Most small pension plans are insured through
the purchase of individual policies under a group arrangement. Job
changers may purchase an annuity from an insurance company by
transferring the paid-up policy to the former employee.
Key to reducing workers' portability losses through an employerbased system is determining who pays for the losses—the former
employer or the new employer. In calculating the transfer payment
from the former employer, assumptions about interest rates and wage
growth rates strongly affect the calculated value of pension liabilities.
The Netherlands is the only European Union country where the new
employer has a liability for the effect of future price increases on pen
sionable service with a previous employer. In all other countries, the
employee loses the effect on previous pensionable service of pay
increases from his new employer (Jolliffe 1991).
Japan also has a portability clearinghouse for contracted-out benefits
under the Employees' Pension Fund. The clearinghouse is run by the
Pension Fund Association, to which contracted-out pension plans must
belong. When an employee changes jobs after less than ten years' work
for the employer, the relatively small accumulated benefits are trans
ferred to the Pension Fund Association. At the request of a plan, the
present value of benefits for employees with ten to fifteen years of
work will also be transferred. The amount transferred by the employer
to the Pension Fund Association is the present value of benefits based
on the nominal career average earnings to the point of the job change.
Because the benefits transferred to the clearinghouse are small, some
employees who are eligible for benefits at retirement do not claim
them.
The actuarial assumptions used in calculating the transfer amount
are controlled by the Pension Fund Association. An interest rate of 5.5
percent is used for discounting. Though higher than the rate used in the
Netherlands, historically this has been a low discount rate for calculat
ing pension liabilities. Because a low interest rate results in larger lia
bilities, its use has assured the Pension Fund Association that adequate
assets are transferred to it. 8 Once the transfer amount is paid to the Pen
sion Fund Association, the employer has no additional obligation.9
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Japan also has a portability clearinghouse for small plans (Smaller
Enterprise Retirement Allowance Mutual Aid plans). In 1987, however,
less than 3 percent of eligible plans used it.
In the United Kingdom, some nationalized industries operate "trans
fer clubs," where an agreed-upon set of actuarial factors is used to cal
culate the accrued vested benefit from one plan to another. Few
corporate plans have joined these arrangements (Atkins 1991).
A job-changing employee in the United Kingdom may transfer his
or her benefit to an approved individual insurance policy. The benefit
value must be calculated using a current long-term interest rate. It does
not have to consider future pay increases, but does have to consider
statutory preretirement indexing.
Portability of service is a feature of the Israeli pension system,
because most workers are covered under a single pension plan spon
sored by the major labor union. When workers change jobs, they do not
lose benefits because they generally do not change pension plans.
Preservation of Benefits Versus Preretirement Distributions
When workers change jobs and receive their pension benefits as a
lump sum, often they do not save the funds until retirement. In the
United States, this is a major cause of lost retirement income.
In the province of Ontario, Canada, statutorily vested pension bene
fits generally cannot be received in a preretirement lump-sum distribu
tion. They are locked in, with the requirement that they can only be
received as annuity payments during retirement. 10 Exceptions are made
for persons with disabilities and for benefits below a low stipulated
value. When benefits are only plan-vested, rather than statutorily
vested (which may occur when the plan has more rapid vesting than
the law requires), such amounts may be refunded if allowed by the plan
rules. Employee contributions plus interest that have not resulted in
entitlement to a deferred pension when employment ends are also
refundable.
Transfers of assets in Canada can be made to a Registered Retire
ment Savings Plan (RRSP), similar to an Individual Retirement
Account in the United States. Assets in a Registered Retirement Sav
ings Plan are locked in with no possibility of withdrawal until retire
ment age. In theory, assets can be transferred to a new employer's plan,
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but most employers will not accept such assets. In addition, if plan
rules specify, the present value of the deferred pension can be used to
purchase a life annuity from an insurance company. The annuity must
not begin payment before the date the plan member would have been
eligible for an early retirement pension. A divorced spouse who has
received an order under the Family Law Act of 1986 must have the
same choices relating to the spouse's benefit as the participant does
with respect to his or her benefit.
The Netherlands only permits preretirement lump-sum distributions
of the employee's contributions before vesting of employer contribu
tions, transfer of funds to another plan, or emigration.
In the United Kingdom, only unvested contributions can be returned
to the job-changing participant. 11 All other benefits are locked in. Thus,
after two years of service in a plan (when vesting occurs), employees
cannot receive preretirement distributions. Pension law does provide
opportunities to the job changer who wishes to transfer funds, however.
Preretirement distributions may be transferred to another plan, placed
in a Personal Pension Plan, or used to buy back into the national social
security system, if the distribution represents contracted-out contribu
tions. They can also be used to purchase an insurance policy or annuity
contract. Any member of a pension plan can ask for a transfer value or
cash equivalent of his or her accrued pension rights in the plan, if he or
she is more than one year from the plan's normal pension age. The
trustees of the plan must arrange for the cash equivalent to be trans
ferred to a statutorily approved alternative chosen by the member. This
transfer usually occurs at a job change, although it may occur anytime.
The United Kingdom offers two options for portable individual
retirement savings. First, private pension plan members are entitled to
purchase Free-Standing Additional Voluntary Contributions from an
insurance company, provided the combined benefits to which they are
entitled do not exceed statutory limits for tax exemption. Free-Stand
ing Additional Voluntary Contributions allow members of employersponsored plans to increase their retirement benefits through individual
contributions. Such benefits, like benefits in individual account plans,
are portable, since they are not tied to an employer. These benefits are
available only to participants in an employer plan. The second portabil
ity option is that workers covered by a private pension may opt out of
their private pension and set up a Personal Pension Plan.
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Some British plans reject asset transfers or only accept transfers for
employees below a certain age. This is particularly likely where the
employer would be forced to subsidize previous service in a salaryrelated plan. Some plans guarantee indexation of pension rights in line
with earnings. If the member has reduced pay in a new job, he or she
may decide to retain rights in his previous plan. Someone who changes
jobs frequently may wish to use a Personal Pension Plan so as to not
change pension plans with each job change.
The United Kingdom offers job changers many pension options
because of a political philosophy that highly values individual choice.
The more options available, the more serious are the effects of adverse
selection. The positive side is that workers can choose benefits that are
relatively advantageous to their personal situations. The negative side
is that it increases the costs of providing benefits when workers choose
the pension arrangements most favorable to their life expectancy or
their income. Another problem is that workers may make poorly
informed choices or be poorly advised by service providers having a
financial stake in the decisions they make.
Conclusions
The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Canada have done more
than the United States to eliminate portability losses. These countries
require short vesting periods and restrict lump-sum distributions. The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom index vested benefits for most
early leavers.
Japan and the United States statutorily allow virtually unrestricted
lump-sum distributions at job change, although defined benefit plans in
the United States frequently do not provide the option. In the other
countries, retirement benefits are preserved by requiring workers to
retain benefits with the previous employer, transfer vested benefits to
the new employer, or transfer benefits to a portability vehicle similar to
an Individual Retirement Account, where the benefits are locked in
until retirement.
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Pensions And Retirement
In most countries, three labor market institutions affect retirement
income: social security, employer-provided pensions, and disability
programs. 12 Often social security programs and private pensions are
not age-neutral, but provide an incentive either to retire early or to
delay retirement. The value of retirement wealth can be affected by
retiring earlier or later than the "normal" retirement age, or by special
provisions such as early retirement bonuses.
As background, this section first surveys the demographic and labor
force participation trends that make retirement age an important issue.
It then discusses aspects of pension plans that affect the age at which
older workers retire. 13

Demographic Trends and Labor Force Participation Rates
Along with population aging, perhaps the most important change in
the labor markets of industrialized nations over the last two decades
has been a massive movement among older workers toward early
retirement. Across OECD countries, labor force participation rates of
males age 55 and older have declined for at least the last twenty years
(table 7.3). The levels and downward trends differ among countries,
but in all cases the majority of males are now out of the full-time labor
force several years before the age of legal entitlement to full social
security retirement pensions. For females, the movement is not as
strong; it is offset to some extent by the trend for more females to have
long-term commitments to the labor force.
While the labor force participation rate of males aged 55-59
declined in every OECD country between 1975 and 1989, there was a
larger decline in percentage point terms for males aged 60-64. In most
countries, few men remain in the labor force past age 65. 14 Less than 5
percent of men over age 65 are working in the European Community as
a whole, with the highest rates in countries with a large agricultural
sector (IDS 1993).
Austria provides a dramatic example of the declining labor force
participation of older males. That country currently has one of the
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lowest labor force participation rates of older males. This is especially
true of the age group 60-64, whose rate has fallen below 15 percent,
compared to more than 30 percent in most other countries. During the
period 1955-1985, the labor force participation rate for this age group
fell 58 percentage points (Zweimuller 1991).
Table 7.3 Labor Force Participation Rates by Sex and Age in Selected
Countries, Selected Years, 1970-1991
(percent)
Country
Australia
Austria
Canada
France
Germany (West)
Japan
Poland
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States

Year
1971
1986
1971
1988
1971
1986
1975
1990
1970
1988
1970
1989
1970
1978
1970
1985
1971
1986
1970
1991

55-59
88.4
76.4
83.7
65.3
84.9
81.3
81.8
68.6
86.8
79.8
94.2
91.6
90.9
81.5
88.4
85.3
95.1
80.3
86.8
79.0

Male
60-64
75.6
44.8
44.9
14.2
74.1
59.9
54.6
18.1
68.8
34.5
85.8
71.4
83.0
62.4
75.7
63.2
86.4
53.4
73.0
54.8

65+
22.2
9.0
8.0
1.8
23.6
14.6
10.7
2.8
16.0
4.9
54.5
35.8
56.4
34.9
15.2
11.3
19.4
7.5
24.8
15.8

55-59
28.3
30.9
35.8
24.6
38.7
44.7
42.1
46.8
34.5
41.1
53.8
52.2
68.1
57.9
41.1
72.5
50.7
51.5
47.4
55.7

Female
60-64
16.0
13.6
13.2
5.7
29.1
27.5
27.9
16.7
17.7
11.1
43.3
39.3
51.1
37.4
25.7
45.6
27.8
18.8
36.1
35.1

65+
4.2
3.0
3.2
0.9
8.3
4.7
5.0
1.5
5.7
1.8
19.7
15.7
33.0
19.4
3.2
3.1
6.4
2.7
10.0

8.6

SOURCE: U.S Department of Commerce (1993).

In contrast, Japan has a high labor force participation rate for older
males. There, 36 percent of men aged 65 and older were in the labor
force in 1989. Many male workers retire from their career jobs with a
lump-sum pension and move to another, usually lower-paying job for
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several years (Schulz, Borowski, and Crown 1991). This pattern of
employment is called "bridge employment" in the United States, refer
ring to the subsequent job as a bridge between the career job and retire
ment. Bridge employment is less prevalent in the United States, but is
still opted for by a sizable minority of workers.
In the United Kingdom, the proportion of men aged 60 to 64 in the
labor force dropped from 86 percent in 1971 to only 53 percent in
1990. Smaller cross-national differences occur for men age 55-59, with
labor force participation rates of 65 percent in Austria and 92 percent
in Japan.
Labor force participation rates among older women are much lower
than for older males, but the downward trend is less apparent. The pro
pensity for successive cohorts of women to have higher labor force par
ticipation rates at younger ages has counteracted a trend for earlier
retirement among working women. In fact, the labor force participation
rate of women aged 55-59 has increased in a number of countries over
the past twenty years.
The rise in unemployment among industrialized nations is well
known, and the increase in long-term unemployment for workers aged
55 and over has been substantial. A general deterioration of labor mar
kets, especially in Europe, may be a factor in increased early retire
ment, as some portion may be involuntary labor force withdrawal,
which for older workers is labeled retirement.
The trend toward earlier retirement has been supported by social
security and disability policies. In effect, social security and disability
programs have become forms of long-term unemployment compensa
tion for some older unemployed workers. A growing number are
claiming disability benefits, apparently in response to unemployment.
This has occurred particularly in countries, such as the Netherlands,
where entitlement to a disability benefit is based on whether the appli
cant can find suitable work in the prevailing labor market, as well as on
his or her physical capability.

Retirement Decisions
Social security and private pensions can be made to affect the age at
which workers retire through four mechanisms. First, for pensions, if
the wage-pension tradeoff is less than dollar for dollar, a higher level of
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benefits raises the real income of the worker, which induces a demand
for greater leisure. For social security, workers may receive wealth
transfers by receiving generous benefits. Second, the age and condi
tions of eligibility for benefits can be liberalized. Third, benefits need
not be actuarially reduced if a worker retires early, nor raised for late
retirees. Finally, if there is an earnings test for receipt of benefits, cur
rent benefits may be reduced by the earnings of retirement-eligible per
sons who continue working.
Age of eligibility for both social security and pension retirement
benefits are key parameters that affect the age at which pension-cov
ered workers retire. Because social security benefits are considerably
larger than pension benefits for most workers, social security's age of
eligibility may have a major effect on the age at which some workers
retire. Firms that wish to encourage workers to retire at ages different
from the age most favorable under social security must establish incen
tives in their pensions sufficient to offset the retirement incentives
imbedded in social security.
Defined benefit private pension plans typically contain incentives
for workers to postpone retirement at least up to the plan's age of eligi
bility for retirement benefits. Defined contribution plans are less likely
to have a minimum age of eligibility, since they pay benefits solely
based on the amount in the worker's account. However, some countries
set minimum ages at which workers can withdraw money from their
defined contribution plans in order to discourage early retirement.
In addition, the generosity of the benefits affects workers' decisions
to retire. For example, when firms subsidize benefits at early retirement
relative to those received later, and when firms provide limited time
special incentives to workers for retirement at the earliest age of eligi
bility, workers are more likely to be induced to retire.
Rather than describe all features of institutions that affect workers'
retirement age in different countries, selected features from various
countries are highlighted to indicate the range of practices.

Eligibility for Social Security Benefits
The earliest age at which an individual can receive social security
retirement benefits within the European Union ranges from age 60
(men and women in France, Belgium, and Germany; women in
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Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom) to 67 (men and women in Den
mark) (Keesing 1992).
Five European Union countries—Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal,
and the United Kingdom—have lower retirement ages for women than
men. There is a gradual trend for countries to equalize retirement ages
for men and women. Japan has a lower age of eligibility for social
security for women than men, but that difference is being phased out,
with the age for women's eligibility gradually rising from 55 to 60 by
the year 2001. It was age 57 in 1994 (table 7.4).
Table 7.4 The Earliest Age for Receipt of Social Security Retirement
Benefits in Selected Countries, 1994
Male
Country
Female
United States
62
62
Canada
60
60
France
60
60
Germany
60
60
Italy3
61
56
57b
Japan
60
United Kingdom
65
60
SOURCE- Aetna/Generali (1993).
a. A December 1992 law increases pensionable age gradually until in the year 2002 it becomes
65 for men and 60 for women.
b. It will gradually be raised to age 60 by the year 2001.

A European Court of Justice decision requires the European coun
tries to have the same retirement ages (and equal benefits) in private
pension plans for both men and women. This decision brings pressure
on social security systems to adopt the same retirement ages for both
sexes as well. The United Kingdom announced that it would gradually
raise the social security retirement age for women from 60 to 65, which
is the age for men.
In nearly all industrialized countries, the minimum age for retire
ment in the mid-1990s was lower than when the social security systems
were started (see Pilcher, Ramirez, and Swihart 1968). The minimum
retirement age has generally been lowered by allowing early retirement
with reduced benefits. This permits a more flexible approach to retire
ment. It raises the cost of a pension system, however.
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Eligibility for Private Pension Benefits
Age Requirements
In the province of Ontario, Canada, employer-provided plans cannot
set the normal retirement age later than the participant's 66th birthday.
Participants may choose to retire at any time within 10 years of the
normal retirement age specified in the plan documents. Participants
may postpone retirement and continue accruing benefits, but if they
choose to receive benefits while continuing to work for the same
employer, no future benefits can be accrued (Pension Commission of
Ontario 1993).
In Germany, a pension-covered worker receiving an early retirement
benefit from social security is legally entitled to early retirement bene
fits from the private pension as well (Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein 1991).
For personal pension plans that meet qualifying restrictions, the
pension can be taken at any age between 50 and 75 in the United King
dom. 15 For certain workers whose occupations require physical skill,
for example cricketers and trapeze artists, the pension may be taken as
early as age 40.
Tenure Requirements
In Canada, usually a worker in a defined benefit plan whose employ
ment ends before the minimum age for subsidized early retirement
cannot receive those benefits. That practice gives workers an incentive
to stay with the firm until the minimum retirement age. The trend in
Canada, however, is toward pension plan provisions that favor early
retirement (Pesando and Gunderson 1987).
Some firms in Canada encourage early retirement by waiving the
early retirement benefit reduction, provided certain age and service cri
teria are met. In such a case, the retiring employee would receive a
pension calculated with the formula used at normal retirement age.
Some plans provide unreduced early retirement after thirty years of
service, or when an individual reaches age 62. Another possibility is
for plans to subsidize the early retirement benefits of long-tenure work
ers, so that rather than a reduction of 7 percent a year for years before
the normal retirement age, which would be roughly fair actuarially,
benefits may be reduced only 2 percent a year.
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Such provisions selectively encourage early retirement for long-ser
vice workers. The existence of such practices suggests that some firms
have a target tenure level, as well as age, at which they feel it is optimal
for workers to retire.
The theory that firms care about the tenure of their older workers
receives support in the United Kingdom, where most pension plans
offer early retirement, provided the worker has been employed a mini
mum number of years. This minimum may differ from that which
applies to eligibility for a pension at normal retirement age. Early
retirement may require the employer's consent (Haberman 1991).
In Germany, a range of collective agreements between unions and
employers makes early retirement possible. For example, older work
ers in most breweries are permitted to accumulate overtime that can be
used as a credit toward years of work required for early retirement
(Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein 1991).
In 1988, 47 percent of all Dutch firms with pension plans offered a
preretirement option to their employees. These options generally
resulted from bargaining between a union and a firm or industry. A
large segment of the working population—especially in small firms—
had no early retirement option through a pension plan. In 80 percent of
the plans, workers needed to have worked at least ten years in the firm
or industry and had to be at least 60 years old before they were entitled
to benefits. Part-time workers were frequently excluded from eligibility
(de Vroom and Blomsma 1991).
Special Inducements
An inducement to early retirement used in the United States, Can
ada, Japan, and the United Kingdom is sometimes called the "open
window policy." In this situation, participants are given a limited time
in which to take advantage of special early retirement rules. For exam
ple, for a three-month period participants may be allowed to retire with
no reduction in their pension if they are more than 55 years old and
have at least twenty years of service. After three months, the window is
closed and the plan reverts to its normal rules (Jobin et al. 1991).
Inducements to early retirement are often used by firms as a way to
reduce their workforce without resorting to layoffs. In periods of
higher unemployment, many Japanese companies offer early retire
ment packages to their older employees.
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While many employers in the United Kingdom use early retirement
to manage workforce reduction, there is a trend away from open-access
early retirement inducements toward closed-access programs. Closedaccess programs are aimed at a particular target population, usually
defined by the type of job or specific individuals. Such arrangements to
encourage retirement of older workers are used to facilitate organiza
tional and technological change (Laczko and Phillipson 1991). In addi
tion, some pension plans provide for early benefits if the worker is laid
off (Haberman 1991). These are permanent features of the pension
plans, and thus differ from "open window" policies, which are tempo
rary.
It is sometimes argued that the flexibility of defined benefit plans as
a personnel tool for selectively encouraging early retirement is an
advantage over defined contribution plans. The generosity of defined
contribution plans could also be manipulated in these ways, however,
simply by employers making special contributions to those plans.
Legal restrictions on the maximum amount that can be contributed to
defined contribution plans limit their flexibility for this purpose, but
firms with defined contribution plans could also achieve the same goal
by offering severance pay.
Adjustment of Benefits for Postponed Retirement
When workers postpone retirement, the annual pension benefit they
receive at retirement generally increases. There are four ways in which
postponed retirement benefits can be adjusted: (1) the continued
accrual of pension benefits, with no actuarial increase of previously
accrued benefits; (2) no further accrual, with an actuarial increase of
previously accrued benefits; (3) continued accrual, with an actuarial
increase of previously accrued benefits; and (4) no further accrual and
no actuarial increase.
An actuarially fair increase provides the worker the same lifetime
expected present value of benefits for a given number of years of work,
regardless of the age at which the worker retires. An actuarially fair
benefit increase takes into account three factors when a worker post
pones retirement: (1) benefits are received for a shorter period of time,
(2) benefits are received at a later date, and (3) the worker has greater
risk of dying before receiving benefits.
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For demographic groups with a high life expectancy at retirement
age, the actuarial adjustment is lower than for groups with low life
expectancy because the percentage reduction in the expected period of
benefit receipt with a one-year postponement of retirement is relatively
low. The actuarial adjustment increases with age because at progres
sively older ages an additional year of postponed benefits is a progres
sively larger reduction in the expected period of benefit receipt.
The actuarially fair increase in benefits with postponed retirement is
smaller when benefits are indexed for inflation after retirement than
when they are not. When benefits are unindexed, the worker compares
the benefit he or she could receive at a later age with the amount he or
she would have if the benefit had been taken at an earlier age and
invested at the market interest rate. The higher the market interest rate,
the greater must be the increase in benefits with postponed retirement.
Thus, the actuarially fair increase of social security benefits with post
poned retirement, which is 6.7 percent between ages 62 and 65 in the
United States, is too low for private pension benefits that are not fully
indexed.
Whether actuarially fair or not, the adjustment of benefits with post
poned retirement presumably will affect the age at which workers
retire. Workers with higher than average mortality risk would maxi
mize the lifetime income from their retirement benefits by retiring
early.
If there are neither actuarial adjustment nor the continued accrual of
benefits, the pension plan delivers a strong incentive for retirement. On
the other hand, the greater the increase in benefits with postponed
retirement, the greater the incentive will be for workers to postpone
retirement.
Provision (1)—the continued accrual of benefits, with no actuarial
increase of previously accrued benefits—is the most prevalent in Can
ada. This degree of accrual creates an incentive for retirement at the
early retirement age because of the lack of actuarial increase in benefits
to take into account that postponed benefits are received for a shorter
period. Provision (3), which would fully compensate workers for the
benefits lost due to postponed retirement, is the least common. Provi
sions (2) and (4) are about equally common (Pesando and Gunderson
1987).
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In Germany, it is common for firms to increase benefits by 0.5 per
cent for each month, or 6 percent per year, of postponed retirement up
to the normal retirement age (Ahrend and Walkiewicz 1991). This
compares to the 6.7 percent increase per year for postponed social
security benefits in the United States for workers ages 62 to 64.
In the United Kingdom, worker contributions to contributory
defined benefit plans generally cease at the normal retirement age, and
subsequent service does not enter into the calculation of the pension
benefit. However, the pension eventually awarded is increased to allow
both for the amount of pension foregone during the further service and
for the interest earned on the reserves backing the pension during the
deferment period (Haberman 1991).
Both employer-provided and personal pensions in the United King
dom provide for flexibility in retirement. Nearly all (95 percent) of
employer-provided pensions allow early retirement (Laczko and Phillipson 1991). However, in both employer-provided and personal pen
sions, early retirement results in benefit reduction. The extent of the
reduction varies according to age, length of service, and, in the case of
personal pension plans, the amount contributed. Many defined benefit
plans provide enhanced benefits in the case of early retirement due to
ill-health.
Virtually all private-sector plans in the United Kingdom base early
retirement benefits on accrued service and then apply a reduction fac
tor based on age at retirement. Some plans feature an immediate pen
sion on early retirement based on accrued service and without
reduction, but such pensions tend to be available under restricted con
ditions. For example, the eligibility may be limited to members over
age 60 and with a long minimum period of service.
Many plans in the United Kingdom offer a pension at normal retire
ment based on a formula that incorporates a deduction to allow for the
pension benefits to be provided by social security. Many of these plans
do not apply this deduction when calculating the pension available on
early retirement, but only reduce it when social security commences.
In a few plans, the person retiring early can choose to exchange a pen
sion at a certain level for one at a higher rate until social security
begins, and then at a lower rate thereafter.
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Mandatory Retirement
In some countries, firms that offer pension plans frequently also
have mandatory retirement ages. While mandatory retirement because
of age is not allowed in the United States and has been banned by Can
ada in some jurisdictions, it is allowed in Japan, the United Kingdom,
and elsewhere. In the United Kingdom, a firm can have different man
datory retirement ages for different classes of workers. For example,
one private school has mandatory retirement at age 60 for teachers and
at age 65 for maintenance staff.
In Japan, many workers expect lifetime employment with their com
panies. 16 An important aspect of the lifetime employment system is
mandatory retirement. The percentage of employers with a compulsory
retirement age of 60 increased from 68 percent in 1988 to 82 percent in
1992 (table 7.5). Employers with a compulsory retirement age of 61 or
over only increased from 1.3 percent in 1988 to 2.4 percent in 1992.
The government has tried to persuade employers to postpone the com
pulsory retirement age to 65, but employers have strongly resisted
because of the high cost of employing older workers who have
received seniority-based wage increases. Japan does not have an Age
Discrimination Act that would prevent employers from forcing older
workers to retire.
Table 7.5 Mandatory Retirement Ages in Japan, 1988 and 1992
Year
Percent of employers with compulsory retirement at age
5556
57
58
59
60
61+
1988
12
32
5A
6^23?7
673
O
1992
9.5
3.6
2.4
82.1
2.4
SOURCE: Japan Employers' Association.
NOTE: A dash indicates that there were no firms m the survey indicating that response.

In countries where mandatory retirement is allowed, pensions tend
to be structured differently with respect to retirement age from coun
tries where it is illegal. In the latter countries, firms that would other
wise have mandatory retirement may adjust the benefit formula so that
it more strongly favors early retirement.
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At the same time that Japanese firms have increased the age of man
datory retirement, they have increasingly offered early retirement
options (Seike and Shimada 1986). By doing so, they may be able,
within a voluntary framework, to approximate the retirement age pat
tern that they formerly achieved through earlier mandatory retirement.

Conclusions
Countries have developed a wide variety of restrictions and incen
tives affecting retirement and the employment of older workers. If gov
ernments decide they wish either to encourage early retirement or
discourage it, they have examples of such policies on which to draw.
Around the developed world, labor force participation rates of older
men have declined, while participation of older women has been more
stable. A country's policies concerning retirement age naturally evolve
with changing economic and demographic circumstances. With the
aging of populations and the trend toward earlier retirement, several
countries have changed their social security programs to encourage
employment of older workers. Whether employers will do likewise
with their private pension plans, and whether the employment of older
workers will increase, remain to be seen.
Private pension plans can affect labor market decisions of workers.
The loss of future pension benefits at job change may deter some work
ers from making otherwise desirable job changes. Many countries have
legislated requirements for pension plans to reduce the benefit losses at
job change. These include maximum periods for vesting and required
indexation of benefits between date of job change and retirement. The
ultimate goal of such programs is to assure the adequacy of retirement
benefits, which is discussed in the next chapter.
NOTES
1. The section is drawn largely from Dailey and Turner (1992).
2. For the United States only, the data on covered workers also includes all nonvested plan
participants who have left employment in the past year (Nonvested workers have not worked suf
ficiently long to have a legal right to a pension benefit. Starting with the data for 1988, this
requirement is changed to five years.) Plans are required to report these workers on the annual
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report to the Internal Revenue Service (Form 5500). Although reliable data on the size of this
group are unavailable, it appears to have little effect on U.S. coverage rates.
3. The pension coverage rate statistics considered here were developed by Lorna Dailey of
Bedford Research Consultants. For a full description of the methodology and data sources used,
see Dailey (1992).
4. The exclusion of those workers from these coverage statistics has been criticized as being
inconsistent with the treatment of Germany, where workers in book reserve plans are included in
the coverage rate statistics.
5. The section is based largely on Turner (1993), Turner and Dailey (1991), and Andrews
(1991). It focuses on portability policies in countries with private pension systems similar to that
of the United States. For a discussion of portability in the United States, see Turner (1993) This
section does not discuss the issues of pension portability across national borders, which European
pension policy analysts are currently discussing because of the creation of a single European labor
market (see Jolliffe 1990).
6. For a discussion of portability in Japan, see Murakami (1991).
7. In the United Kingdom, the statutory requirement to revalue vested benefit rights originally
existed only for benefit rights that accrued after January 1, 1985. Under the Social Security Act
1990, the requirement now applies to all accrued benefits
8. For a further discussion, see Watanabe, Turner, and Rajnes (1994a).
9. The social security Employees' Pension Insurance program continues to be responsible for
indexing benefits by providing a benefit based on the difference between indexed and unmdexed
earnings.
10. For a discussion of portability in Canada, see Conklin (1991).
11. The following discussion of portability in the United Kingdom is drawn largely from Bir
mingham (1991).
12. Unemployment compensation programs are another institution that may affect the transi
tion between work and retirement, but they are not considered here.
13. This section is based largely on Dorsey and Turner (1995).
14. Japan is a notable exception.
15. This applies only to personal pensions bought with contributions additional to the contracted-out rebate.
16. The lifetime employment system has been primarily for Japanese male workers.

8
The Adequacy
of Retirement Income
The adequacy of pension benefits is the fundamental measure of
success of a retirement income system. This chapter considers evi
dence on the adequacy of retirement income in several countries.

Japan
In Japan, the social security National Pension provides three types
of benefits: (1) an old-age pension, (2) a disability pension, and (3) a
survivor's pension. The earliest age at which workers can receive full
benefits is 65. The National Pension in 1992 provided average benefits
of 35,000 yen a month (about $330, or about $4,000 a year) to benefi
ciaries age 65 and older. The Employees' Pension Insurance paid aver
age monthly benefits of 151,000 yen in 1992 (about $1,400 a month or
$17,000 a year). Thus, in Japan the flat benefit pays about 20 percent of
the total social security benefit on average, with the earnings-related
benefit providing the remaining 80 percent.
The two benefits combined are higher than the benefits received
from social security in most other countries. For example, the average
annual social security benefits in the United States in 1993 were
$7,300, which is about a third that received in Japan. The maximum
social security benefits a U.S. worker retiring at age 65 could receive
were less than the average social security benefits received by Japanese
workers. These comparisons, however, are affected by the cost-of-living in different countries, so comparisons made solely by adjusting for
the exchange rate give only a rough comparison of the standard of liv
ing that social security benefits can support.
In Japan, the average amount provided annually by an Employee's
Pension Fund plan in 1990 was about $4,500. The average amount pro
vided by a Tax-Qualified plan in 1992 was about $8,100 (Watanabe
1995). This compares with average pensions in the United States in
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1989 of $6,400 (Dailey and Turner 1992). However, in the United
States, defined benefit pension plans are required to provide survivor's
benefits, unless the spouse signs a written statement waiving them,
while survivor's benefits are rarely provided in Japan.

Germany
In Germany, employer-provided pensions make a relatively small
contribution to retirement income. The benefits provided by the Ger
man social security system are nearly 70 percent of German retirement
income. By comparison, for households aged 65 and older in the
United States, social security provides about 40 percent of income
(Grad 1994). The benefits provided by the German social security sys
tem are more than ten times as large as those provided by the private
pension system (table 8.1). When the public employer pensions are
included, however, the total of employer-provided pension benefits is
about a third as large as the benefits provided by social security.
Table 8.1 Percentage of Retirement Income Received From Different
Sources in Germany, 1992
Percentage of retirement income
Source
68.8
Social security
14.4
Public employer pensions
5.3
Private employer pensions
11.7
Other
Total___________________________100.0________
SOURCE: Schmahl (1994).

United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the economic well-being of retirees has
improved considerably over the past thirty years. Pensioners repre
sented 40 percent of the poorest tenth of the population in 1961, but
only around 20 percent in 1991. However, when comparing over a
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more recent period, an increasing number are living below the poverty
threshold, which is half the national average income. 1 Between 1984
and 1991, the number of pensioners in poverty in the United Kingdom
rose from 1 million to 3.4 million. This happened in part because the
government indexed the flat rate pensions to prices rather than earnings
starting in 1980. In 1994, the flat rate pension paid 4,789 pounds per
year (about $7,200) to married couples. Strong earnings growth after
1984 thus put more elderly into poverty when measured relative to
earnings (Jenkins 1994).
Employer-provided pensions are much more important in the United
Kingdom than in Germany; they are similar to those provided by social
security. In 1989, the average weekly basic pension from social secu
rity was 42 pounds. In 1987, the average weekly pension was 48
pounds from employer-provided plans—57 pounds for plans for pub
lic-sector employees and 38 pounds for plans for private-sector
employees (apRoberts and Reynaud 1992). However, because only
roughly half the labor force is covered by an employer-provided pen
sion, many retirees do not receive that type of benefit.
Table 8.2 presents a slightly different view of retirement income in
the United Kingdom, averaging benefit amounts over all household
units that receive a retirement pension, and including the earningsrelated pension in the measure of social security benefits. The percent
age of retirement income from social security has declined over time,
but in 1988 still accounted for slightly over half of the income of fam
ily units receiving a pension. The percentage of retirement income
from occupational pensions has increased considerably, and in 1988
was nearly half as large as that provided by social security.

United States
Wide differences persist in the economic well-being of older Ameri
cans. Such differences occur across age, race, gender, and marital sta
tus. While the economic well-being of the aged has improved
considerably, the poverty rate for the aged is greater than for other
adult age groups.
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Table 8.2 The Percentage of Retirement Income Received From
Different Sources in the United Kingdom, 1980,1984,1988
(percent and pounds per week in 1988 pounds)
Source
1984
1980
1988
Social security
61%
61%
51%
61.2
53.8
60.7
Employer-provided pensions
18%
16%
23%
18.2
13.8
27.7
13%
11%
Savings income
17%
12.7
20.0
10.0
Earnings
8%
11%
8%
9.7
8.2
9.9
Total gross income
100%
100%
100%
118.1
100.4
87.5
92%
Total net income
90%
93%
92.3
106.3
81.3
SAMPLE: Family units receiving retirement income.
SOURCE: Family Expenditure Survey, compiled in Daykin (1994).

This section evaluates the adequacy of cash retirement income for
U.S. retirees.2 Special attention is paid to characteristics of retirees
whose retirement income may be inadequate.
Even as older Americans have seen their income from earnings
decline, their economic status has been improving, both absolutely and
relative to the rest of the population. This improvement is largely due
to social security, which was enacted in 1935 as the foundation of
retirement income in the United States. Though social security is not
universal, more than 90 percent of retirees aged 65 and older receive
social security benefits, and it is now the most important source of
retirement income for most retirees.3
As in other developed countries, the system of providing retirement
income in the United States is often described as a three-legged stool,
meaning that there are three primary sources of retirement income.
However, except for white married couples, less than half of all race
and marital status groups receive retirement income from all three
sources (Grad 1992). Roughly 60 percent of nonmarried males and 70
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percent of nonmarried females receive no income from an employerprovided pension.
The probability of pension coverage differs greatly between
employment in the public and private sectors. Employer pensions are
almost universally provided to federal, state, and local government
employees, who are 17 percent of the labor force. Pension coverage is
much less common among private-sector workers.
The pattern of pension coverage repeats in the receipt of benefits. In
1992, 92 percent of "aged households" received social security retire
ment benefits, 32 percent received private pension benefits and 15 per
cent received a pension based on government employment. "Aged
households" refers to a married couple living together where at least
one is age 65 or older or to a nonmarried person age 65 or older. The
statistics on employer-provided pensions imply that no more than 47
percent of aged households received income from an employer-pro
vided pension. In addition, 67 percent of aged households received
income from savings, and 20 percent received earnings from a job
(table 8.3).
Table 8.3 Percentage of Aged Households Receiving Income From
______Different Sources in the United States, 1962-1992_____
Income source
Percentage of households receiving
1962
1971
1980
1990
1992
Social security
69
87
90
92
92
9
17
Private pensions
22
30
32
5
6
Government employee pension
12
15
15
54
49
66
68
Savings
67
36
31
23
Work
22
20
SOURCES: Grad (1992, 1994), Chen (1992).
NOTE: "Aged household" refers to a household where at least one member is age 65 or older.

Another way to look at sources of retirement income is to rank them
according to the total dollars they provide. In 1992, the three primary
sources of retirement income—social security, asset income, and
employer-provided pensions—provided 40, 21, and 19 percent, respec
tively, of the income of aged households. Earnings from a current job

140 The Adequacy of Retirement Income

also accounted for 17 percent of income (Grad 1994). Thus, while
earnings from employment are excluded from the image of the retire
ment income stool, they are nonetheless an important source of income
for older Americans.
Only in the highest income quintile is social security not the domi
nant source of income. It accounts for more than three-fourths of
aggregate income for retirees in the lowest two income quintiles. How
ever, the percentage of retirement income provided by social security
declined from 39 percent in 1980 to 36 percent in 1990, but jumped to
40 percent in 1992.
The Internal Revenue Code prohibits benefits from a defined benefit
plan while a participant is working on the job providing the pension.
However, employment earnings are received by 50 percent of married
couples age 65 to 69 from jobs taken following retirement from a
career job or from a working spouse.4
Less than half of older Americans receive retirement income from
an employer-provided pension.5 However, that percentage has grown
steadily since the mid-1970s. The percentage of aged households
receiving income from an employer-provided pension increases with
age for Americans age 55 to 64 as active workers retire, while the per
centage of aged households receiving income from an employer-pro
vided pension declines with age for Americans age 65 and older.
A major distinguishing characteristic between the poor and affluent
aged is that the poor generally do not receive employer-provided pen
sion benefits, while the affluent do. Pensions are an important supple
ment to social security for both middle- and upper-income elderly.
They accounted for 16 percent of aggregate income for those in the
middle-income quintile and 38 percent of income of those in highestincome quintile. In the top-income quintile, 30 percent received bene
fits from a pension based on government employment, and 45 percent
received a pension based on private-sector employment. This compares
to 2 percent for a government-sector pension and 5 percent for a pri
vate pension in the bottom-income quintile. The top-income quintile of
the older population received 57 percent of all employer pension pay
outs, while the bottom two income quintiles of the older population
received only 4 percent.
Even though private pensions are an increasingly important source
of retirement income, they are not about to supplant social security as
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the major source. In 1992, private pensions were 50 percent or more of
retirement income for only 3 percent of aged households. Pension
income among the aged that receive it is generally a small proportion
of their income. In comparison, social security accounted for 50 per
cent or more of retirement income for 59 percent of aged households
and accounted for 90 percent or more of retirement income for 23 per
cent of aged households. For households aged 75 and older, social
security accounted for 90 percent or more of income for 24 percent.
Traditionally, retirees in the United States have received pension
benefits as an annuity, rather than as a lump-sum payment. The receipt
of retirement benefits as a lump sum, however, is increasingly com
mon. This trend is at least partly due to the increasing popularity of
defined contribution plans. For pension recipients age 60 to 64 in 1989,
60 percent received an annuity only, 29 percent received a lump sum
only, and 12 percent received both (Beller and McCarthy 1992).
While the real pension benefits of men have increased, the real pen
sion benefits of women declined during the 1980s. Comparing pen
sioners who first received private pension benefits in 1978 and 1989,
median real benefits of men rose 6 percent, while median real benefits
of women fell 17 percent. These changes caused the median benefits of
women to fall as a percentage of men's from 47 percent in 1978 to 37
percent in 1989. This fall was not caused by a relative decline in the
earnings of women covered by pensions, nor by a decline in their rela
tive job tenure. The median earnings of these women rose from 58 to
65 percent of the median for men. The causes of the fall have not been
determined (Beller and McCarthy 1992).
Over the 1980s, real benefits declined in manufacturing industries,
while they rose in nonmanufacturing. Analysis by industry indicates
that, for reasons not yet deciphered, female pensioners suffered greater
losses than males in real pension benefits in the manufacturing sector.
One measure of the adequacy of pension benefit levels is the per
centage of a worker's final earnings replaced by the pension. Using this
measure, private pensions in the United States provide a median wage
replacement rate of 23 percent. Most private pension recipients older
than age 62 also receive social security benefits. For them, the median
replacement rate for both benefits combined is 66 percent (Beller and
McCarthy 1992).
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The median private pension wage replacement rate for men was 26
percent, compared to 17 percent for women. The lower replacement
rate for women is at least partly due to their shorter job tenure, which
occurs in part because women change jobs more frequently than men.
However, the combined replacement rate for private pension benefits
and social security benefits was higher for women (a median of 63 per
cent) than for men (59 percent). The explanation for this reversal is that
social security provides higher replacement rates for lower-wage work
ers than for higher-wage workers.

Comparisons
The percentage of retirement income accounted for by employerprovided pensions varies across countries (table 8.4). In the mid-1980s,
it was nearly twice as high in the Netherlands as in the United States.
The level in Canada and the United States is about the same. In all
countries, single women receive a somewhat smaller percentage of
their retirement income from employer-provided pensions than do
other elderly households.
Table 8.4 The Percentage Employer-Provided Pension Benefits Are of
Income for Households Aged 65 and Older in Selected
Countries, 1985-1987
Pension benefits as a percentage
Country
Year
of retirement income
All households
Single women
1985
14.0
5.4
Australia
1987
Canada
11.9
9.5
1987
22.1
Netherlands
15.5
1986
14.1
United Kingdom
9.8
1986
11.3
United States
8.7
SOURCE: Smeeding, Torrey, and Rainwater (1993).

A comparison of retirement income levels across countries shows
that married retired couples in the United States have relatively high
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retirement incomes, while older single women fair relatively poorly
(Smeeding, Torrey, and Rainwater 1993). The gap between the top and
the bottom of the aged income distribution is larger in the United States
than in other developed countries. Receipt of pensions is much more
prevalent among couples than among singles and among younger
households than older.

Conclusions
There are major differences across gender and marital status groups
in the probability of receiving an employer-provided pension. Data for
the United States clearly indicate that the image of retirement income
as a three-legged stool only applies for white married couples. It does
not apply for the majority of the members of all other race and marital
status groups. For all other groups, less than 50 percent receive retire
ment income from an employer-provided pension. Because for most
other countries the percentage of the labor force covered by a private
pension and the percentage of total retirement income provided by a
private pension are at the same level or lower than the United States, it
probably also holds that the prevalent image of retirement income as
having three parts generally does not apply, except for privileged
groups.

NOTES
1. The poverty threshold in the United States is calculated as three times minimum food
expenditures.
2. A complete evaluation of the economic status of the aged would also discuss noncash
income, such as the value of government- or employer-provided health insurance or the imputed
rental value of owner-occupied housing. When noncash income is also considered, the measured
relative economic status of the aged generally improves. Further considerations include the wealth
holdings of the elderly and their consumption needs.
3. Civilian employees of the federal government were not covered by social security until Jan
uary 1, 1984, when coverage was required for those hired after that date. Since 1950, state and
local government employees have been covered under social security at the option of the govern
mental entity for which they work Approximately seven in ten state and local government
employees are covered by social security. Those not covered generally have pension plans that
substitute for both social security and private pensions.
4. The statistics in this section are taken from Grad (1994).
5. Employer-provided pensions include private pensions and pensions provided by federal,
state, and local governments to their employees.

9
Trends in Pensions
Retirement income systems evolve with changes in the economic
and demographic environment that shapes them. The trend away from
reliance on family and toward reliance on government that marked the
middle years of this century, following the Great Depression and the
end of World War II, is being replaced by a trend toward greater reli
ance on private sector individual or employer-provided pension plans.
This change is occurring in the United States, Japan, the United King
dom, and many other countries.
It is useful to examine how policy makers have responded to similar
problems in different countries. Pension systems can be highly com
plex, and sometimes policy makers have a large number of options to
consider when facing a particular problem. Policy makers in different
countries have developed a great variety of incentives and regulatory
structures in an effort to encourage the accrual of adequate private pen
sion benefits and to control the risks that are inherent in such systems.
Cultural differences in attitudes toward savings, work, and retire
ment may cause pension systems to have different economic effects on
the behavior of workers and firms in different countries. For example,
cultural differences in family responsibility for the elderly may cause
the demand for private pensions to differ across countries. Cultural dif
ferences in responsibility to society and its rules may cause differences
in the extent to which regulatory safeguards and legal enforcement of
pension laws are required across countries. For these reasons, not every
aspect of foreign experience is useful in analyzing domestic pension
policy issues. Nonetheless, in all countries firms and workers respond
to economic incentives imbedded in pension systems.

A Selective Summary of Pension Trends
First, there appears to be a long-term trend towards greater privatiza
tion of retirement income. Chile has a system of retirement income that
is nearly entirely privatized, and other countries have adopted partial
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versions of its system. The United Kingdom and Japan both allow for
partial privatization of their social security systems through an
approach they call "contracting out," but which is known in the United
States (in the context of health care) as "pay or play." Sweden plans to
partially privatize its social security system starting in 1996 by estab
lishing mandatory funded individual accounts. Germany has a priva
tized system of pension benefit insurance. The United States does not
have explicit institutions for privatizing aspects of retirement income,
though in the more general sense its tax subsidy for private pensions
has the effect of partial privatization. The integration of pension bene
fits in the United States, however, is a means of de-privatizing retire
ment income.
Second, the aging of populations in developed countries is raising
the cost of social security systems, but it is also making the tax subsi
dies to support private pension systems more expensive. Presumably in
response to cost increases, a number of countries have reduced the gen
erosity of their tax subsidies for pensions. At the same time they have
reduced the generosity of their social security systems.
Third, in many countries, there is a trend towards defined contribu
tion plans. In some cases, this is at least partly the result of increasing
regulation of defined benefit plans. In other cases, it is the result of
government policy mandating the provision of defined contribution
plans.
Fourth, more countries are providing insurance or a guarantee of
pension benefits. These guarantees usually apply to defined benefit
plans, but also apply to defined contribution plans in some countries.
However, only two countries—the United States and Japan—insure
funded defined benefit plans, and the United States has the only
national program that has had an insurance claim for underfunding.
Other countries insure book reserve funds against firm bankruptcy. The
province of Ontario has a benefit insurance program similar to that of
the United States and has had claims against its system.
Fifth, increasingly pension plans are investing in foreign securities.
The regulations inhibiting foreign pension investments in some coun
tries have been reduced or eliminated. In other countries, the increase
seems to be driven by a realization of the financial benefits afforded by
the greater diversification that international investing provides.
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Sixth, many countries have taken steps to reduce the loss of benefits
suffered by workers who change jobs. Portability has been enhanced
by reducing the years required for vesting, and in some countries by
indexing (up to a ceiling inflation rate) the benefits of workers leaving
a job before retirement age.
Seventh, in most countries with pension systems the coverage rate
of workers has increased over the past twenty years. In some countries,
this trend has stabilized or perhaps slightly reversed in more recent
years.

Conclusion
This book provides policy makers in various countries with informa
tion on a wide range of approaches for resolving pension policy issues.
Providing an adequate, secure, and equitable retirement income for all
elderly individuals and families should be the goal of every retirement
income system. Because resources are limited, accomplishing this goal
efficiently is a challenge facing policy makers. A careful analysis of the
pension policies and practices of other countries can aid policy makers
in their efforts to develop or improve their private pension systems.
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